# Tractatus De Fide Theologica. In 2. 2. Div. Thom. Ad illustrissimum d. d., Tract De Fide (*Treatise on Theological Faith. In 2. 2. Div. Thom. To the Most Illustrious, Tract on Faith*)

**by Fr. Francisco Palanco, 1701**

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## Disp. III, Quaest. XI

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| *Latin* |  | *English* |
| *AN HAEC PROPOSITIO: INNOCENTIUS XII. est verus Papa sit immediate de fide?* |  | *WHETHER THIS PROPOSITION: INNOCENT XII is the true Pope is immediately of faith?* |
| 1. QUAMVIS huius quaestionis resolutio communis, & uniformis iam sit inter Theologos pro parte affirmativa, nihilominus difficillima est, propter difficilia argumenta, & haud facilem eius probationem. Ut tamen in ea clarius procedamus. |  | **1.** ALTHOUGH the resolution of this question is now common and uniform among Theologians in favor of the affirmative position, nevertheless it is most difficult, due to challenging arguments and its not easily established proof. However, so that we may proceed more clearly in this matter. |
| *Aliqua praemittuntur.* |  | *Some preliminary points.* |
| 2. SUPPONENDUM est primo, posse dari electionem Papae, vel irritam, & invalidam, vel dubiam. Hoc quidem experientia ipsa docet, desumpta ex electionibus illis, quibus in Ecclesia subsequuta sunt schismata circa verum Pontificem agnoscendum, aliis unum, aliis alium ut legitimum acceptantibus, ut contigit tempore Concilii Constantiensis, quando Ecclesia divisa per factiones tres Pontifices praetensos habebat, quos ipsum Concilium declaravit nullos, vel eos deposuit: Si autem electio certò valida fuisset in aliquo, & minimè dubia, talis in Ecclesia divisio non fuisset, nec necessitas congregandi Concilium ad discernendum de vero Papa. |  | **2.** IT MUST BE SUPPOSED first, that a papal election can be either null and invalid, or doubtful. This indeed experience itself teaches, as evidenced from those elections which were followed in the Church by schisms concerning the recognition of the true Pontiff, with some accepting one, others another as legitimate, as happened during the time of the Council of Constance, when the Church, divided by factions, had three pretended Pontiffs, whom the Council itself declared null, or deposed them: If, however, the election had been certainly valid in any one case, and minimally doubtful, such a division in the Church would not have occurred, nor would there have been a necessity of convening a Council to discern the true Pope. |
| 3. Sed inquires, ex quo Capite electio Papae vitiari, aut invalidari potest? Ratio dubitandi est, nam imprimis ex parte eligentium videtur non posse invalidari: Eligentes enim sunt Cardinales, quibus Ecclesia suam potestatem electivam commisit; sed his nulla potest objici exceptio: Ergò ex parte eorum invalidari nequit. Minor probatur, quia imprimis nequit illis opponi censura ulla, aut excommunicatio, nam est privilegium huius electionis, quod nullus elector impediri possit à iure eligendi propter censuram ullam, ut expressè traditur, *in Clement*. *Ne Romani §. Ceterum, de electione*. Quod ita merito statutum est, ut in electione, a qua totum Ecclesiae regimen pendet, vitaretur schisma, dubietas, aut incertitudo. Deinde nec potest opponi, quod electio facta sit per fraudem, violentiam, aut ambitionem, nam haec exceptio non admittitur, sed repellitur, *in cap. in Nomine, distinct. 23*. quando Papa invenitur electus a duabus ex tribus partibus Cardinalium, ut de facto fiunt Papae electiones: Nulla ergo exceptio opponi potest. Et confirmatur, quia certissimum est, atque omnibus exploratum ei electioni assistere Spiritum Sanctum: Sed electio, in qua certissima assistit Spiritus Sanctus, certissime valida est, & minime potest esse dubia, aut invalida: Ergo. Major probatur, ex *Sixti V. Const. 50*. ubi de Cardinalibus congregatis ad Papam eligendum sic ait: *In illa Sacra electione censendi sunt veri Interpretes, atque internuntij voluntatis divinae, cuius Spiritu, sicut universum Ecclesiae Corpus sanctificatur, & regitur, ita maxime hoc totum eiusmodi electionis opus eiusdem afflatu, & instinctu absolvi certissimum est, atque omnibus exploratum*: Ergo certissimum est, atque omnibus exploratum, &c. |  | **3.** But you may ask, on what grounds can a papal election be vitiated or invalidated? The reason for doubt is that, first of all, it seems it cannot be invalidated on the part of the electors: For the electors are Cardinals, to whom the Church has committed its elective power; but no objection can be raised against them: Therefore, the election cannot be invalidated on their part. The minor premise is proven because, primarily, no censure or excommunication can be brought against them, for it is a privilege of this election that no elector can be prevented from the right of electing because of any censure, as is expressly stated in *Clement*. *Ne Romani §. Ceterum, de electione* [the Clementine decree “Ne Romani,” section “Furthermore,” concerning election]. This was justly established so that in the election, upon which the entire governance of the Church depends, schism, doubt, or uncertainty might be avoided. Furthermore, neither can it be objected that the election was conducted through fraud, violence, or ambition, for this objection is not admitted but is rejected, as stated *in cap. in Nomine, distinct. 23* [in the chapter “In the Name,” distinction 23], when the Pope is found to have been elected by two-thirds of the Cardinals, as papal elections are in fact conducted: Therefore, no objection can be raised. And this is confirmed because it is most certain and evident to all that the Holy Spirit assists in this election: But an election in which the Holy Spirit most certainly assists is most certainly valid, and can in no way be doubtful or invalid: Therefore. The major premise is proven from *Sixtus V’s Constitution 50*, where he says thus concerning the Cardinals gathered to elect a Pope: *In that Sacred election they are to be considered true Interpreters and intermediaries of the divine will, by whose Spirit, just as the entire Body of the Church is sanctified and governed, so especially this entire work of election is most certainly and evidently to all completed by His inspiration and prompting*: Therefore it is most certain and evident to all, etc. |
| 4. Verumtamen dico, quod licet ex praefatis exceptionibus vitiari non possit. Potest tamen invalida esse, aut dubia electio illa, primo si non fiat a legitimis Electoribus, nempe si fieret ab aliquibus non Cardinalibus, intrusis tamen absque Ecclesiae consensu. Secundo, quamvis fiat a Cardinalibus, si fiat per metum cadentem inconstantem virum, quia tunc declaratur ut nulla *in Concil. Constantiensi Sess. 39*. Similiter, si a duabus partibus Cardinalium non sit electus, ut habetur, *in Constit. Iulij II*. quae incipit: *Cum tam divina, Anno 1505*. Aut si aliquis ex illis duabus partibus non esset vere Cardinalis, ut colligitur *ex Abbate in c. licet, de Electione*. Tertio, si electus sit haereticus manifestus, ut constat ex dicta *Constit*. Quinto, si non esset vir, si esset iudicio privatus, aut pateretur aliam exceptionem iuris naturalis, quae ipsum incapacem redderet Pontificatus, nam istae exceptiones reddunt electionem nullam ex parte electi. Quaelibet ergo ex his exceptionibus, si certo concurreret in electione, faceret electionem certo nullam. Si autem dubium foret ex ratione gravi, & prudenti, an concurrisset, faceret electionem dubiam: Ad confirmationem in contra dico, talem assistentiam Spiritus Sancti non esse certissimam, nisi postquam constat electionem esse pacifice consummatum, & promulgatam, in hoc enim sensu loquitur Sixtus V, & inde posset nos etiam certitudinem illius electionis comprobabimus, inquit enim quod electionis opus eiusdem afflatu, & instinctu absolvi certissimum est, non autem absolvitur, dum pacifice non consummatur, & promulgatur, acceptate Ecclesia; Potest autem non consummari pacifice, sed cum dubio, & tunc est, quando potest esse nulla, vel dubia. |  | **4.** Nevertheless, I say that although it cannot be vitiated by the aforementioned exceptions, such an election can still be invalid or doubtful: first, if it is not conducted by legitimate Electors—for instance, if it were carried out by some who are not Cardinals, but intruders without the Church’s consent. Second, even if it is conducted by Cardinals, if it is done under fear that would overcome a steadfast man, because then it is declared null *in the Council of Constance, Session 39*. Similarly, if the person is not elected by two-thirds of the Cardinals, as stated *in the Constitution of Julius II* which begins: *Cum tam divina, in the Year 1505*. Or if any of those constituting the two-thirds were not truly Cardinals, as is gathered *from Abbate in c. licet, on Election*. Third, if the elected person is a manifest heretic, as established in the said *Constitution*. Fifth, if the person were not a man, if he were deprived of judgment, or if he suffered from some other exception of natural law that would render him incapable of the Pontificate, for these exceptions render the election null on the part of the elect. Any of these exceptions, if it were certainly present in the election, would make the election certainly null. But if there were doubt based on serious and prudent reasoning whether such an exception were present, it would make the election doubtful. To the contrary argument, I say that such assistance of the Holy Spirit is not entirely certain until it is established that the election has been peacefully consummated and promulgated. It is in this sense that Sixtus V speaks, and from there we could also verify the certainty of that election. For he says that it is most certain that the work of election is completed by the inspiration and instinct of the Holy Spirit, but it is not completed while it is not peacefully consummated and promulgated, with the Church’s acceptance. However, it may not be peacefully consummated, but with doubt, and this is when it can be null or doubtful. |
| 5. Suppono secundo, esse immediate de fide hanc universalem: Omnis rite electus in Papam est verus Papa. Ita omnes Catholici, & colligitur ex dictis potissime quaest.8. nam ex ea constat esse de fide divina, ex Christi institutione, & revelatione simul cum perpetua Ecclesiae traditione, residere Dignitatem Pontificiam D. Petri in omnibus eius legitimis Successoribus; ac proinde omnem legitimum Div. Petri Successorem esse verum Papam, seu Pastorem universalis Ecclesiae; cum autem ex Christi ipsius institutione Successores Div. Petri designentur per electionem, ut ex quaest. praecedenti, constat; consequens est, quod de fide sit omnem rite electum esse verum Papam, seu Pastorem universalis Ecclesiae: Unde de hac universali inter Catholicos nemo dubitat. |  | **5.** I suppose secondly, that it is immediately of faith this universal proposition: Every one rightly elected as Pope is the true Pope. Thus all Catholics hold, and it is gathered from what has been said especially in question 8. For from this it is established to be of divine faith, by Christ’s institution and revelation together with the perpetual tradition of the Church, that the Pontifical Dignity of St. Peter resides in all his legitimate Successors; and consequently every legitimate Successor of St. Peter is the true Pope, or Pastor of the universal Church. Since, moreover, by Christ’s own institution, the Successors of St. Peter are designated by election, as is established from the preceding question, it consequently follows that it is of faith that everyone rightly elected is the true Pope, or Pastor of the universal Church. Hence, concerning this universal proposition, no Catholic doubts. |
| 6. Suppono tertio, non esse de fide, quando electio, vel certo est nulla, vel dubia in Ecclesia, electum esse verum Papam. Ita etiam absque controversia omnes Catholici, quia si certo electio est nulla, certo etiam electus non est Papa, si vero sit dubia, eo ipso, vel non est verus Papa, quia ut aliqui existimant Papa dubius in Ecclesia non est verus Papa, vel dato, quod esset verus Papa, non est propositus Ecclesiae cum sufficienti certitudine ut debeat credi per fidem divinam talis. |  | **6.** I suppose thirdly, that it is not of faith, when an election is either certainly null or doubtful in the Church, that the one elected is the true Pope. Thus also without controversy all Catholics hold, because if the election is certainly null, then certainly the one elected is not Pope; if indeed it is doubtful, by that very fact, either he is not the true Pope, because as some believe, a doubtful Pope in the Church is not a true Pope, or granted that he would be the true Pope, he is not proposed to the Church with sufficient certainty such that he ought to be believed through divine faith to be such. |
| 7. Quaestio ergo solum habet locum, quando supponitur rite electus, & ut talis sine dubio, & sine schismate propositus, & acceptatus ab Ecclesia, an scilicet tunc sit de fide divina immediate ipsum in singulari nominatum esse verum Papam. |  | **7.** The question therefore only has relevance when one who is supposed to be rightly elected, and as such without doubt and without schism has been proposed to and accepted by the Church, whether namely then it is of immediate divine faith that this specifically named individual is the true Pope. |
| 8. Ante cuius resolutionem, praemittit Ioann. a S. Thom. in praesenti, quod dupliciter potest aliquid esse de fide, nempe, vel per se primo, id est (explicat ipse) immediate; vel per se secundo, id est, mediate: Illud est de fide per se primo, & immediate, quod immediate creditur per lumen fidei, tamquam immediate a Deo revelatum: Illud vero tantum est de fide per se secundo, & mediate, quod tantum virtualiter continetur in obiecto immediate revelato, & ex illo deducitur veluti conclusio Theologica, & hoc non pertinet ad lumen fidei, sed ad lumen Theologicum. De quo vide supra, disp. 1. quaest. 7. a num. 1. & 21. Quaestio ergo praesens inquirit, an sit immediate, seu per se primo de fide praedicta propositio: Rursus, dupliciter potest esse aliquid de fide, vel quoad se, vel quoad nos. Illud est de fide quoad se, sed non quoad nos, quod re ipsa revelatum est in Sacra Scriptura, sed ut sic revelatum nondum est definitum, nec propositum ab Ecclesia, & sic de pluribus censent Theologi esse immediate in Scripturis revelata, ut quod gratia sit qualitas, quod efficacia gratiae sit independens a consensu libero voluntatis, quod Deus ante praevisa merita eligat praedestinatos ad Gloriam, & alia huiusmodi, quae tamen non sunt de fide quoad nos, quia Ecclesia hoc non definivit. Illud autem est de fide, etiam quoad nos, quod non solum est revelatum a Deo, sed ut sic revelatum proponitur Fidelibus ab Ecclesia. |  | **8.** Before resolving this question, John of St. Thomas makes a preliminary distinction in the present discussion, noting that something can be a matter of faith in two ways, namely, either per se primo, that is (as he explains), immediately; or per se secundo, that is, mediately. Something is a matter of faith per se primo and immediately when it is directly believed through the light of faith as something immediately revealed by God. On the other hand, something is a matter of faith per se secundo and mediately when it is only virtually contained in an object immediately revealed, and is deduced from it as a theological conclusion; this pertains not to the light of faith, but to theological reasoning. On this matter, see above, disputation 1, question 7, from numbers 1 and 21. The present question, therefore, inquires whether the aforementioned proposition is immediately, or per se primo, a matter of faith. Furthermore, something can be a matter of faith in two ways: either in itself (quoad se) or in relation to us (quoad nos). Something is a matter of faith in itself, but not in relation to us, when it is actually revealed in Sacred Scripture, but has not yet been defined or proposed by the Church as being so revealed. Thus, theologians consider many things to be immediately revealed in Scripture—such as that grace is a quality, that the efficacy of grace is independent of the free consent of the will, that God chooses the predestined for Glory before foreseeing their merits, and other such matters—which nevertheless are not matters of faith in relation to us, because the Church has not defined them as such. That, however, is a matter of faith even in relation to us, which is not only revealed by God but, as so revealed, is proposed to the faithful by the Church. |
| 9. Adhuc tamen subdistinguit Ioan. a S. Thom. quod inter ea, quae sunt de fide quoad nos, alia sunt de fide quoad aliquos, nempe Sapientes, alia quoad omnes: Ea sunt de fide quoad omnes, quae ab omnibus sine controversia habentur ut revelata, & definita ab Ecclesia, ut Mysterium Trinitatis, & Incarnationis. Ea vero solum quoad aliquos Sapientes, quae non ita clare sunt revelata, & definita, quod non sit inter Sapientes de hoc controversia (saepe enim Sapientes concertat de aliqua propositione an sit revelata immediate, & ut talis definita ab Ecclesia, vel non, & consequenter an sit de fide; sicut de contraria, an sit haeretica, vel non, & tunc licet talis propositio directe de fide sit, tamen propositio reflexa dicens illam esse de fide, de fide non est. |  | **9.** Nevertheless, John of St. Thomas further distinguishes that among those things which are of faith for us, some are of faith for certain individuals, namely the Learned, while others are of faith for all: Those matters are of faith for all which are held without controversy by everyone as revealed and defined by the Church, such as the Mystery of the Trinity and the Incarnation. Those matters, however, are of faith only for certain Learned individuals, which are not so clearly revealed and defined that there is no controversy about this among the Learned (for often the Learned dispute about some proposition as to whether it is immediately revealed, and as such defined by the Church, or not, and consequently whether it is of faith; just as concerning its contrary, whether it is heretical or not, and then although such a proposition may directly be of faith, nevertheless the reflexive proposition stating that it is of faith, is not itself of faith). |
| 10. Insuper maxime praenotandum duxi, licet id in aliis praenotatum non viderim, quod dupliciter potest aliquid esse de fide immediate, & quoad nos, nempe vel absolute, vel conditionate. Illud est de fide conditionate, quod tantum credi potest, & debet fide divina obiective conditionata: Illud est de fide divina absolute, quod credi potest, & debet fide divina obiective absoluta. Quod adhuc stat dupliciter, quia fides divina obiective conditionata, vel potest esse tacite solum conditionata, vel expresse; tunc est expresse conditionata, quando prudenter dubitari potest de conditione, ut si adessent rationes dubitandi prudenter de validitate Baptismi alicuius infantis, tunc posset credi fide divina obiective conditionata, exprimendo conditionem, nempe, si est valide baptizatus, ipsum esse in gratia: Tunc est solum tacite conditionata, quando prudenter dubitari nequit de conditione, sed tamen conditio non manet omnino certa, sed cum contingentia, & possibilitate falsitatis, ut cum nulla ad est ratio dubitandi, nec suspicandi Baptismum infantis non esse validum, sed tamen quia de hoc non est infallibilis certitudo, sed semper cum contingentia aliqua, & possibilitate ad oppositum, fides divina de eo quod infans ille baptizatus sit in gratia, est tacite, seu implicite conditionata. Itemque fides divina potest esse obiective absoluta, vel intrinsece, vel extrinsece: Tunc est obiective absoluta intrinsece, quando nec implicite, nec explicite est conditionata, quia videlicet ex modo intrinseco tendendi omnino absolute, & cum securitate, & infallibilitate absoluta assentitur obiecto: Tunc solum est absoluta extrinsece, quanto ex modo intrinseco tendendi non importat illam securitatem, & infallibilitatem absolutam, sed solum sub tacita conditione, conditio tamen creditur impleta fide humana, vel alio lumine fallibili, quia tunc per fidem, aut iudicium de conditione impleta, fides divina, alias intrinsece, & implicite conditionata, redditur extrinsece absoluta. Quae doctrina constat ex dictis supra, disp. 1. quaest. 9. a num. 61. 68. 76. &c. |  | **10.** Moreover, I have deemed it most necessary to note beforehand, although I have not seen it noted by others, that something can be of immediate faith, and known to us, in two ways, namely either absolutely or conditionally. That which is of faith conditionally is what can only be believed, and must be believed, with a divinely objective conditional faith. That which is of absolute divine faith is what can be believed, and must be believed, with a divinely objective absolute faith. This further occurs in two ways, because divinely objective conditional faith can be either tacitly conditional or expressly conditional. It is expressly conditional when one can prudently doubt the condition, as when there are reasons to prudently doubt the validity of the baptism of a certain infant. In such a case, one could believe with a divinely objective conditional faith, explicitly expressing the condition, namely, if he is validly baptized, that he is in a state of grace. It is only tacitly conditional when one cannot prudently doubt the condition, yet nevertheless the condition is not entirely certain, but remains with contingency and the possibility of falsehood, as when there is no reason to doubt or suspect that an infant’s baptism is invalid. Yet because there is no infallible certainty about this, but always some contingency and possibility of the opposite, the divine faith regarding whether that baptized infant is in a state of grace is tacitly or implicitly conditional. Likewise, divine faith can be objectively absolute, either intrinsically or extrinsically. It is intrinsically objectively absolute when it is neither implicitly nor explicitly conditional, because by its intrinsic mode of operation it assents to the object entirely absolutely, with absolute security and infallibility. It is only extrinsically absolute when, from its intrinsic mode of operation, it does not convey that absolute security and infallibility, but only under a tacit condition. However, the condition is believed to be fulfilled through human faith or some other fallible light, because then, through faith or judgment about the fulfilled condition, divine faith—otherwise intrinsically and implicitly conditional—is rendered extrinsically absolute. This doctrine is established from what was said above, in disputation 1, question 9, from numbers 61, 68, 76, etc. |
| 11. Igitur sine controversia certum est inter Catholicos, esse de fide, saltem sub tacita conditione, propositionem de qua est quaestio, nempe si Innocentius sit ricte electus, & consequenter esse etiam de fide absolute, saltem extrinsece, quia hoc nihil aliud importat, quam esse de fide illam universalem: *Omnis rite electus est Summus Pontifex*, & credi per humanam fidem, & certitudinem moralem, Innocentium esse rite electum, absque ulla ratione prudenter dubitandi, aut suspicandi oppositum: Hoc autem, supposita pacifica acceptatione, ut modo supponitur, a nullo Catholico negatur, sed nec negari potest. |  | **11.** Therefore, it is certain beyond controversy among Catholics that the proposition in question is a matter of faith, at least under tacit condition, namely, if Innocent has been rightly elected, and consequently it is also absolutely a matter of faith, at least extrinsically, because this imports nothing other than that this universal proposition is a matter of faith: “Everyone rightly elected is the Supreme Pontiff,” and it is believed through human faith and moral certainty that Innocent has been rightly elected, without any reason for prudently doubting or suspecting the opposite. This, however, given the peaceful acceptance that is now presumed, is denied by no Catholic, nor indeed can it be denied. |
| 12. Ex quo infero controversiam praesentem in eo potissimum consistere, an videlicet sit de fide divina immediate, & absolute sine conditione ulla, nec tacita, nec expressa, *Innocentium XII. esse verum Papam.* In qua quidem controversia partem negativam tenent ex Catholicis, Cardenalis Turrecremata, Caietanus, Castro, Cano, Corduba, Bañez, Malderus, Araujo. Quorum loca, & verba referunt PP. Salmant. in praesent. disp. 4. de Rom. Pont. a num. 28. Quin, & eam probabilem censent apud ipsos Azor, & Gonet. Pars tamen affirmativa iam est communis inter Theologos modernos. Pro qua sit. |  | **12.** From this I infer that the present controversy primarily consists in this: whether it is immediately and absolutely a matter of divine faith, without any condition, neither tacit nor expressed, that “Innocent XII is the true Pope.” In this controversy, the negative position is held by these Catholics: Cardinal Turrecremata [Juan de Torquemada], Cajetan [Thomas de Vio], Castro [Alfonso de Castro], Cano [Melchior Cano], Corduba [Antonio de Córdoba], Bañez [Domingo Bañez], Malderus [Jan Malderus], and Araujo [Francisco de Araujo]. Their passages and words are referenced by the Salmanticenses in the present disputation 4 on the Roman Pontiff, from number 28. Indeed, even Azor [Juan Azor] and Gonet [Jean-Baptiste Gonet] consider it probable, according to these same authors. The affirmative position, however, is now common among modern theologians. For which: |
| **13.** DICO igitur 1. De fide divina est immediate, & absolute Innocentium XII. esse verum Papam. Probatur primo: Quia Martinus V. in Concilio Constantiensi, in proscriptione errorum Ubicleph. Sess. 45. & ult. iubet, quod suspectis in fide, inter alias, haec interrogatio fiat: *Utrum credas quod Papa canonice electus, qui pro tempore fuerit, eius nomine proprio expresso, sit Successor B. Petri, habens Supremam Authoritatem in Ecclesia Dei*: Ergo suspectis in fide, eo tempore, quo regnat in Ecclesia Innocent. XII. debet interrogari, an credant, *quod Innocentius XII. est verus Petri Successor, &c.* Nam interrogatio debet fieri, proprio nomine Pontificis expresso, iuxta praedictum Decretum: Sed solum debet interrogati utrum credant quod immediate est de fide, nam quod tantum mediate est de fide, non creditur, sed Theologice ex creditis deducitur, & scitur: Ergo supponit Martinus V. cum Concilio esse immediate de fide in hoc temporis serie, quod Innocent. XII. est verus Pontifex. |  | **13.** I THEREFORE SAY 1. It is of divine faith immediately and absolutely that Innocent XII is the true Pope. This is proven first: Because Martin V in the Council of Constance, in the proscription of the errors of Wycliffe, Session 45 and last, commands that this interrogation, among others, be made to those suspected in the faith: *“Whether you believe that the canonically elected Pope, whoever he may be at the time, with his proper name expressed, is the Successor of Blessed Peter, having Supreme Authority in the Church of God”*: Therefore, those suspected in the faith, in this time when Innocent XII reigns in the Church, should be asked whether they believe *“that Innocent XII is the true Successor of Peter, etc.”* For the interrogation must be made with the proper name of the Pontiff expressed, according to the aforementioned Decree. But they should only be questioned whether they believe what is immediately of faith, for what is only mediately of faith is not believed, but is theologically deduced and known from what is believed: Therefore Martin V with the Council presupposes that it is immediately of divine faith in this time that Innocent XII is the true Pontiff. |
| **14.** Dices ex PP. Salmant. in praesenti, quod credere non semper significat actum fidei immediate, sed potest ampliari ad assensum theologicum ex principijs fidei deductum; & sic ampliari potest in praedicto Decreto, quia illud formatum fuit contra asserta Ubicleph, quae non omnia erant immediate contra fidem, sed aliqua tantum mediate, id est, erronea, aliqua suspecta in fide, aut sapientia haeresim; unde cum sic suspecti interrogari iubentur de illis articulis, an credant, credere sumi potest in ampla significatione pro assentire. |  | **14.** You will say, following the Fathers of Salamanca in this matter, that “to believe” does not always signify an immediate act of faith, but can be extended to theological assent deduced from principles of faith; and thus it can be extended in the aforementioned Decree, because that Decree was formulated against the assertions of Wycliffe, which were not all immediately against the faith, but some only mediately, that is, erroneous, some suspect in faith, or savoring of heresy; thus when those under suspicion are ordered to be interrogated concerning these articles, as to whether they believe them, “to believe” can be taken in a broad sense as “to assent.” |
| 15. Sed contra, quia licet huiusmodi solutio sufficiat ad intentum PP. Salmant. nempe ut nostra sententia non intelligatur expresse definita in illo Decreto, ita quod sit de fide reflexe, de quo infra dicemus, tamen negari nequit, quod in illo Decreto, dum iubentur interrogari suspecti an credant, respectu aliquorum articulorum debet intelligi credere stricte, nempe immediate per fidem, potissime si articulus interrogationis sit talis, quod si non sit immediate de fide, nec mediate possit esse de fide: Sed talis est articulus iste, nempe quod *Pontifex praesens, proprio nomine expresso, sit verus Pontifex*, ut infra constabit: Ergo dum iubentur interrogari, an id credant, ly credant, debet intellegi de fide stricte, pro actu proprio fidei immediate. |  | **15.** But to the contrary, because although such a solution suffices for the intention of the Fathers of Salamanca, namely that our opinion not be understood as expressly defined in that Decree, such that it would reflexively be a matter of faith, about which we shall speak below, nevertheless it cannot be denied that in that Decree, when those under suspicion are ordered to be interrogated as to whether they believe, with respect to some articles it must be understood as believing strictly, namely immediately through faith, especially if the article of interrogation is such that if it is not immediately of faith, it cannot even mediately be of faith. But such is this article, namely that *the present Pontiff, expressly named, is the true Pontiff*, as will be established below. Therefore, when they are ordered to be interrogated whether they believe this, the term “believe” must be understood strictly concerning faith, as the proper act of faith immediately. |
| 16. Dices secundo, & urgentius; praedictum Decretum, ad summum probare quod articulus ille de vero Papa pro tempore existenti, sit immediate de fide sub tacita conditione, nempe si sit rite electus, non tamen omnino absolute, & sine ista conditione. Probabisque, quia etiam Ecclesia iubet infirmis, quibus administratur Viaticum, fieri hanc interrogationem inter alias, quae ad fidem spectant: *Credis, quod hoc, quod meis manibus teneo, est verum Corpus Christi?* Et tamen inde non infertur esse de fide omnino absolute in illa numero Hostia esse Corpus Christi, sed solum sub tacita conditione, ut supra explicabam, *disput. 2. quest. 4. a num. 12.* Ergo pariter, licet Martinus V. iubeat interrogari suspectos in fide, an credant hunc pro tempore existentem esse verum Pontificem. Sed contra, quia licet sit paritas in modo utriusque interrogationis, est tamen disparitas in fine, propter quem iubentur fieri illae interrogationes. Etenim illa interrogatio, quae fieri iubetur infirmo circa Hostiam singularem, non exigitur ut novum fidei articulum credat, sed solum ut fidem iam confessam in priori articulo, seu interrogatione, nempe quod Christus sit in qualibet Hostia rite Consecrata, applicet ad illam singularem Hostiam, & hoc eo fine ut eam cum singulari devotione recipiat, prout oportet; ad quod non requiritur quod illa applicatio fidei sit sine tacita conditione omnino absoluta, sed satis est, quod sit tacite conditionata, & extrinsece absoluta, modo explicato supra. At illa interrogatio, quam iubet fieri Martinus V. suspectis in fide, fieri iubetur, ut examinentur in fide, & circa Supremam regulam visibilem animatam illius, an videlicet circa illam habeant debitam firmitatem; ad hoc autem opus est, ut infra ostendam, quod circa praesentem Papam in singulari habeant firmam fidem absolute, & sine ulla tacita conditione; unde cum exigitur ut credant ipsum in singulari esse verum Papam, debet intelligi *de credere*, seu de fide omnino absoluta, & sine tacita conditione. |  | **16.** You will say secondly, and more urgently: the aforementioned Decree proves at most that the article concerning the true Pope existing at a given time is immediately of faith under a tacit condition, namely if he has been rightly elected, but not entirely absolutely and without that condition. You may prove this because the Church also commands that the sick, to whom the Viaticum is administered, be asked this question among others pertaining to faith: *Do you believe that this, which I hold in my hands, is the true Body of Christ?* And yet from this it is not inferred that it is absolutely of faith that the Body of Christ is in that particular Host, but only under a tacit condition, as I explained above, *disputation 2, question 4, from number 12*. Therefore, similarly, although Martin V orders that those suspected in faith be asked whether they believe that the one existing at this time is the true Pontiff. But against this, because although there is parity in the manner of both interrogations, there is nevertheless disparity in the purpose for which these interrogations are ordered to be made. Indeed, the interrogation which is ordered to be made to the sick person concerning the particular Host is not required so that he may believe a new article of faith, but only that he may apply the faith already confessed in the prior article, or interrogation, namely that Christ is in any rightly Consecrated Host, to that particular Host, and this so that he may receive it with singular devotion, as is fitting; for which it is not required that this application of faith be without tacit condition and entirely absolute, but it is enough that it be tacitly conditional and extrinsically absolute, in the manner explained above. But the interrogation which Martin V orders to be made to those suspected in faith is ordered to be made so that they may be examined in faith, and concerning the Supreme visible animated rule of that faith, whether indeed they have due firmness concerning it; for this purpose, however, it is necessary, as I shall show below, that concerning the present Pope in particular they have firm faith absolutely, and without any tacit condition; hence when they are required to believe that he in particular is the true Pope, it must be understood *as believing*, or as faith entirely absolute and without tacit condition. |
| 17. Probatur deinde Conclusio ratione a priori, communiterque a Recentioribus existimata efficaci, quam sic proponunt PP. Salmant. in praesenti: Propositio singularis contenta in universali toti Ecclesiae revelata est immediate de fide, sicut ipsa universalis: Sed haec propositio singularis: *Innocentius XII. est Summus Ecclesiae Pontifex* continetur in illa universali: *Omnis rite electus est verus Pontifex*: Ergo de fide est immediate praedicta propositio singularis. Maior supponitur ab ipsis, sicut a nobis, supra probata, *disp. 1. quest. 7.* Ubi ostendimus revelationem propositionis universalis facere immediate de fide omnes singulares sub universali revelata contentas. Minor etiam supponitur: Quia supponimus Pontificem, de quo loquimur, non esse invalide, aut dubie electum, sed certo rite electum, & ut talem acceptatum ab Ecclesia, sicut de facto est Innocentius XII. Sed eo ipso, quod sit rite electus, & acceptatus ab Ecclesia, illa singularis continetur sub universali, quod omnis rite electus, &c. Ergo. |  | **17.** The Conclusion is furthermore proven by an a priori argument, commonly considered effective by more recent authors, which the Salmanticenses Fathers present as follows: A singular proposition contained within a universal proposition revealed to the whole Church is immediately of faith, just as the universal proposition itself is. But this singular proposition: *Innocent XII is the Supreme Pontiff of the Church* is contained in that universal proposition: *Every person validly elected is the true Pontiff*. Therefore, the aforementioned singular proposition is immediately of faith. The major premise is assumed by them, as it was proven by us above, in *disputation 1, question 7*, where we demonstrated that the revelation of a universal proposition makes all singular propositions contained under the revealed universal immediately of faith. The minor premise is also assumed: Because we presuppose that the Pontiff of whom we speak was not invalidly or doubtfully elected, but certainly validly elected, and as such accepted by the Church, as is indeed the case with Innocent XII. But by the very fact that he is validly elected and accepted by the Church, that singular proposition is contained under the universal proposition that everyone validly elected, etc. Therefore [the conclusion follows]. |
| **18.** Verumtamen haec ratio, nisi aliquid ultra ostendatur, nondum probat efficaciter assumptum. Nam instatur manifeste in hac propositione singulari: Haec Hostia continet verum Corpus Christi, quae quidem, quamvis supponamus esse rite consecratam, ut supponitur, quando nulla est ratio dubitandi, nec suspicandi contrarium, nihilominus non est omnino absolute de fide, sed solum sub tacita conditione, ut vidimus ex Div. Thom. tum disput. 1. quaest. 9. num. 68. tum disput. 2. quaest. 4. a num. 32. Instatur etiam manifeste in quolibet infante solemniter baptizato, nam de fide est universaliter: Omnem infantem rite baptizatum esse in gratia; sed sub hac universali continetur haec singularis: Hic infans (designato aliquo solemniter baptizato) est in gratia, quia supponitur rite baptizatus: Ergo de fide Catholica erit haec singularis; quod tamen negant omnes. |  | **18.** Nevertheless, this reasoning, unless something further is demonstrated, does not yet effectively prove what is assumed. For there is a manifest contradiction in this singular proposition: “This Host contains the true Body of Christ,” which indeed, although we suppose it to be rightly consecrated, as it is assumed when there is no reason for doubting or suspecting the contrary, nevertheless is not absolutely of faith in an unqualified sense, but only under a tacit condition, as we have seen from St. Thomas both in disputation 1, question 9, number 68, and in disputation 2, question 4, from number 32. There is also a manifest contradiction in the case of any infant solemnly baptized, for it is universally of faith that: “Every infant rightly baptized is in a state of grace”; but under this universal is contained this singular: “This infant (designating some solemnly baptized one) is in a state of grace,” because he is supposed to be rightly baptized. Therefore, this singular proposition would be of Catholic faith; which, however, all deny. |
| **19.** Et ratio est, quia licet universalia sit immediate de fide, continentia tamen singularis, quam supponimus, sub illa, aut in illa, non est de fide, nec infallibilis, nec omnino infallibiliter certa, sed cum contingentia falsitatis, siquidem, quod haec Hostia sit rite consecrata, & quod hic infans sit valide baptizatus, non potest habere certitudinem omnino infallibilem: Sed quoties datur huiusmodi contingentia, singularis contenta in universali non potest esse omnino absolute de fide, sed ad summum sub tacita conditione: Ergo in duobus exemplis relatis singulares non sunt immediate de fide omnino absolute, sed sub tacita conditione, nempe si Hostia sit rite consecrata, & si infans sit valide baptizatus, sicut supponitur, potest enim quod supponitur, non esse ita sicut supponitur. Tum sic, sed quamvis illa universalis, omnis rite electus, &c. sit immediate de fide, tamen, quod Innocentius XII. fuerit rite electus, non videtur de fide certum, nec omnino infallibile, quia potuit electio esse nulla ex aliquo vitio, nempe vel quia facta per simoniam, vel quia electus non esset baptizatus, vel alio titulo ex supra numeratis, num. 4. Ergo praedicta singularis *Innocentius XII. est Verus Papa*, ad summum erit de fide sub tacita conditione ritae electionis, non vero omnino absolute. |  | **19.** And the reason is that, although universals are immediately of faith, nevertheless the singular content, which we suppose under it, or in it, is not of faith, nor infallible, nor entirely infallibly certain, but comes with a contingency of falsity, since the fact that this Host is properly consecrated, and that this infant is validly baptized, cannot have entirely infallible certainty. But whenever such contingency is given, the singular contained in the universal cannot be entirely absolutely of faith, but at most under a tacit condition. Therefore, in the two examples related, the singulars are not immediately of faith entirely absolutely, but under a tacit condition, namely if the Host is properly consecrated, and if the infant is validly baptized, as is supposed, for what is supposed may not be as it is supposed. Now thus, although that universal, “everyone duly elected, etc.” is immediately of faith, nevertheless, that Innocent XII was duly elected does not seem certain as a matter of faith, nor entirely infallible, because the election could be null due to some defect, namely either because it was done through simony, or because the one elected was not baptized, or by another cause from those enumerated above, number 4. Therefore the aforesaid singular statement *Innocent XII is the True Pope* would at most be of faith under the tacit condition of a valid election, but not entirely absolutely. |
| **20.** Nec huiusmodi difficultas evacuatur, si dices, quod huiusmodi solutio destruit statum praesentis controversiae, nam haec procedit supposita legitima electione Innocentij XII. & quod sit in pacifica possessione, & quod ei non contradicat Ecclesia; cum hac autae suppositione non compatitur negare certitudinem illius minoris, nempe, quod *Innocentius est legitime electus*. Sed contra, quia licet supponatur ipsum fuisse legitime electum, restat tamen explicare, qua certitudine hoc supponatur. Etenim, dum adoramus Hostia in singulari, supponimus illam esse rite consecratam, & hoc certo supponimus sine dubitatione, aut suspitione in contra; non tamen tanta certitudine, quae sufficiat ad fidem divinam omnino absolutam, & sine tacita conditione de existentia Corporis Christi in illa singulari Hostia: Ergo pariter, quamvis in hac controversia supponatur, Innocentius rite electus, & id quidem certo supponatur sine ulla contradictione, tamen inde non infertur esse de fide omnino absoluta ipsum esse Papam, nisi prius exploretur, qua certitudine debeat gaudere illa minor, nempe quod sit rite electus, & an tanta certitudine gaudeat. |  | **20.** Nor is such a difficulty removed if you should say that such a solution destroys the premise of the present controversy, for this proceeds on the supposition of the legitimate election of Innocent XII, and that he is in peaceful possession, and that the Church does not contradict him; however, with this supposition, it is incompatible to deny the certainty of that minor premise, namely, that *Innocent is legitimately elected*. But to the contrary, because although it may be supposed that he was legitimately elected, it still remains to explain with what certainty this is supposed. Indeed, while we adore a particular Host, we suppose it to have been rightly consecrated, and we suppose this with certainty without doubt or suspicion to the contrary; yet not with such certainty as would suffice for divine faith that is completely absolute and without tacit condition regarding the existence of the Body of Christ in that particular Host. Therefore, similarly, although in this controversy it is supposed that Innocent was rightly elected, and this is indeed supposed with certainty without any contradiction, nevertheless it does not follow from this that it is of absolutely certain faith that he is the Pope, unless it is first determined what degree of certainty that minor premise should enjoy, namely that he was rightly elected, and whether it enjoys such a degree of certainty. |
| **EXPLICATUR CERTITUDO EXACTA *contingentiae singularis in universali, ut singularis sit de fide.*** |  | **THE PRECISE CERTAINTY REQUIRED IS EXPLAINED *for a singular contingency within a universal, such that the singular may be of faith.*** |
| 21. Et hinc oritur quaestio intercidens, a qua, nifallor, pendet huius controversiae clara ennodatio, & argumentorum solutio, nempe: Quenam certitudo requiratur de continentia subiecti singularis sub subiecto universalis revelatae, ut singularis sit de fide immediate. Cui ut respondeam. |  | **21.** And hence arises an incidental question, upon which, if I am not mistaken, depends the clear unraveling of this controversy and the solution of the arguments, namely: What certainty is required regarding the containment of a singular subject under the subject of a universal revelation, so that the singular may be immediately of faith? To which I respond. |
| 22. Dico primo, quod ut singularis sit de fide sub expressa conditione, nulla certitudo requiritur, sed cum dubio de tali continentia potest esse sic de fide. Patet, quia quamvis esset dubium positivum na haec singularis Hostia esset rite consecrata, credi tamen posset, & deberet sub expressa conditione, quod si re ipsa esset rite consecrata, continet Corpus Christi; & similiter si esset prudens suspicio: Ergo. |  | **22.** I say firstly, that for a particular instance to be a matter of faith under an express condition, no certainty is required, but with doubt concerning such content, it can still be a matter of faith in this manner. This is evident because, even if there were a positive doubt whether this particular Host was properly consecrated, it could and should still be believed under the express condition that if it were indeed properly consecrated, it contains the Body of Christ; and similarly if there were a prudent suspicion: Therefore. |
| 23. Dico secundo, quod ut credatur fide divina absoluta extrinsece sub conditione solum tacita, sed non exprimenda, sufficit certitudo humana, seu moralis, sine prudenti suspitione in contra. Patet etiam, quia ubi ita certum est Hostiam esse rite consecratam, aut infantem rite baptizatum, opus non est exprimere in credendo conditionem illam in Hostia sit rite consecrata, & similiter de infante, sed potius esset imprudentia: Ergo. |  | **23.** I say secondly, that for something to be believed with divine faith absolutely but extrinsically under a condition that is only tacit and not to be expressed, human or moral certainty suffices, without prudent suspicion to the contrary. This is also evident because where it is thus certain that a Host is properly consecrated, or an infant properly baptized, it is not necessary to express in the act of believing that condition “if the Host is properly consecrated,” and similarly concerning the infant, but rather it would be imprudence: Therefore. |
| 24. Maior, seu tota difficultas est de certitudine requisita ad fidem intrinsece absolutam, & sine conditione adhuc tacita. Respondent autem aliqui, satis esse, quod sit moraliter certa talis continentia, v. g. in nostro casu, quod sit moraliter certum in Ecclesia Innocentium XII. fuisse rite electum. Verumtamen huic sententiae non acquiesco, & eam sic impugno: Nam certitudo pure moralis est fallibilis physice, & metaphysice: Sed dummodo maneat fallibile physice, & metaphysice quod Innocentius fuerit rite electus, implicat quod sit de fide divina omnino absolute ipsum esse verum Papam: Ergo. Probatur minor, quia idem est aliquid esse de fide divina omnino absolute, ac esse infallibile physice, & metaphysice, siquidem fides divina ita infallibilis est, ut supra ostendimus, disput. 1. quest. 4. Sed nequit esse infallibile physice, & metaphysice Innocentium XII. esse Summum Pontificem, quandiu fallibile manet physice, & metaphysice eum fuisse rite electum: Ergo. nec potest esse de fide divina omnino absolute. Probo minorem, quia quandiu fallibile manet physice, & metaphysice ipsum esse rite electu (id est, valide, nam pro eodem usurpatur in praesenti, rite electio, ac valida) manet etiam physice, & metaphysice fallibile ipsum esse verum Pontificem: Ergo nequit esse infallibile ipsum esse verum Pontificem, quandiu fallibile manet ipsum fuisse rite, seu valide electum. Antecedens probatur, nam quod sit valide electus, vel est de essentia Summi Pontificis, vel saltem conditio essentialis, & de iure divino exacta, ut sit verus Pontifex, quia Christus instituit eam Dignitatem ut transituram ad Successores unice per validam electionem, ut constat ex quest. praeced. Sed quotiescumque est fallibile physice, & metaphysice quod detur conditio essentialiter, & de iure divino requisita ut quis sit verus Pontifex, est similiter fallibile ipsum esse verum Pontificem: Ergo. Probo minorem, quia nequit esse falsum, dari conditionem essentialem, ut quis sit verus Pontifex, quin sit etiam falsum dari conditionatum, nempe ipsum esse verum Pontificem, quia deficere nequit conditio essentialis, quin deficiat id, ad quod est conditio essentialis, alias si id posset persistere, illa deficiente, iam illa non esset conditio essentialis, id est, essentialiter, exacta: Ergo eadem possibilitate, qua posset esse falsum dari talem conditionem ut quis sit verus Pontifex, eadem potest esse falsum ipsum esse verum Pontificem : Sed idem est aliquid esse fallibile, ac posse esse falsum : Ergo quandiu manet fallibile physice, & metaphysice dari conditionem essentialem, ut quis sit verus Pontifex, eodem modo manet fallibile ipsum esse verum Pontificem. |  | **24.** The greater, or entire difficulty concerns the certainty required for intrinsically absolute faith, without even a tacit condition. Some respond that it is sufficient that such content be morally certain, for example, in our case, that it is morally certain that Innocent XII was properly elected in the Church. Nevertheless, I do not acquiesce to this opinion, and I challenge it thus: For purely moral certainty is fallible physically and metaphysically. But as long as it remains physically and metaphysically fallible that Innocent was properly elected, it is impossible that it be of divine faith absolutely that he is the true Pope. Therefore. The minor premise is proven because for something to be of divine faith absolutely is the same as for it to be physically and metaphysically infallible, since divine faith is infallible, as we demonstrated above in disputation 1, question 4. But it cannot be physically and metaphysically infallible that Innocent XII is the Supreme Pontiff, so long as it remains physically and metaphysically fallible that he was properly elected. Therefore, it cannot be of divine faith absolutely. I prove the minor premise because as long as it remains physically and metaphysically fallible that he was properly elected (that is, validly, for in the present context, a proper election is used to mean the same as a valid one), it also remains physically and metaphysically fallible that he is the true Pontiff. Therefore, it cannot be infallible that he is the true Pontiff, as long as it remains fallible that he was properly, or validly, elected. The antecedent is proven, for a valid election is either of the essence of the Supreme Pontiff, or at least an essential condition required by divine law, for someone to be the true Pontiff, because Christ instituted that Dignity to pass to Successors solely through valid election, as is established from the previous question. But whenever it is physically and metaphysically fallible that the condition essentially required by divine law for someone to be the true Pontiff is present, it is similarly fallible that he is the true Pontiff. Therefore. I prove the minor premise, because it cannot be false that an essential condition for someone to be the true Pontiff exists, without it also being false that the conditioned exists, namely that he is the true Pontiff, because an essential condition cannot be lacking without that for which it is an essential condition also being lacking. Otherwise, if that could persist despite the condition’s absence, then that condition would not be an essential condition, that is, essentially required. Therefore, with the same possibility by which it could be false that such a condition for someone to be the true Pontiff exists, by the same token it can be false that he is the true Pontiff. But for something to be fallible means the same as that it can be false. Therefore, as long as it remains physically and metaphysically fallible that the essential condition for someone to be the true Pontiff exists, in the same way it remains fallible that he is the true Pontiff. |
| 25. Confirmatur : Quia si solum est moraliter certum Innocentium XII. esse valide electum : Ergo physice, & metaphysice non repugnat in eius electione intervenisse aliquem defectum annullantem ipsam, v. g. quod non esset re ipsa baptizatus, aut quod non esset re ipsa ordinatus : Ergo physice, & metaphysice non repugnat quod ex tali defectu hodie non sit verus Pontifex, & consequenter, quod fallatur Ecclesia ipsum credens verum Pontificem. Probatur haec ultima consequentia, quia de fide est, & consequenter metaphysice infallibile, quod qui non est valide baptizatus, nec valide ordinatus, non est verus Pontifex : Ergo si physice, & metaphysice loquendo, non repugnat quod Innocentius XII. non sit valide baptizatus, nec valide ordinatus, sed potest metaphysice loquendo in hoc falli Ecclesia, pariter poterit Ecclesia falli in credendo ipsum esse verum Pontificem. |  | **25.** This is confirmed: Because if it is only morally certain that Innocent XII has been validly elected, then physically and metaphysically it is not impossible that some invalidating defect intervened in his election, e.g., that he was not actually baptized, or that he was not actually ordained. Therefore, physically and metaphysically, it is not impossible that due to such a defect he is not today the true Pontiff, and consequently, that the Church is mistaken in believing him to be the true Pontiff. This final consequence is proven because it is a matter of faith, and consequently metaphysically infallible, that one who is not validly baptized, nor validly ordained, is not a true Pontiff. Therefore, if speaking physically and metaphysically, it is not impossible that Innocent XII is not validly baptized, nor validly ordained, but the Church can, metaphysically speaking, be mistaken in this matter, likewise the Church could be mistaken in believing him to be the true Pontiff. |
| 26. Confirmatur secundo, quia in consequentia metaphysice infallibili, eo ipso quod consequens possit esse falsum, potest etiam antecedens eadem possibilitate falsum esse: quia in bona consequentia repugnat metaphysice quod antecedens sit verum, & consequens falsum : Sed haec est consequentia metaphysice infallibilis : *Innocentius XII. est verus Pontifex : Ergo est valide electus* : Ergo si consequens potest, metaphysice loquendo, hodie esse falsum, nempe quod sit valide electus, poterit etiam metaphysice loquendo hodie esse falsum antecedens, nempe quod sit verus Pontifex: Non ergo erit metaphysice infallibilis, & consequenter nec de fide divina absolute, quod Innocent. XII. est verus Pontifex. |  | **26.** It is confirmed secondly, because in a metaphysically infallible consequence, by the very fact that the consequent can be false, the antecedent can also be false with the same possibility: for in a valid consequence, it is metaphysically repugnant that the antecedent should be true and the consequent false. But this is a metaphysically infallible consequence: “Innocent XII is the true Pontiff; Therefore, he is validly elected.” Thus, if the consequent can, metaphysically speaking, be false today, namely that he was validly elected, then the antecedent can also be false today, metaphysically speaking, namely that he is the true Pontiff. Therefore, it will not be metaphysically infallible, and consequently not a matter of divine faith absolutely, that Innocent XII is the true Pontiff. |
| 27. Vel aliter : In bona consequentia, si antecedens est infallibile metaphysice etiam consequens debet esse metaphysice infallibile, quia sicut ex antecedenti necessario non sequitur nisi necessarium, ita ex antecedenti infallibili metaphysice sequi non potest, nisi infallibile metaphysice : Sed haec est bona consequentia : *Est verus Pontifex, ergo est valide electus* : Ergo si est metaphysice infallibile quod est verus Pontifex, debet etiam esse metaphysice infallibile, quod est valide electus. Vel aliter : Haec est bona consequentia : *Non est valide electus : Ergo non est verus Pontifex* : Rogo igitur, vel est possibile physice, & metaphysice antecedens, rebus prout nunc, nempe post pacificam acceptationem (hoc enim sensu semper loquor, & non ex terminis secundum se sumptis, quia ex terminis secundum se sumptis nec moraliter repugnat hunc hominem non esse Pontificem) vel est metaphysice impossibile. Si metaphysice impossibile: Ergo non solum moraliter, sed metaphysice impossibile est quod non sit valide electus: Ergo quod sit valide electus est metaphysice infallibile, & non solum moraliter; & habeo intentum, nempe quod non sufficiat sola certitudo moralis de valida electione. Si est possibile metaphysice illud antecedens: Ergo & consequens, quia in bona consequentia ex antecedenti possibili non sequitur consequens impossibile, ut docent dialectici; Ergo, rebus prout nunc, erit metaphysice possibile quod Innocentius XII non sit verus Pontifex, & consequenter non erit metaphysice infallibile quod est verus Pontifex: Ergo nec de fide divina omnino absolute. |  | **27.** Or alternatively: In a valid inference, if the antecedent is metaphysically infallible, then the consequent must also be metaphysically infallible, because just as from a necessary antecedent nothing follows except what is necessary, so from a metaphysically infallible antecedent nothing can follow except what is metaphysically infallible. But this is a valid inference: *He is the true Pontiff, therefore he is validly elected*. Therefore, if it is metaphysically infallible that he is the true Pontiff, it must also be metaphysically infallible that he is validly elected. Or alternatively: This is a valid inference: *He is not validly elected; therefore he is not the true Pontiff*. I ask, therefore, whether the antecedent is physically and metaphysically possible, given things as they now stand, namely after peaceful acceptance (for this is the sense in which I always speak, and not in terms considered in themselves, because in terms considered in themselves it is not even morally repugnant that this man is not the Pontiff), or whether it is metaphysically impossible. If it is metaphysically impossible, then it is not only morally but metaphysically impossible that he is not validly elected. Therefore, that he is validly elected is metaphysically infallible, and not just morally so; and I have my intended conclusion, namely that mere moral certainty concerning valid election is not sufficient. If that antecedent is metaphysically possible, then so is the consequent, because in a valid inference, an impossible consequent cannot follow from a possible antecedent, as dialecticians teach. Therefore, given things as they now stand, it would be metaphysically possible that Innocent XII is not the true Pontiff, and consequently it would not be metaphysically infallible that he is the true Pontiff. Therefore, this is not a matter of divine faith in an absolutely unqualified sense. |
| 28. Confirmatur tertio, quia quamvis sit moraliter certum Hostiam esse valide consecratam, v. g. quando plures Sacerdotes in magno numero concurrunt ad eam consecrandam, ut in Ordinum celebratione, ubi moraliter est impossibile quod aliquis saltem ex illis non habeat veram intentionem, & valide consecret; tamen adhuc supposita morali certitudine de valida consecratione non est de fide divina omnino absolute quod in illa Hostia singulari sit Corpus Christi, sed solum sub tacita conditione: Ergo si solum sit moralis, & non maior certitudo de valida electione Innocentii XII, non potest esse de fide divina omnino absolute ipsum esse verum Pontificem. |  | **28.** It is confirmed thirdly because, although it is morally certain that the Host is validly consecrated, for example, when many Priests in great number concur in consecrating it, as in the celebration of Holy Orders, where it is morally impossible that at least one of them does not have the true intention and validly consecrate; nevertheless, even supposing the moral certainty of valid consecration, it is not a matter of absolutely divine faith that the Body of Christ is in that particular Host, but only under a tacit condition. Therefore, if there is only moral certainty, and not greater certainty, about the valid election of Innocent XII, it cannot be a matter of absolutely divine faith that he is the true Pontiff. |
| 29. Respondebis primo, cum Lugo, distinguendo duplicem gradum certitudinis moralis, nempe, & certitudinem moralem, quae admittit formidinem prudentem falsitatis, & huiusmodi est certitudo humana ex testibus, vel aliis coniecturis humanis desumpta, quae sufficit ad regulandas actiones humanas, licet admittat prudentem formidinem de opposito, quia videlicet testes possunt fallere, & similiter alia motiva, quibus nititur talis certitudo, & nonunquam contingit aliquem falli ex ipsis, vel similibus motivis; de qua quidem certitudine morali loquuti sumus *tract. de Conscientia, quaest. 33, a num. 8.* & cum ea formidinem falsitatis conciliari, diximus *ibid. a num. 45.* Et de hac morali certitudine inquit Lugo non sufficere ad fidem divinam omnino absolutam, quia cum formidine prudenti, ne forsan haec Hostia non sit rite consecrata, credere non possu omnino absolute fide divina in ea esse Corpus Christi, & similiter de Infante baptizato, quod sit in gratia. Secunda certitudo moralis est, quam in summo gradu talem diximus supra disp.2. quaest.6.num.15. Et haec non admittit prudentem formidinem falsitatis, ut ibidem diximus num. 4. Immo nec imprudentem videtur posse admittere, nam huiusmodi certitudo ea dicitur, quam habemus de existentia Romae, aut Neapolis, vel Mediolani: Quis autem, nisi amens sit, aut fatuus, vel imprudenter quidem formidare poterit, ne forsan Roma non detur in rerum natura? Et de huiusmodi; aut simili certitudine morali sentit Lugo satis esse quod quis illam habeat de continentia singularis in universali revelata, ut singularis sit absolute de fide divina. |  | **29.** You will respond first, with Lugo, by distinguishing two degrees of moral certainty, namely: moral certainty which admits prudent fear of falsity, and this is the kind of human certainty derived from witnesses or other human conjectures, which suffices for regulating human actions, although it admits prudent fear of the opposite, because witnesses can indeed deceive, and similarly other motives upon which such certainty rests, and sometimes it happens that someone is deceived by these or similar motives; concerning which moral certainty we have spoken in *our Treatise on Conscience, question 33, from number 8*, and we said that such fear of falsity can be reconciled with it *in the same work from number 45*. And concerning this moral certainty, Lugo says it is not sufficient for divine faith that is completely absolute, because with prudent fear that perhaps this Host might not be properly consecrated, I cannot believe completely and absolutely by divine faith that the Body of Christ is in it, and similarly regarding a baptized infant, that he is in a state of grace. The second moral certainty is that which we called such in the highest degree above in disputation 2, question 6, number 15. And this does not admit prudent fear of falsity, as we said there in number 4. Indeed it seems it cannot admit even imprudent fear, for this kind of certainty is said to be that which we have about the existence of Rome, or Naples, or Milan: Who, unless he is insane or foolish, could even imprudently fear that perhaps Rome does not exist in reality? And concerning this kind or similar moral certainty, Lugo holds that it is sufficient that one has it regarding the containment of a particular in a universally revealed truth, so that the particular is absolutely of divine faith. |
| 30. Sed contra est primo, quia certitudo moralis de rita electione, seu valida Innocent. XII. non potest esse tanta, sicut certitudo de Romae existentia, nam haec fundatur in convenientia innumerorum testium ocularium, nullo negante, & est de re, quae oculis ipsis videtur: Quinimo non solum moraliter, sed etiam physice impossibile videtur, quod omnes, qui tanquam testes oculares de illa scribant, & loquantur, omnes fallere velint, nullusque veritatem propalare audeat; quod enim omnes homines in aliquo mendacio scienter proferendo constanter, & semper conveniant, potissime de re oculis ipsis subiecta, & in quo mendacio a quocumque comprehendi possint, nedum moraliter, sed physice, & ex natura rei repugnat naturae humanae; & ideo forsan illa certitudo non solum moralis, sed physica est. Quod si praedicta repugnantia physica est, etiam erit metaphysica, quia Deus de potentia absoluta, seu miraculose facere nequit quod omnes homines conveniant in praedicto proferendo mendacio, natura ipsa id repugnante, alias Deus esset Author specialis mendacii; Ergo metaphysice etiam repugnabit, quod omnes, qui de Roma tanquam testes oculares loquuti sunt, aut scripsere, scienter fallere nos voluerint constanter, & unanimiter, nullo contradicente: Hoc autem omnino necessarium erat, ut falsum foret Romam existere: Est ergo metaphysice impossibilis haec falsitas, & consequenter metaphysice infallibile Romam existere, & idem de qualibet alia Urbe, aut Regione, vel individuo, de quibus innumeri testes oculares unanimiter testificantur, nullo dubitante, aut contradicente. Haec obiter dixerim; quia video sine examine omnes istas certitudines reputari pure morales, cum tamen ex praedicto fundamento ostendi possit infallibilitatem habere metaphysicam. Vide supra, disputat. 2. quaest. 6. num. 5. |  | **30.** But against this, firstly, because moral certainty about the proper election, or valid election of Innocent XII, cannot be as great as the certainty of the existence of Rome, for the latter is founded upon the agreement of innumerable eyewitnesses, with no one denying it, and concerns a matter which is seen with one’s own eyes. Indeed, it seems not only morally but even physically impossible that all who write and speak about it as eyewitnesses would all wish to deceive, and that no one would dare to reveal the truth; for that all men would constantly and always agree in knowingly uttering some falsehood, especially regarding a matter subject to their own eyes, and in which falsehood they could be caught by anyone, is repugnant not only morally but physically and by the very nature of things to human nature; and therefore perhaps that certainty is not only moral but physical. And if the aforementioned repugnance is physical, it will also be metaphysical, because God by His absolute power, or miraculously, cannot make all men agree in uttering the aforementioned falsehood, nature itself repugnating against it, otherwise God would be the special Author of falsehood. Therefore, it will also be metaphysically repugnant that all who have spoken or written about Rome as eyewitnesses would knowingly wish to deceive us constantly and unanimously, with no one contradicting: Yet this would be absolutely necessary for it to be false that Rome exists. Therefore, this falsity is metaphysically impossible, and consequently it is metaphysically infallible that Rome exists, and the same applies to any other City, or Region, or individual, about which innumerable eyewitnesses unanimously testify, with no one doubting or contradicting. I have said these things in passing; because I see that without examination all these certainties are considered purely moral, whereas from the aforementioned foundation it can be shown that they have metaphysical infallibility. See above, disputation 2, question 6, number 5. |
| 31. Sed demus quod sint certitudines solum morales, sed in summo gradu, ita ut nullam formidinem admittant falsitatis. Certitudo moralis de validitate electionis Pontificis tanta nequit esse, quia non est de re, quae oculis patens sit, nec de qua sint testes oculares, nec in tanto numero. Non quidem in tanto numero, quia testes illius electionis praecise sunt Cardinales. Nec isti sunt testes oculares validitatis electionis, quia quod sit valida consistit in pluribus conditionibus per se non patentibus, v. g. quod non sit simoniaca, quod electus sit vir, & non mulier, & praesertim quod sit re ipsa, & valide baptizatus, de hoc enim ipsi Cardinales testes oculares esse non possunt. Immo nec ullus praeter illum, qui electum baptizavit, quia de intentione essentialiter requisita in baptizante nullus esse potest ocularis testis. Non ergo certitudo moralis de validitate electionis Pontificis potest esse tanta sicut certitudo de Romae existentia, nec in summo gradu certitudinis moralis, sicut illa, ita ut omnem formidinem prudentem excludat. |  | **31.** But let us grant that these are only moral certainties, yet of the highest degree, such that they admit no apprehension of falsehood. The moral certainty regarding the validity of a Pontifical election cannot be of such a high degree, because it does not concern a matter that is evident to the eyes, nor one for which there are eyewitnesses, nor in such great number. Not indeed in such great number, because the witnesses of that election are precisely the Cardinals. Nor are these eyewitnesses to the validity of the election, because its validity consists in multiple conditions not evident in themselves, e.g., that it is not simoniacal, that the elect is a man and not a woman, and especially that he is in reality validly baptized, for of this the Cardinals themselves cannot be eyewitnesses. Indeed, no one can be an eyewitness except the person who baptized the elect, because regarding the intention essentially required in the one baptizing, no one can be an eyewitness. Therefore, the moral certainty about the validity of a Pontifical election cannot be as great as the certainty of Rome’s existence, nor of the highest degree of moral certainty like that one, such that it excludes all prudent apprehension. |
| 32. Explicatur, & tacita solutio praecluditur; nam vel illa electio consideratur independenter ab assistentia Spiritus Sancti infallibiliter revelata, aut promissa, solum ex motivis visibilibus, & humanis humano modo propositis Ecclesiae; vel in vi revelationis, aut promissionis alique, vi cuius Christus promiserit absolute illi electioni assistentiam Spiritus Sancti. Si hoc secundum; ergo non est tantum certa moraliter validitas illius electionis, sed certa, & infallibilis metaphysice, quia electio, cui Christus promisit assistentiam Spiritus Sancti ne erret, in vi talis promissionis infallibile est eam non errasse, & consequenter validam fuisse. Et quidem non solum infallibile moraliter, sed metaphysice, quia quod Christus absolute promisit, metaphysice repugnat non esse sicut promisit. Si dicatur primum, sane omnia ea motiva visibilia, quantumvis uniformia, & convenientia, cum sint de re oculis non patenti, sed potius dependenti a re occultissima, nempe ab intentione Ministri qui electum baptizavit, & a Baptismo ipso, de quo nullus electus est testis ocularis, & similiter ab Ordinibus susceptis, minime possunt excludere per se ipsa independenter a revelatione, & promissione divina, formidinem prudentem nullitatis, vel incapacitatis subiecti. |  | **32.** It is explained, and a tacit solution is precluded; for either that election is considered independently from the infallibly revealed or promised assistance of the Holy Spirit, solely based on visible and human motives humanly presented to the Church; or by virtue of some revelation or promise, by which Christ absolutely promised the assistance of the Holy Spirit to that election. If it is the latter, then the validity of that election is not only morally certain, but certain and metaphysically infallible, because an election to which Christ promised the assistance of the Holy Spirit so that it would not err is, by virtue of such a promise, infallibly free from error, and consequently was valid. And indeed it is not only morally infallible, but metaphysically so, because what Christ has absolutely promised metaphysically cannot fail to be as He promised. If the former is claimed, truly all those visible motives, however uniform and fitting they may be, since they concern a matter not evident to the eyes, but rather dependent on something most hidden, namely on the intention of the Minister who baptized the elected person, and on Baptism itself (of which no elected person is an eyewitness), and similarly on the Orders received, can by no means exclude, through themselves independently of divine revelation and promise, a prudent fear of nullity or incapacity of the subject. |
| 33. Urgetur: Nam vel est infallibiliter promissa illi electioni assistentia Spiritus Sancti, ne erret, vel non? Si est infallibiliter promissa : Ergo infallibile est, non solum moraliter, sed metaphysice, ipsam non errasse, & consequenter fuisse validam. Si autem non est illi infallibiliter promissa ; ergo manet locus prudenti formidini, ne forsan Spiritus Sanctus non adstiterit electioni illi, & consequenter ne forsan erraverit eligendo non baptizatum, aut alio titulo incapacem ; nam sane deficiente assistentia Spiritus Sancti, nulla securitas esse potest de non errando, praesertim in re tam occulta. |  | **33.** It is pressed further: For either the assistance of the Holy Spirit is infallibly promised to that election, that it may not err, or it is not. If it is infallibly promised: Therefore it is infallible, not only morally but metaphysically, that the election has not erred, and consequently that it was valid. But if it is not infallibly promised to that election; then there remains room for prudent fear, lest perhaps the Holy Spirit did not assist that election, and consequently lest perhaps it erred by electing someone not baptized, or incapable by some other qualification; for indeed, without the assistance of the Holy Spirit, there can be no certainty about not erring, especially in such a hidden matter. |
| 34. Urgetur amplius, quia electio illa, si praescindamus ab assistentia Spiritus Sancti, non maiorem certitudinem potest habere de valore sui, vel saltem de capacitate intrinseca subiecti, quam aliae electiones Canonicae, quae fiunt in Ecclesia, inferiorum Pastorum, nam praecilla tali assistentia, Cardinales homines sunt, fragiles, infirmi, lutea vasa portantes, passionibus, & fallibilitati expositi, sicut electores in aliis Canonicis electionibus. Sed aliae electiones, quia illis singillatim non est promissa absolute, & infallibiliter assistentia Spiritus Sancti ne errent, non sunt ita certo validae, ut certitudo excludat omnem prudentem formidinem, ne forsan intervenerit aliquod caput nullitatis: Ergo si electioni Pontificis non sit infallibiliter, & absolute promissa assistentia Spiritus Sancti ad non errandum, seu praescindendo ab illa, non potest esse ita certa, quod excludat omnem formidinem. |  | **34.** It is pressed further, because that election, if we prescind from the assistance of the Holy Spirit, cannot have greater certainty of its validity, or at least of the intrinsic capacity of the subject, than other Canonical elections that take place in the Church for inferior Pastors, for setting aside such assistance, the Cardinals are men, fragile, infirm, carrying vessels of clay, exposed to passions and fallibility, just like electors in other Canonical elections. But other elections, because assistance from the Holy Spirit that they may not err is not promised to each of them absolutely and infallibly, are not so certainly valid that the certainty excludes all prudent fear that perhaps some ground for nullity might have intervened: Therefore, if the assistance of the Holy Spirit is not infallibly and absolutely promised to the election of the Pontiff to prevent error, or prescinding from that assistance, it cannot be so certain as to exclude all fear. |
| 35. Urgetur tertio, nam casu, quo centum Sacerdotes concurrerent ad consecrandam Hostiam, omnes probi, & timorati, rogo utrum esset tunc locus formidini prudenti ne forsan non esset valide consecrata, vel non? Si adhuc esset locus formidini prudenti : Ergo quamvis concurrant omnes Cardinales ad electionem unius Pontificis, praescindendo ab assistentia infallibili Spiritus Sancti, adhuc manebit locus prudenti formidini, potissime cum ad validam consecrationem Hostiae satis sit quod unus ex centum sit verus Sacerdos, & habeat intentionem, & alias ex parte materiae capacitas sit visibilis, ad validitatem autem electionis Papae opus sit, quod duae partes ex tribus Cardinalium concurrat, & sint vere Cardinales, & alias capacitas subiecti eligendi non sit visibilis, sed pendens a conditionibus occultis. Si vero dicas in illa consecratione non manere locum formidini prudenti; sic arguo : Et tamen non esset de fide omnino absolute illam Hostiam continere Corpus Christi, sed solum sub tacita conditione; Ergo quamvis de valida electione Papae nulla supersit formido prudens de nullitate illius, tamen si solum sit certa moraliter, non manebit de fide omnino absolute, electum esse verum Pontificem. Consequentia patet, quia sicut est revelatum, quod omnis rite electus est verus Pontifex, ita est revelatum, quod omnis Hostia rite consecrata continet Corpus Christi. Ex quo. |  | **35.** It is urged thirdly, for in the case where one hundred priests might come together to consecrate a Host, all of them upright and God-fearing, I ask whether there would then be grounds for prudent fear that perhaps it was not validly consecrated, or not? If there would still be grounds for prudent fear, then even though all Cardinals might participate in the election of a single Pontiff, setting aside the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit, there would still remain grounds for prudent fear, especially since for the valid consecration of the Host it is sufficient that one of the hundred be a true Priest who has the intention, and moreover, the suitability of the matter is visible; but for the validity of a papal election it is necessary that two-thirds of the Cardinals concur, and that they be true Cardinals, and furthermore the suitability of the subject to be elected is not visible, but depends on hidden conditions. If, however, you say that in such a consecration there would not remain grounds for prudent fear, I argue thus: And yet it would not be a matter of absolute faith that the Host contains the Body of Christ, but only under a tacit condition. Therefore, although regarding the valid election of a Pope no prudent fear of its nullity might remain, nevertheless if it is only morally certain, it will not remain a matter of absolute faith that the one elected is the true Pontiff. The consequence is clear, because just as it is revealed that everyone duly elected is the true Pontiff, so it is revealed that every Host duly consecrated contains the Body of Christ. From which… |
| 36. Secundo impugno praedictam solutionem, quia dato, quod electione Pontificis acceptata, non maneat locus prudenti formidini, tamen si manet fallibile physice, & metaphysice quod sit valide electus, manet fallibile physice, & metaphysice, quod sit verus Pontifex, ut ostensum manet: Sed si solum sit moraliter certa validitas illius electionis, necessario manet fallibilis physice, & metaphysice, quia sola certitudo moralis nequit excludere fallibilitatem physicam, & metaphysicam: Ergo non potest manere metaphysice infallibile, & consequenter nec de fide divina omnino absolute quod sit verus Pontifex, sed ad summum manebit certum moraliter certitudine excludente formidinem prudentem. |  | **36.** Secondly, I challenge the aforementioned solution, because even if, once the papal election has been accepted, there remains no place for prudent fear, nevertheless if it remains physically and metaphysically fallible that he has been validly elected, it remains physically and metaphysically fallible that he is the true Pontiff, as has been demonstrated. But if the validity of that election is only morally certain, it necessarily remains physically and metaphysically fallible, because moral certainty alone cannot exclude physical and metaphysical fallibility. Therefore, it cannot remain metaphysically infallible, and consequently neither can it be of divine faith absolutely that he is the true Pontiff; rather, at most, it will remain morally certain with a certainty that excludes prudent fear. |
| 37. Propterea respondent alij, certitudinem moralem de validitate electionis sufficere ut sit absolute de fide electum esse verum Papam, quia sufficit ut absolute obligemur ad credendum illum esse verum Pontificem. Sed contra, quia quaestio illa, non tam instituta est ad indagandam obligationis qualitatem, quam ad indagandam fidei qualitatem circa verum Pontificem, & certitudinem fidei de illo habendam. Suppono ergo eam certitudinem moralem sufficere ut obligemur absolute ad credendum electum esse verum Pontificem, sed rogo, an obligemur absolute ad id credendum fide divina intrinsece absoluta, an tantum fide divina intrinsece, & tacite conditionata, & solum extrinsece absoluta? Si hoc secundum, ergo fides de eo quod electus, nempe Innocent. XII. est verus Pontifex non est intrinsece absoluta, sed conditionata tacite, sicut fides de existentia Christi in Hostia determinata: Ergo manebit, fallibile, & contingens absolute, an sit, vel non sit verus Pontifex; quod quis dicat? Si vero dicatur primum, redit argumentum factum, nam quandiu manet solum moraliter certa validitas electionis, & consequenter fallibile physice, & metaphysice an sit valide electus, non possumus credere fide divina omnino, & intrinsece absoluta, electum esse verum Papam: Ergo ad ita credendum non obligamur ex vi solius certitudinis moralis. Antecedens patet, quia dum manet fallibile absolute physice, & metaphysice an sit verus Papa, id credere non possumus fide divina omnino, & intrinsece absoluta, ut per se patet: Sed dum manet ita fallibile an sit valide electis, eodem modo manet fallibile an sit verus Papa : Ergo. |  | **37.** Therefore, others respond that moral certainty regarding the validity of an election is sufficient for it to be absolutely a matter of faith that the one elected is the true Pope, because it is sufficient that we are absolutely obligated to believe that he is the true Pontiff. But against this argument, because that question is not so much established to investigate the quality of the obligation, as to investigate the quality of faith concerning the true Pontiff, and to have certainty of faith about him. I suppose, therefore, that this moral certainty is sufficient for us to be absolutely obligated to believe that the one elected is the true Pontiff, but I ask whether we are absolutely obligated to believe this with intrinsically absolute divine faith, or only with divine faith that is intrinsically and tacitly conditional, and only extrinsically absolute? If the second, then faith concerning the fact that the one elected, namely Innocent XII, is the true Pontiff is not intrinsically absolute, but tacitly conditional, just like faith in the existence of Christ in a specific Host. Therefore, it will remain fallible and contingent in an absolute sense whether he is or is not the true Pontiff; who would say this? But if the first is asserted, the argument already made returns, for as long as the validity of the election remains only morally certain, and consequently physically and metaphysically fallible as to whether he has been validly elected, we cannot believe with divine faith that is entirely and intrinsically absolute that the one elected is the true Pope. Therefore, we are not obligated by virtue of moral certainty alone to believe in this way. The antecedent is evident, because while it remains absolutely fallible physically and metaphysically whether he is the true Pope, we cannot believe it with divine faith that is entirely and intrinsically absolute, as is self-evident. But while it remains fallible in this way whether he has been validly elected, it remains fallible in the same way whether he is the true Pope. Therefore. |
| 38. Respondent denique alij, quod certitudo de rita electione est duplex, una antecedens ad fidem de veritate Papae electi, alia consequens ad talem fidem. Et hanc secundam esse certitudinem metaphysicam per modum Conclusionis Theologicae, quia videlicet semel supposito quod sit de fide divina absolute Innocent. XII. esse verum Papam, inde consequenter infertur consequentia metaphysice infallibili fuisse valide electum, & sic est consequenter metaphysice infallibile, quod electio fuit valida. Attamen antecedenter non requiritur, quod validitas electionis sit metaphysice infallibilis, sed sufficit, quod sit moraliter certa, quia cum haec certitudo requiratur solum ex parte credibilitatis, sufficit quod sit solum certitudo moralis, qua sola supposita, iam est absolute infallibile metaphysice Innocent. XII. esse verum Papam. |  | **38.** Finally, others respond that certainty regarding a proper election is twofold: one preceding faith in the truth of the elected Pope, and another following such faith. And this second type is metaphysical certainty in the manner of a Theological Conclusion, because once it is supposed as a matter of divine faith absolutely that Innocent XII is the true Pope, it is consequently inferred with metaphysically infallible consequence that he was validly elected, and thus it is consequently metaphysically infallible that the election was valid. However, antecedently it is not required that the validity of the election be metaphysically infallible, but it suffices that it be morally certain, because since this certainty is required only on the part of credibility, it suffices that it be only moral certainty, which being supposed, it is already absolutely metaphysically infallible that Innocent XII is the true Pope. |
| 39. Haec solutio magis accedit ad veritatem, quia fatetur non posse esse infallibile absolute quod Innocent. XII. sit verus Papa, quin eadem infallibilitate, nempe metaphysica, sit absolute infallibile ipsum fuisse valide electu, licet consequenter. Verumtamen adhuc non satisfacit, quia ante fidem divinam intrinsece absolutam de veritate Papae electi, debet dari certitudo obiectiva, seu fundamentalis omnino absoluta de eo quod sit verus Papa, hoc est, motivum absolute certificans cum metaphysica infallibilitate de veritate Papae: Sed si solum supponatur illa revelatio universalis: *Omnis rite electus est verus Papa*, cum certitudine tantum morali de rita electione, non supponitur motivum absolute certificans cum infallibilitate absoluta metaphysica, quod hic sit verus Papa: Ergo requiritur maior certitudo de validitate electionis pro priori ad fidem divinam intrinsece absolutam de veritate Papae. Minor probatur, quia illa universalis revelatio: *Omnis rite electus est verus Papa* se sola non certificat absolute quod hic sit verus Papa, sed solum sub conditione, quod sit rite electus: sicut haec universalis revelata: *Omnis Hostia rite consecrata continet Corpus Christi*, non certificat se sola absolute quod haec singularis Hostia contineat Corpus Christi, sed solum sub conditione, quod sit rite consecrata: Sed motivum ex se solum certificans conditionate, non potest certificare absolute antequam sit certa purificatio conditionis, nec potest certificare magis de conditionato, quam sit certa purificatio conditionis: Ergo si non supponatur maior certitudo, quam moralis de purificatione conditionis, nempe de rita electione, non potest illa universalis certificare absolute maiori certitudine, quam morali, de veritate Pontificis: Ergo nequit supponi motivum certificans absolute certitudine metaphysica de eo quod Innocent. XII. sit verus Papa. Et urgetur, quia adhuc supposita certitudine morali de eo quod aliqua Hostia sit rite consecrata, illa universalis: *Omnis Hostia rite consecrata continet Corpus Christi*, non certificat absolute certitudine absoluta metaphysica, quod in illa Hostia sit vere Corpus Christi: Ergo idem in nostro casu. |  | **39.** This solution approaches closer to the truth, because it acknowledges that it cannot be absolutely infallible that Innocent XII is the true Pope without it being—with the same infallibility, namely metaphysical—absolutely infallible that he was validly elected, albeit consequently. Nevertheless, it still does not satisfy, because before an intrinsically absolute divine faith in the truth of the elected Pope, there must be given an objective certainty, or a completely absolute fundamental certainty that he is the true Pope, that is, a motive absolutely certifying with metaphysical infallibility the truth of the Pope. But if only that universal revelation is supposed: *Every properly elected person is the true Pope*, with only moral certainty concerning a proper election, then a motive is not supposed that absolutely certifies with absolute metaphysical infallibility that this person is the true Pope. Therefore, greater certainty regarding the validity of the election is required prior to an intrinsically absolute divine faith in the truth of the Pope. The minor premise is proven because that universal revelation: *Every properly elected person is the true Pope* does not by itself absolutely certify that this person is the true Pope, but only under the condition that he is properly elected—just as this revealed universal: *Every properly consecrated Host contains the Body of Christ* does not by itself absolutely certify that this particular Host contains the Body of Christ, but only under the condition that it is properly consecrated. But a motive that by itself only certifies conditionally cannot certify absolutely before the fulfillment of the condition is certain, nor can it certify about the conditioned matter with greater certainty than there is certainty about the fulfillment of the condition. Therefore, if no greater certainty than moral certainty is supposed concerning the fulfillment of the condition, namely concerning the proper election, that universal cannot absolutely certify with greater than moral certainty about the truth of the Pontiff. Therefore, a motive cannot be supposed that absolutely certifies with metaphysical certainty that Innocent XII is the true Pope. And it is further pressed, because even supposing moral certainty that some Host is properly consecrated, that universal: *Every properly consecrated Host contains the Body of Christ* does not absolutely certify with absolute metaphysical certainty that in that Host there is truly the Body of Christ. Therefore, the same applies in our case. |
| 40. Confirmatur, quia licet in motivis credibilitatis non requiratur connexio metaphysica absoluta cum re credenda, sed satis fit connexio moralis, tamen suppositis motivis credibilitatis certo moraliter suadentibus illam rem esse dictam a Deo, requiritur revelatio, seu motivum formale credendi absolute certificans intellectum cum infallibilitate absoluta metaphysica, de veritate rei credendae: Sed si solum supponatur ex parte credibilitatis certitudo moralis de electione, revelatio illa universalis: *Omnis rite electus est verus Papa*, non certificat absolute certitudine metaphysica, sed solum sub tacita conditione, si nimirum certitudo moralis non fallatur in electione: Ergo nequit fundare fidem divinam absolutam de eo quod sit verus Papa. |  | **40.** This is confirmed because, although in motives of credibility no absolute metaphysical connection with the thing to be believed is required, but rather a moral connection suffices, nevertheless, given the motives of credibility that morally and certainly persuade that something has been spoken by God, revelation is required, or a formal motive of believing that absolutely certifies the intellect with absolute metaphysical infallibility regarding the truth of the thing to be believed. But if, on the part of credibility, only moral certainty about the election is supposed, that universal revelation: *Every duly elected person is the true Pope*, does not certify with absolute metaphysical certainty, but only under a tacit condition, namely if moral certainty is not mistaken in the election. Therefore, it cannot establish absolute divine faith that he is the true Pope. |
| 41. Confirmatur secundo, quia valida electio, non solum requiritur ex parte credibilitatis, sed potius ut revelatio illa universalis constituatur in ratione motivi formalis fidei divinae absolutae de veritate Papae: Sed motivum formale fidei divinae in esse talis debet praesupponi ut certum, non solum moraliter, sed metaphysice: Ergo ut illa revelatio universalis moveat ad fidem absolutam de veritate Papae, debet supponi validitas electionis, vi cuius constituitur in esse motivi absoluti, certa, non solum moraliter, sed metaphysice. Minor patet, quia motivum formale fidei divinae praestat illi certitudinem, non solum moralem, sed metaphysicam: Ergo debet supponi, vel proponi ut certum, non solum moraliter, sed metaphysice, nequit enim praestare certitudinem, quam non habet. Minor vero probatur: Quia illa revelatio universalis solum est motivum formale fidei absolutae de veritate huius Papae singularis, in quantum est revelatio absoluta illius, nam motivum fidei divinae absolutae non potest esse revelatio, ut pure conditionata: Sed illa revelatio universalis constituitur inesse revelationis absolutae per validitatem electionis: Ergo per illam constituitur inesse motivi formalis fidei absolutae. Minor probatur, quia illa revelatio universalis ex se solum conditionate revelat hunc singularem hominem esse verum Papam, nempe si sit rite electus; sed revelatio ex se solum conditionata constituitur absoluta per ipsam purificationem conditionis, quae in praesenti est valida electio : Ergo illa revelatio universalis constituitur inesse revelationis absolutae per validam electionem. |  | **41.** It is confirmed secondly, because valid election is required not only for the sake of credibility, but rather so that universal revelation may be established as the formal motive of absolute divine faith concerning the truth of the Pope. But the formal motive of divine faith, as such, must be presupposed as certain, not only morally, but metaphysically. Therefore, in order for that universal revelation to move one to absolute faith concerning the truth of the Pope, the validity of the election, by virtue of which it is constituted as an absolute motive, must be supposed certain, not only morally, but metaphysically. The minor premise is evident, because the formal motive of divine faith provides certainty that is not only moral, but metaphysical. Therefore, it must be supposed or proposed as certain, not only morally, but metaphysically, for it cannot provide a certainty which it does not possess. The minor premise is proven: Because that universal revelation is the formal motive of absolute faith concerning the truth of this particular Pope only insofar as it is an absolute revelation of him, for the motive of absolute divine faith cannot be revelation understood as merely conditional. But that universal revelation is constituted as an absolute revelation through the validity of the election. Therefore, through the validity of the election, it is constituted as the formal motive of absolute faith. The minor premise is proven because that universal revelation, of itself, reveals this particular man to be the true Pope only conditionally, namely, if he has been properly elected; but a revelation that is in itself merely conditional becomes absolute through the fulfillment of the condition itself, which in the present case is valid election. Therefore, that universal revelation is constituted as an absolute revelation through valid election. |
| 42. Urgetur : Non potest esse metaphysice certum absolute hunc esse verum Papam,certitudine absoluta fidei,nisi praesupponatur obiective certum metaphysice, id est revelatum absolute, nam motivum formale illud credendi absolute cum certitudine metaphysica, est, quia revelatum absolute,implicat autem quod fides sit magis certa,quam motivum formale ipsius : Sed non potest supponi ut metaphysice certum illud esse revelatum absolute, in vi illius universalis, nisi supponatur tanquam metaphysice certum hunc hominem esse valide electum; quia per hoc constituitur illa revelatio universalis revelatio absoluta huius individui : Ergo debet supponi metaphysice certa valida electio, ut in vi illius universalis possit credi fide divina absoluta hunc esse verum Papam : Ergo non sufficit certitudo metaphysica consequuta ad fidem absolutam de veritate Papae, sed requiritur certitudo metaphysica obiectiva, & fundamentalis antecedenter ad talem fidem,siquidem talis certitudo de valore electionis debet praesupponi ex parte motivi fidei divinae absolutae. |  | **42.** It is urged: It cannot be metaphysically certain in an absolute sense that this person is the true Pope, with absolute certainty of faith, unless it is presupposed to be objectively metaphysically certain—that is, absolutely revealed—for the formal motive for believing it absolutely with metaphysical certainty is because it is absolutely revealed. It implies, however, that faith cannot be more certain than its formal motive. But it cannot be supposed as metaphysically certain that this is absolutely revealed, by virtue of that universal principle, unless it is supposed as metaphysically certain that this man has been validly elected; because through this, that universal revelation becomes the absolute revelation regarding this individual. Therefore, a valid election must be supposed metaphysically certain, so that by virtue of that universal principle it can be believed with absolute divine faith that this person is the true Pope. Therefore, metaphysical certainty that follows from absolute faith in the truth of the Pope is not sufficient, but objective and fundamental metaphysical certainty is required prior to such faith, since such certainty about the validity of the election must be presupposed as part of the motive for absolute divine faith. |
| 43. Confirmatur tertio, quia in vi illius universalis : *Omnis rite electus,&c*. Non potest, adhuc mediate inferri tanquam conclusio Theologica, quod Innocent. XII. sit rite electus : Ergo nisi fides de veritate Papae innitatur alia revelatione, non potest dari certitudo metaphysica de valore electionis, adhuc consequenter ad fidem de veritate Papae, & per modum conclusionis theologicae.: Ergo nec antecedenter, nec consequenter erit maior certitudo,quam pure moralis de valida electione : Ergo tam antecedenter, quam consequenter manebit fallibile physice, & metaphysice ipsum fuisse valide electum : Sed cum hoc fatetur solutio non componi quod sit absolute de fide divina absoluta hunc esse verum Papam : Ergo, Caetera parent. Maior probatur : Quia ex hac universali : *Omnis rite electus est verus Papa*, nec immediate, nec mediate inferri potest ista singularis : *Ergo Innocent. XII. est rite electus*, nam qui sic argueret : *Omnis rite electus est verus Papa; ergo Innocent. XII. est rite electus*, omnino disparate argueret, non minus quam qui ita argueret : *Omnis iustus est Dei amicus; Ergo Petrus est iustus* : Ergo in vi illius universalis adhuc mediate non revelatur quod Innocent. XII. est rite electus: Ergo nec potest hoc reddi certum per modum conclusionis theologicae, siquidem conclusio theologica debet esse mediate revelata. |  | **43.** This is confirmed thirdly, because by virtue of that universal proposition: *“Everyone who is rightly elected, etc.”* One cannot, even mediately, infer as a theological conclusion that Innocent XII was rightly elected. Therefore, unless faith in the truth of the Pope rests upon another revelation, metaphysical certainty regarding the validity of the election cannot be established, even as a consequence of faith in the truth of the Pope, nor by means of a theological conclusion. Therefore, neither antecedently nor consequently will there be greater certainty than purely moral certainty concerning the valid election. Therefore, both antecedently and consequently, it remains physically and metaphysically fallible that he was validly elected. But this solution admits that it cannot be reconciled with the claim that it is absolutely a matter of divine faith that this man is the true Pope. Therefore, and so forth. The major premise is proven: Because from this universal proposition: *“Everyone who is rightly elected is the true Pope,”* neither immediately nor mediately can this particular proposition be inferred: *“Therefore Innocent XII is rightly elected.”* For one who would argue thus: *“Everyone who is rightly elected is the true Pope; therefore Innocent XII is rightly elected,”* would argue in a completely disparate manner, no less than one who would argue: *“Every just man is a friend of God; therefore Peter is just.”* Therefore, by virtue of that universal proposition, it is not even mediately revealed that Innocent XII is rightly elected. Therefore, neither can this be rendered certain by means of a theological conclusion, since a theological conclusion must be mediately revealed. |
| **44.** Nec valet recursus ad certitudinem moralem, nam si solum supponatur moraliter certa haec propositio : Innocent. XII. est rite electus, in vi illius universalis revelare: *Omnis rite electus est verus Papa*, nullam maiorem potest accipere certitudinem, sed manebit adhuc consequenter solum moraliter certa. Ratio est, quia ex illa universali nullo pacto infertur, sed disparate ad illam se habet, ut ostensum manet sed ex vi illius revelationis, seu propositionis revelatae, quae nullo pacto illam infert, sed disparate se habet, non potest accipere maiorem certitudinem, immo nec certitudinem ullam, ut ex se patet : Ergo si solum supponitur antecedenter certa moraliter, tantum certa moraliter manebit consequenter, non vero certa theologice per modum conclusionis theologicae. Explicatur : Quando in vi huius universalis revelatae: *Omnis homo est mortalis*, supposita tanquam naturaliter evidenti hac, *Petrus est homo*, creditur fide divina, quod *Petrus est mortalis*, nemo dixit, quod consequenter ad hanc fidem divinam, manet certa per modum conclusionis theologicae illa *Petrus est homo*, aut quod ista fuerit mediate revelata, quia videlicet, dum Deus revelat omnem hominem esse mortalem, per hanc revelationem, nec mediate, nec immediate revelat quinam sint veri homines, nec ex illa universali infertur, adhuc mediate : *Ergo Petrus est homo*; unde ista semper manet solum certa, & evidens lumine naturali, non vero lumine theologico : Ergo idem dicendum, quando in vi illius universalis : *Omnis rite electus*, &c. supposita ut moraliter certa ista : *Hic est rite electus*, creditur fide divina, quod hic est verus Pontifex, nempe quod manebit illa minor consequenter, sicut antecedenter, solum certa moraliter. |  | **44.** Nor does recourse to moral certainty prove valid, for if we merely suppose as morally certain this proposition: “Innocent XII was duly elected,” by virtue of that universal revelation: “Everyone duly elected is the true Pope,” it cannot receive any greater certainty, but will consequently remain only morally certain. The reason is that from that universal proposition it is in no way inferred, but relates to it disparately, as has been shown; but by virtue of that revelation, or revealed proposition, which in no way infers it but relates disparately, it cannot receive greater certainty—indeed, it cannot receive any certainty at all, as is self-evident. Therefore, if it is only supposed antecedently to be morally certain, it will consequently remain only morally certain, not theologically certain in the manner of a theological conclusion. Let me explain: When, by virtue of this revealed universal: “Every man is mortal,” having supposed as naturally evident that “Peter is a man,” it is believed by divine faith that “Peter is mortal,” no one has said that, consequently to this divine faith, “Peter is a man” remains certain in the manner of a theological conclusion, or that this was mediately revealed, because, namely, when God reveals that every man is mortal, through this revelation He neither mediately nor immediately reveals who are true men, nor from that universal is it inferred, even mediately: “Therefore, Peter is a man.” Hence, this always remains only certain and evident by natural light, not by theological light. Therefore, the same must be said when, by virtue of that universal: “Everyone duly elected, etc.,” having supposed as morally certain that “This person is duly elected,” it is believed by divine faith that this person is the true Pontiff—namely, that the minor premise will remain consequently, just as it was antecedently, only morally certain. |
| **45.** Et ratio a priori est, quia cum assensus fidei de hac propositione : *Innocent. XII. est verus Papa*, sit effectus formalis illius revelationis universalis : *Omnis rite electus est verus Papa*, unice motus formaliter ex illa, non potest inferre certitudinem, quam illa universalis non infert, quia effectus non potest excedere suam causam unicam : Sed illa universalis, *Omnis rite electus*, &c. adhuc supposita certitudine morali de rita electione Innocent. XII. non infert certitudinem metaphysicam de illa, quia adhuc tali certitudine supposita, nec mediate, nec immediate revelat ritam electionem, sed disparata se habet; & item, quia haec consequentia est disparate: Certum est metaphysice, quia sic revelatum, quod omnis rite electus est verus Papa, sed alias supponitur certum moraliter, quod hic est rite electus: Ergo certum est metaphysice hunc esse rite electum. Ergo adhuc supposita tali certitudine morali rite electionis, assensus fidei elicitus solum in vi illius universalis: Omnis rite electus, &c. non potest inferre metaphysicam certitudinem de rita electione Innocent. XII. |  | **45.** And the a priori reason is that since the assent of faith concerning this proposition: *Innocent XII is the true Pope*, is the formal effect of that universal revelation: *Everyone who is rightly elected is the true Pope*, formally motivated solely by that revelation, it cannot produce a certainty greater than what that universal proposition confers, because an effect cannot exceed its sole cause. But that universal proposition, *Everyone who is rightly elected*, etc., even supposing moral certainty about the right election of Innocent XII, does not infer metaphysical certainty about it, because even with such certainty supposed, it neither mediately nor immediately reveals the rightness of the election, but relates to it disparately. Also, because this consequence is disparate: It is metaphysically certain, because it is so revealed, that everyone rightly elected is the true Pope, but it is otherwise supposed to be morally certain that this person is rightly elected: Therefore it is metaphysically certain that this person is rightly elected. Therefore, even supposing such moral certainty of a right election, the assent of faith elicited solely by virtue of that universal proposition: Everyone rightly elected, etc., cannot infer metaphysical certainty concerning the right election of Innocent XII. |
| **46.** Ex dictis inferes primo: Quod ad credendam singularem fide divina omnino absoluta, in vi universalis revelarae, non sufficit sola certitudo moralis de continentia singularis in universali. Secundo: Quod requiritur certitudo metaphysice infallibilis, non solum consequenter ad fidem singularis, sed etiam antecedenter, & ex parte motivi ad credendum, saltem tanquam conditio essentialis ut moveat ad fidem divinam absolutam. Tertio: Quod probari nequit esse de fide absolute, & sine tacita conditione, Innocent. XII. esse verum Papam, in vi illius universalis: *Omnis rite electus est verus Papa*, nisi prius ostendatur esse metaphysice infallibile quod sit rite, seu valide electus. Sed unde inquies id ostendi poterit? Respondeo, ut sequitur. |  | **46.** From what has been said, you may infer first: That for believing a particular proposition with absolutely divine faith, by virtue of a universal revelation, mere moral certainty about the inclusion of the particular in the universal is not sufficient. Second: That metaphysical and infallible certainty is required, not only consequently to the faith in the particular, but also antecedently, and on the part of the motive for believing, at least as an essential condition for it to move one to absolute divine faith. Third: That it cannot be proven to be a matter of absolute faith, without tacit condition, that Innocent XII is the true Pope, by virtue of the universal principle: “Every properly elected person is the true Pope,” unless it is first demonstrated with metaphysical infallibility that he was properly or validly elected. But from where, you may ask, can this be demonstrated? I respond as follows. |
| **INSTAURATUR RATIO** *Conclusionis.* |  | **THE ARGUMENT OF THE** *Conclusion* **IS RENEWED.** |
| 47. SI ergo instaurari potest ratio Conclusionis, ut efficaciter probet: Etenim quotiescumque est immediate de fide universalis, & est omnino infallibilis continentia singularis sub ipsa, singularis est etiam immediate, & absolute de fide: Sed haec universalis: *Omnis rite electus est verus Papa*, est immediate de fide; & est omnino infallibile, quod singularis ista: *Innocent. XII. est verus Papa*, continetur sub illa: Ergo etiam ista singularis est immediate, & absolute de fide. Minor, quoad secundam partem, in qua sola stat difficultas, probatur: Quia omnino, seu metaphysice infallibile est Innocent. XII. fuisse rite, seu valide electum: Sed in hoc consistit formaliter continentia praedictae singularis sub illa universali: Ergo talis continentia est omnino infallibilis. Probatur maior: Quia infallibile omnino est Electores non errasse in illa electione, saltem, quoad valorem ipsius: Ergo infallibile omnino est illam electionem fuisse ritam, seu validam. Probo antecedens: Infallibile omnino est Electores non errare in electione, quae absolvitur, & consumatur instinctu, & afflatu Spiritus Sancti : Sed infallibile omnino est quod electio Innocent. XII. fuit absoluta, & consumata instinctu, & afflatu Spiritus Sancti : Ergo infallibile omnino est, illam electionem fuisse ritam,& validam. Minor, in qua sola stat difficultas, probatur primo ex traditione perpetua Ecclesiae,quae semper tenuit illam sacram electionem, in qua designatur Pastor universalis Ecclesiae, & Div. Petri Successor,Vicarius Christi D. non absolvi, nec pacifice consummari,nisi per assistentiam Spiritus Sancti:Quam traditionem satis confirmat,& ex Cathedra docet Sixtus V. Const. 50. sic decernens : *In illa Sacra Electione censendi sunt Cardinales veri interpretes, atque internuncij voluntatis divinae,cuius Spiritu, sicut universum Ecclesiae Corpus sanctificatur, & regitur, ita maxime hoc totum huiusmodi electionis opus, eiusdem afflatu, & instinctu absolvi certissimum est, idque omnibus exploratum*: Sed perpetua Ecclesiae traditio, Pontificia Constitutione firmata ex Cathedra, facit fidem, & certitudinem omnino infallibilem, & non pure moralem : Ergo. |  | **47.** IF therefore the reasoning of the Conclusion can be established, so that it effectively proves: For whenever a universal proposition is immediately of faith, and the containment of a particular under it is absolutely infallible, then that particular is also immediately and absolutely of faith. But this universal proposition: *Every validly elected person is the true Pope*, is immediately of faith; and it is absolutely infallible that this particular proposition: *Innocent XII is the true Pope*, is contained under the former. Therefore, this particular proposition is also immediately and absolutely of faith. The minor premise, with respect to its second part, in which alone lies the difficulty, is proven: Because it is absolutely, or metaphysically, infallible that Innocent XII was validly, or legitimately elected. But in this consists formally the containment of the aforementioned particular under that universal proposition. Therefore, such containment is absolutely infallible. The major premise is proven: Because it is absolutely infallible that the Electors did not err in that election, at least regarding its validity. Therefore, it is absolutely infallible that the election was legitimate, or valid. I prove the antecedent: It is absolutely infallible that the Electors do not err in an election that is completed and consummated by the instinct and inspiration of the Holy Spirit. But it is absolutely infallible that the election of Innocent XII was completed and consummated by the instinct and inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, it is absolutely infallible that that election was legitimate and valid. The minor premise, in which alone lies the difficulty, is proven first from the perpetual tradition of the Church, which has always held that the sacred election, in which the universal Pastor of the Church and the Successor of Divine Peter, the Vicar of Christ the Lord, is designated, is not completed nor peacefully consummated except through the assistance of the Holy Spirit. This tradition is sufficiently confirmed and taught ex Cathedra by Sixtus V in Constitution 50, thus decreeing: *In that Sacred Election, the Cardinals must be considered true interpreters and intermediaries of the divine will, by whose Spirit, just as the entire Body of the Church is sanctified and governed, so most especially this entire work of election, it is most certain, is completed by His inspiration and instinct, and this is well known to all*. But the perpetual tradition of the Church, confirmed by a Pontifical Constitution ex Cathedra, establishes faith and certainty that is absolutely infallible, and not merely moral. Therefore. |
| 48. Secundo, quia Cardinales congregati, & pacifice eligentes, & promulgantes electionem Papae representant totam Ecclesiam in ordine ad munus illud eligendi, & promulgandi,seu proponendi Fidelibus verum Papam, tanquam verum Pastorem universalem, & primam regulam visibilem fidei, & morum: Sed est metaphysice infallibile, & non solum moraliter, Spiritum Sanctum assistere Ecclesiae, & consequenter non posse Ecclesiam errare in proponenda Fidelibus prima regula visibili fidei:Ergo nec in illa electione consummanda, & promulgada pacifice. Probo minore: Quia Spiritum Sanctum assistere Ecclesiae in eo munere est certum in vi illius Christi promissionis, Ioan. 16. *Cum venerit Paraclytus, decebit vos omnem veritatem : Ille docebit vos omnia, & suggeret vobis omnia, quaecumque dixero vobis* : Et, eam non posse errare, in vi illius revelationis, seu Sacri Textus, quo Paulus 1. ad Timoth. 3. inquit: *Quod Ecclesia est Columna, & firmamentum veritatis*, vide supra quaest. 5. à num. 3.4.Sed quod est certum in vi divinae promissionis,& revelationis,non solum est certum moraliter, sed in vi illius metaphysice infallibile:Ergo Ecclesiam regi ab Spiritu Sancto, & non posse errare in proponenda Fidelibus regula visibili fidei est certum, non solum moraliter, sed cum infallibilitate metaphysica, nempe in vi divinae promissionis, & revelationis. |  | **48.** Secondly, because the Cardinals gathered together, peacefully electing and promulgating the election of the Pope, represent the entire Church in relation to that duty of electing and promulgating, or proposing to the Faithful the true Pope as the true universal Pastor and the first visible rule of faith and morals. But it is metaphysically infallible, and not merely morally so, that the Holy Spirit assists the Church, and consequently the Church cannot err in proposing to the Faithful the first visible rule of faith. Therefore, neither can it err in consummating and peacefully promulgating that election. I prove the minor premise: Because the Holy Spirit’s assistance to the Church in this duty is certain by virtue of Christ’s promise in John 16: “When the Paraclete comes, he will teach you all truth: He will teach you all things and remind you of everything that I have told you.” And that the Church cannot err is by virtue of that revelation or Sacred Text in which Paul in 1 Timothy 3 says: “That the Church is the pillar and foundation of truth,” see above question 5, from numbers 3-4. But what is certain by virtue of divine promise and revelation is not only morally certain but metaphysically infallible by virtue of it. Therefore, that the Church is governed by the Holy Spirit and cannot err in proposing to the Faithful the visible rule of faith is certain not only morally but with metaphysical infallibility, namely by virtue of divine promise and revelation. |
| 49. Confirmatur: Quia in vi dictae promissionis, & revelationis, & aliarum similium est metaphysice infallibile Ecclesiam non posse errare in proponendis rebus fidei ad salutem necessariis : Sed regula visibilis,& animata fidei est maxime res fidei, & credenda de necessitate salutis, ut patet ex dictis supra quaest. 4. & quaest. 9. num. 4. ubi Bonifacius VIII. expresse asserit id esse : Omnino de necessitate salutis: Ergo ex vi dictae revelationis, & promissionis est metaphysice infallibile Ecclesiam non posse errare in proponenda Fidelibus regula visibili animata fidei,& consequenter nec in electione Summi Pastoris ut consumata, & absoluta pacifica, seu pacifice promulgata. |  | **49.** This is confirmed: Because by virtue of the said promise, revelation, and other similar ones, it is metaphysically infallible that the Church cannot err in proposing matters of faith necessary for salvation. But the visible and animate rule of faith is most certainly a matter of faith, and must be believed out of necessity for salvation, as is evident from what was said above in question 4 and question 9, number 4, where Boniface VIII expressly asserts that it is: “Absolutely necessary for salvation.” Therefore, by virtue of the said revelation and promise, it is metaphysically infallible that the Church cannot err in proposing to the Faithful the visible animate rule of faith, and consequently, neither in the election of the Supreme Pastor when it is consummated, absolute, and peacefully accepted, or peacefully promulgated. |
| 50. Confirmatur: Quia non minus est res fidei, & ad salutem necessaria regula visibilis animata fidei (quae est Papa) quam regula visibilis inanimata, quales sunt Libri Canonici: Sed quia in vi revelationis, vel traditionis Ecclesia est infallibilis in proponendis rebus fidei, est etiam infallibilis in proponenda Fidelibus regula fidei inanimata,nempe definiendo, quaenam sit vera Scriptura, & veri Libri Canonici: Ergo potiori iure erit infallibilis in proponenda Fidelibus regula visibili animata, nempe vero Summo Pontifice, seu Papa. |  | **50.** This is further confirmed: Because the visible animate rule of faith (which is the Pope) is no less a matter of faith and necessary for salvation than the visible inanimate rule, such as the Canonical Books. But since by virtue of revelation or tradition the Church is infallible in proposing matters of faith, it is also infallible in proposing to the Faithful the inanimate rule of faith, namely in defining which is the true Scripture and which are the true Canonical Books. Therefore, with even stronger reason, the Church will be infallible in proposing to the Faithful the visible animate rule, namely the true Supreme Pontiff, or Pope. |
| 51. Confirmatur tertio: Quia si Ecclesia posset errare in proponenda regula animata fidei, seu proponendo Papam nullum pro vero, eo ipso posset errare in definiendis rebus fidei: Sed nequit errare in definiendis rebus fidei, idque est infallibile in vi revelationis, & promissionis Divinae: Ergo pariter est infallibile, quod non possit errare in proponenda regula animata visibili fidei, proponendo Papam nullum,pro vero. Maior probatur: Quia semel quod erraret proponendo Papam nullum, pro vero, iam ille in definiendis rebus fidei non esset infallibilis regula fidei, quia solus verus, & non falsus Papa est regula infallibilis in definiendis rebus fidei: Sed si Papa esset fallibilis in rebus fidei definiendis, eo ipso Ecclesia in his posset errare, quia Ecclesia non definit res fidei, nisi per os Summi Pastoris: Ergo. |  | **51.** It is confirmed thirdly: Because if the Church could err in proposing the living rule of faith, or in proposing a null Pope as true, by that very fact it could err in defining matters of faith. But it cannot err in defining matters of faith, and this infallibility exists by virtue of Divine revelation and promise. Therefore, it is equally infallible that the Church cannot err in proposing the visible living rule of faith by presenting a null Pope as true. The major premise is proven: Because once the Church would err by proposing a null Pope as true, that person would not be an infallible rule of faith in defining matters of faith, since only a true Pope, not a false one, is the infallible rule in defining matters of faith. But if the Pope were fallible in defining matters of faith, by that very fact the Church could err in these matters, because the Church does not define matters of faith except through the mouth of the Supreme Pastor. Therefore [the conclusion follows]. |
| 52. Confirmatur quarto: Nam definibile est, & determinabile secundum fidem, quaenam sit regula visibilis animata fidei, cui omnes Christi Fideles in fide conformari teneantur, sicut est definibile secundum fidem, quaenam sit regula fidei inanimata, v.g.quaenam sit vera Scriptura: Ergo debet dari in Ecclesia Authoritas infallibilis ad hoc definiendum, & modus infallibilis hoc definiendi; sed ad hoc definiendum non est alia Authoritas in Ecclesia destinata, nisi Collegium Cardinalium, nec alius modus hoc definiendi,nisi per electionem pacificam,pacifice promulgatam, quia Ecclesia non aliter proponit Fidelibus, nec definit hunc esse verum Papam, seu veram regulam animatam fidei, nisi designando per electionem verum Christi Vicarium, & Successorem D. Petri, & pacifice electum pacifice promulgando Fidelibus ut vere talem: Ergo in hoc munere Ecclesia infallibilis est: Ergo electio pacifica, & pacifice promulgata infallibilis est, & non potest errare proponendo Papam nullum, pro vero: Ergo implicat quod sit nulla: Ergo hoc non solum est moraliter certum, sed omnino infallibile in vi divinae revelationis, & promissionis, vi cuius Ecclesia errare nequit in rebus fidei proponendis, & definiendis. Ex quo. |  | **52.** It is confirmed fourthly: For it is definable and determinable according to faith which is the living visible rule of faith to which all Christ’s Faithful are bound to conform in faith, just as it is definable according to faith which is the inanimate rule of faith, e.g., which is the true Scripture. Therefore, there must exist in the Church an infallible Authority to define this, and an infallible method of defining it; but for defining this there is no other Authority designated in the Church except the College of Cardinals, nor any other method of defining this except through peaceful election, peacefully promulgated, because the Church does not otherwise propose to the Faithful, nor define this to be the true Pope, or the true living rule of faith, except by designating through election the true Vicar of Christ and Successor of St. Peter, and by peacefully promulgating to the Faithful the one peacefully elected as truly such. Therefore, the Church is infallible in this function. Therefore, a peaceful election, peacefully promulgated, is infallible and cannot err in proposing a null Pope as true. Therefore, it is contradictory that such an election could be null. Therefore, this is not only morally certain but entirely infallible by virtue of divine revelation and promise, by force of which the Church cannot err in proposing and defining matters of faith. From which: |
| **ALIAE RATIONES PRO Conclusione.** |  | **OTHER REASONS FOR The Conclusion.** |
| 53. SECUNDO probatur Conclusio: Non potest Pontifex facere fidem absolute infallibilem in rebus a se definitis ex Cathedra, nisi sit absolute de fide ipsum esse verum Pontificem; Sed iuxta omnes Catholicos Pontifex hic numero, nempe Innocent. XII. facit fidem infallibilem in rebus, quas ex Cathedra definit: Ergo de fide absolute est ipsum esse verum Pontificem. Probatur maior: Quia non potest Pontifex facere fidem absolute infallibilem in rebus ex Cathedra definitis. Nisi sit absolute de fide definitionem ipsius esse legitimam, nec potest esse de fide eius definitionem esse legitimam, nisi sit absolute de fide esse factam a vero Pontifice, seu a vera regula fidei; Sed hoc nequit esse absolute de fide, nisi sit absolute de fide ipsum esse verum Pontificem: Ergo. |  | **53.** SECONDLY, the Conclusion is proven: The Pontiff cannot establish absolutely infallible faith in matters defined by himself ex Cathedra, unless it is absolutely a matter of faith that he is the true Pontiff; But according to all Catholics, this particular Pontiff, namely Innocent XII, establishes infallible faith in matters which he defines ex Cathedra: Therefore, it is absolutely a matter of faith that he is the true Pontiff. The major premise is proven: Because the Pontiff cannot establish absolutely infallible faith in matters defined ex Cathedra, unless it is absolutely a matter of faith that his definition is legitimate, nor can it be a matter of faith that his definition is legitimate, unless it is absolutely a matter of faith that it was made by a true Pontiff, or by a true rule of faith; But this cannot be absolutely a matter of faith, unless it is absolutely a matter of faith that he is the true Pontiff: Therefore [the conclusion follows]. |
| Respondent PP.Salmant. Quibus haec ratio non placet, in primis retorquendo illam sic: *Non possumus obligari ad credendum fide divina rem definitam a Pontifice, nisi pariter obligemur ad credendum fide divina, definitionem eius esse legitimam, ac subinde procedere a legitimo Pontifice: Sed non tenemur credere immediate per fidem divinam hunc hominem definientem esse legitimum Pontificem: Ergo non tenemur credere immediate per fidem divinam rem ab hoc Pontifice definitam.* In hoc discursu, inquiunt: Consequentia est legitima, & consequens est haereticum: Ergo opus est, quod aliqua ex praemissis sit falsa: Sed non est falsa minor, quia Ecclesia hucusque nõ definivit teneri homines ad praedictum assensum, & illum denegare non est haereticum: Ergo maior, in qua fundamus praesentem rationem, est falsa, vel dubia. |  | **54.** The Fathers of Salamanca respond. For those who do not accept this reasoning, they first counter it as follows: *We cannot be obliged to believe by divine faith a matter defined by a Pontiff, unless we are equally obliged to believe by divine faith that his definition is legitimate, and consequently that it proceeds from a legitimate Pontiff: But we are not bound to believe immediately by divine faith that this defining man is a legitimate Pontiff: Therefore, we are not bound to believe immediately by divine faith a matter defined by this Pontiff.* In this discourse, they say: The consequence is legitimate, and the consequent is heretical: Therefore, it is necessary that one of the premises be false: But the minor is not false, because the Church has not thus far defined that men are bound to the aforementioned assent, and to deny it is not heretical: Therefore, the major premise, on which we base the present reasoning, is false or doubtful. |
| Sed sane, non capio, qua ratione dicant minorem illam non esse falsam? Etenim ipsi tenent cum communi sententia, hanc propositionem ut veram, eamque ut veram propugnant: Tenemur credere immediate per fidem divinam hunc hominem esse verum Pontificem, siquidem defendunt id esse immediate de fide divina: Sed minor illa est expressa huic contradictoria; siquidem dicit: Non tenemur, &c. Ergo dicunt non esse falsam contradictoriam expressam illius propositionis, quam propugnant ut veram. Hoc autem dici nequit, nisi negando illam regulam evidentem dialecticae, quod ex contradictoriis, si una est vera, altera necessario est falsa, quia impossibile est ide simul esse, & non esse: Est ergo falsa illa minor. Nec in contra obstat, quod Ecclesia non definierit expresse nos teneri ad credendum fide divina hunc hominem esse verum Pontificem. Tum quia licet id non definierit signate, & expresse, definitum tamen iam est implicite, seu exercite, eadem definitione, qua definitum est nos teneri ad credendum fide divina huic Pontifici ex cathedra definienti, tanquam regulae infallibili in proponendo, & id sufficit ut teneamur: Tum quia ut teneamur vera obligatione, non opus est, quod talis obligatio sit definita, & illam negare sit haereticum; alias quamvis omnes sapientes dicerent, nullo contradicente, nos obligari ad aliquid, non obligaremur, usque dum Ecclesia expresse definiret, & redderet haereticam opinionem contrariam, quod sane absurdissimum foret. Unde potius ex praedicto discursu, sic debet summi; sed maior est vera, ut ostensum manet: Ergo minor est falsa, siquidem consequens est haereticum. |  | **55.** But indeed, I do not understand by what reasoning they say that the minor premise is not false. For they themselves hold, in accordance with the common opinion, this proposition as true, and defend it as such: We are bound to believe immediately through divine faith that this man is the true Pontiff, since they assert this to be immediately of divine faith. But that minor premise is expressly contradictory to this, as it states: We are not bound, etc. Therefore, they claim that the express contradictory of the proposition they defend as true is not false. This, however, cannot be maintained without denying that evident rule of dialectic which states that of contradictories, if one is true, the other is necessarily false, because it is impossible for the same thing to both be and not be at the same time. Therefore, that minor premise is false. Nor does it stand as an objection that the Church has not expressly defined that we are bound to believe by divine faith that this man is the true Pontiff. This is because, although the Church may not have defined it explicitly and expressly, it has already been defined implicitly or in practice by the same definition by which it was determined that we are bound to believe by divine faith this Pontiff when defining ex cathedra, as an infallible rule in proposing, and this suffices to bind us. Furthermore, for us to be truly obligated, it is not necessary that such an obligation be defined and that denying it be heretical; otherwise, even if all learned persons unanimously stated, with no one contradicting, that we are obliged to something, we would not be obligated until the Church expressly defined it and rendered the contrary opinion heretical, which would certainly be most absurd. Hence, from the aforementioned discourse, it should rather be concluded thus: the major premise is true, as has been demonstrated; therefore, the minor premise is false, since the consequent is heretical. |
| Opponunt secundo, contra praedictam rationem quod Belarm. apud Suarium disput. 5. sect. 8. num. 12. censet, non solum verum Pontificem non posse errare in definiendis rebus fidei, sed nec reputatum ab Ecclesia: Si autem hoc verum est, ergo non est opus credere fide divina ipsum esse verum, & legitimum Papam, ut sint certae de fide res ab eo definitae. Sed contra, quia ut ipse Suarez postea disput. 10. sect. 5. num. 4. inquit, qui hoc dicit: Primam veritatem ignorat, & contradictoria dicit. Primo, quia essentia Summi Pontificis, ut ab aliis Episcopis contradistingui, est habere infallibilem authoritatem in definiendis rebus fidei ex infallibili assistentia Spiritus Sancti: Ergo dicere, quod haberet hanc authoritatem, quamvis non esset verus Pontifex, sed solum reputatus ab Ecclesia, est dicere, quod haberet essentiam Summi Pontificis, quamvis non esset verus Pontifex, quod est vel ignorare quod significet verus Pontifex, vel dicere contradictoria simul. Secundo, quia vel Ecclesia potest falli reputando verum Papam, illum qui verus Papa non sit. vel in hoc falli nequit? Si in hoc falli nequit? Ergo dictum Belarmini implicat contradictionem, dum admittit possibilem Papam reputatum ab Ecclesia, qui non sit verus Papa. Si in hoc falli potest: Ergo potiori titulo, vel aequali fallibilis erit in reputando ipsum pro infallibili in definiendo ex infallibili assistentia Spiritus Sancti. Tum quia in hoc consistit differentia essentialis Summi Pontificis. Tum quia non minus certum est ipsum habere infallibilem assistentiam Spiritus Sancti in definiendo, quam ipsum esse verum Pontificem: Ergo si Ecclesia circa hoc secundum falli possit, falli etiam poterit circa primum, reputando ipsum infallibilem in definiendo, quin re ipsa infallibilis sit, & existimando assistentiam infallibilem Spiritus Sancti, ubi talis assistentia non sit. |  | **56.** They object secondly against the aforementioned reasoning that Bellarmine, as cited by Suárez in disputation 5, section 8, number 12, holds that not only can a true Pontiff not err in defining matters of faith, but neither can one who is merely reputed as such by the Church. If this were true, then it would not be necessary to believe with divine faith that he is the true and legitimate Pope in order for matters defined by him to be certain as matters of faith. But against this, as Suárez himself later states in disputation 10, section 5, number 4, whoever says this “is ignorant of the first truth and speaks contradictions.” First, because the essence of the Supreme Pontiff, as distinguished from other Bishops, is to have infallible authority in defining matters of faith through the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, to say that someone would have this authority even though he were not the true Pontiff, but only reputed as such by the Church, is to say that he would possess the essence of the Supreme Pontiff while not being the true Pontiff—which either demonstrates ignorance of what “true Pontiff” signifies, or asserts contradictions simultaneously. Second, either the Church can err in regarding as the true Pope one who is not the true Pope, or it cannot err in this matter. If it cannot err in this? Then Bellarmine’s statement implies a contradiction, while admitting the possibility of a Pope reputed by the Church who is not the true Pope. If it can err in this? Then, with greater or at least equal reason, it will be fallible in regarding him as infallible in defining matters through the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit. This is true both because the essential difference of the Supreme Pontiff consists in this, and because it is no less certain that he has the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit in defining than that he is the true Pontiff. Therefore, if the Church could be mistaken about this second point, it could also be mistaken about the first, regarding him as infallible in defining when in reality he is not infallible, and presuming the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit where such assistance does not exist. |
| 57. Dices forsan: Esse necessarium ut Ecclesiae fides firma, & infallibilis sit, quod falli non possit circa regulam infallibilem fidei, quia si falleretur existimando regulam infallibilem, illum qui talis non esset, nutaret tota fides Ecclesiae. Attamen ad firmitatem fidei opus non esse, quod falli non possit Ecclesia putando verum Pontificem, eum, qui re ipsa, vel non sit baptizatus, vel non sit valide ordinatus, aut consecratus, aut rite electus, quia quamvis haec omnia deficerent si tamen maneret semper regula infallibilis fidei, Ecclesiae fides semper firma persisteret. Sed contra, quia in Summo Pontifice sicut necessaria est authoritas infallibilis definiendi doctrinam fidei, ita etiam est necessaria infallibilis potestas ligandi atque solvendi, non quidem solum in foro externo, & judiciali, sed potissime in foro Conscientiae, tum quia sicut Ecclesiae fides debet esse infallibilis; & non esset talis, si capitis authoritas fallibilis foret; ita remissio peccatorum debet esse infallibilis in Ecclesia, & non esset infallibilis, si potestas Clavium, seu jurisdictio spiritualis pro foro Conscientiae remittendi peccata, non esset infallibilis in Summo Pontifice, a quo talis jurisdictio promanet ad caeteros Ecclesiae Pastores. Tum quia Christus Dominus non solum commisit Petro Authoritatem infallibilem proponendi veram doctrinam fidei per ea verba: Pasce Oves meas, nempe salutari doctrina; sed etiam potestatem Clavium seu jurisdictionem spiritualem claudendi, & aperiendi Regnum Coelorum, retinendi, & remittendi peccata, per ea verba: Tibi dabo claves: Quodcumque ligaveris, &c. Et utramque authoritatem, seu potestatem tradidit Petro pro se, & pro suis Successoribus, ut perpetuo futuram in Ecclesia: Ergo quia utramque judicavit Christus Ecclesiae suae aeque necessariam : Et utramque voluit esse infallibilem. Tum demum : Quia rogo, casu, iuxta solutionem possibili, quo Summus Pontifex non esset vere sacerdos, si tentaret absolvere sacramentaliter aliquem rite dispositum, valide ne absolveret, vel non? Si non: Ergo omnes, qui recurrunt ad Papam, pro peccatorum suorum absolutione, fallerentur : Ergo Pontifex non haberet iurisdictionem absolvendi sacramentaliter : Ergo nec valide illam conferret Pastoribus inferioribus. Item si consecraret Episcopos aliquos : Ergo illi non manerent re ipsa consecrati, & similiter si ordinaret Diaconos, vel Sacerdotes : Ergo si potestas ordinalis, & iurisdictionis spiritualis esset fallibilis in Summo Pontifice, & Ecclesia in hoc posset falli, falli posset recurrendo ad Papam pro peccatorum absolutione, falli posset recurrendo ad Episcopos, quia a solo Papa accipiunt talem iurisdictionem; falli posset existimando re ipsa ordinatos, & consecratos, quos Pontifex ordinasset, & consecrasset, & in omnibus ab illis ordinatis, & consecratis, siquidem omnia essent nulla: Cum autem haec absurdissima sint, dici debet, quod in Pontifice Romano est aeque infallibilis potestas ordinis, & clavium, seu iurisdictio spiritualis, sicut authoritas infallibilis in rebus fidei proponendis. Dicere autem, quod licet non esset vere sacerdos, nec baptizatus, valide absolveret sacramentaliter, & valide exerceret actus ordinis, haereticum est : Ergo debet etiam esse infallibile quod sit verus sacerdos, & vere baptizatus. |  | **57.** Perhaps you will say: It is necessary for the Church’s faith to be firm and infallible, that it cannot be deceived regarding the infallible rule of faith, because if it were deceived in considering as an infallible rule one who was not such, the entire faith of the Church would waver. However, for the firmness of faith, it is not necessary that the Church be unable to be deceived in thinking someone to be the true Pontiff who in reality is either not baptized, or not validly ordained, or not validly consecrated, or not properly elected, because even if all these things were deficient, if the infallible rule of faith nevertheless always remained, the faith of the Church would always remain firm. But against this argument, because in the Supreme Pontiff, just as the infallible authority of defining the doctrine of faith is necessary, so also is the infallible power of binding and loosing necessary, not only in the external and judicial forum, but especially in the forum of Conscience. This is so first because just as the Church’s faith must be infallible, and would not be such if the authority of the head were fallible; likewise, the remission of sins must be infallible in the Church, and would not be infallible if the power of the Keys, or the spiritual jurisdiction for the forum of Conscience in remitting sins, were not infallible in the Supreme Pontiff, from whom such jurisdiction flows to the other Pastors of the Church. Secondly, because Christ the Lord not only entrusted to Peter the infallible Authority of proposing true doctrine of faith through these words: “Feed my sheep,” namely with salutary doctrine; but also the power of the Keys or spiritual jurisdiction of closing and opening the Kingdom of Heaven, of retaining and remitting sins, through these words: “To you I will give the keys: Whatever you bind, etc.” And Christ handed over both authorities, or powers, to Peter for himself and for his Successors, to exist perpetually in the Church. Therefore, Christ judged both to be equally necessary for His Church, and He wanted both to be infallible. Finally, I ask, in the case that according to this solution is possible, if the Supreme Pontiff were not truly a priest, if he attempted to sacramentally absolve someone properly disposed, would he validly absolve or not? If not, then all who approach the Pope for the absolution of their sins would be deceived. Therefore, the Pontiff would not have jurisdiction to absolve sacramentally. Therefore, he would not validly confer that jurisdiction to inferior Pastors. Likewise, if he consecrated certain Bishops, they would not in reality remain consecrated, and similarly if he ordained Deacons or Priests. Therefore, if the power of orders and spiritual jurisdiction were fallible in the Supreme Pontiff, and the Church could be deceived in this, it could be deceived in recourse to the Pope for the absolution of sins, it could be deceived in recourse to Bishops, because they receive such jurisdiction from the Pope alone; it could be deceived in considering as truly ordained and consecrated those whom the Pontiff had ordained and consecrated, and in all those ordained and consecrated by them, since all such acts would be null. Since these things are most absurd, it must be said that in the Roman Pontiff the power of orders and of the keys, or spiritual jurisdiction, is equally infallible as is the infallible authority in proposing matters of faith. To say, however, that although he were not truly a priest, nor baptized, he would validly absolve sacramentally and validly exercise acts of orders, is heretical. Therefore, it must also be infallibly certain that he is a true priest and truly baptized. |
| 58. Dicere ergo, cum aliquibus, quos suppresso nomine refert Suarez *ubi supra*, quod haberet omnia privilegia Summi Pontificis, & valide ageret omnia munera ipsius, ut absolvere sacramentaliter, conferre iurisdictionem sacramentalem, & ordinare Episcopos, creare Cardinales, definire res fidei, imponere censuras, &c. quamvis verus Papa non esset : Manifestam implicationem involvit, vel potius haeresim : Implicationem, quia haberet essentiam adaequatam Summi Pontificis, & non esset Summus Pontifex. Haeresim : Nam haereticum est dicere actus ordinis valide exerceri a non baptizato, nec valide ordinato : Nec potest dici quod Ecclesia suppleret, tum quia Ecclesia supplere nequit potestatem ordinis, Tum quia nec iurisdictionem in supremo Capite supplere potest, quia supremum Caput non accepit ab Ecclesia iurisdictionem, sed a solo Christo. Si autem Christus illi conferret iurisdictionem, re ipsa faceret illum Papam. |  | **58.** To say, therefore, along with certain authors whom Suarez cites without naming *in the aforementioned passage*, that such a person would possess all the privileges of the Supreme Pontiff and validly perform all his duties, such as absolving sacramentally, conferring sacramental jurisdiction, ordaining Bishops, creating Cardinals, defining matters of faith, imposing censures, etc., although he would not be the true Pope: This involves a manifest contradiction, or rather a heresy. A contradiction, because he would possess the complete essence of the Supreme Pontiff, yet not be the Supreme Pontiff. A heresy: For it is heretical to say that acts of orders can be validly exercised by one who is neither baptized nor validly ordained. Nor can it be said that the Church would supply the defect, both because the Church cannot supply the power of orders, and because it cannot supply jurisdiction in the supreme Head, since the supreme Head does not receive jurisdiction from the Church, but from Christ alone. If, however, Christ were to confer jurisdiction upon him, this would in fact make him Pope. |
| 59. Addunt praeterea PP. Salmanticenses, non esse opus credere definitionem esse legitimam, ut credamus fide divina res diffinitas? Ergo nec opus est credere fide divina definientem esse legitimum Pontificem, ad credendas res diffinitas. Probant antecedens, quia intimius se habet ad rem credendam revelatio divina, quam definitio Pontificis: Sed non est opus ad credendam rem revelatam credere ipsam revelationem per eandem fidem, quia fides rei revelatae stat cum evidentia revelationis, & consequenter sine fide ipsius revelationis, ut supponunt a se probatum: Ergo. Sed sane hoc fundamentum in sufficiens esse ad derendam illam rationem quam communem inter Thomistas supponunt. Nam propterea Thomistae illi requirunt quod sit de fide definitionem esse legitimam, & a legitimo Pontifice factam, quia aliter de hoc non potest haberi infallibilis certitudo, seu quia non sufficit certitudo moralis fallibilis de legitima definitione, & legitimo Pontifice: Contra hoc autem non video qua consequentia liceat opponere, quod ad fidem rei revelatae non requiritur fides divina de revelatione, sed sufficit evidentia in attestante, quae sane, vel magis, vel saltem aeque certa est, & metaphisice infallibilis, nam est idem, ac sic arguere: Ad fidem divinam rei revelatae non requiritur credere per fidem ipsam revelationem, sed sufficit habere de illa evidentiam aeque vel magis certam, & infallibilem, quam sit fides: Ergo ad fidem divinam rei definitae, non requiritur credere fide divina definitionem esse legitimam, sed sufficit certitudo moralis fallibilis, & multo inferior ad certitudinem fidei. Haec autem consequentia apertissime est nulla. Itaque, si PP. Salm. loco fidei divinae de legitima definitione, & legitimo Pontifice, substituerent evidentiam supernaturalem infallibilem de hoc ipso, qualis est evidentia revelationis, libenter illis daremus, quod opus non esset credere per fidem definitionem legitimam, at, repugnamus, quod sufficiat certitudo moralis fallibilis de legitima definitione, ut sit de fide infallibili res definita. Unde. |  | **59.** Furthermore, the Fathers of Salamanca add that it is not necessary to believe that a definition is legitimate in order to believe by divine faith the things defined. Therefore, neither is it necessary to believe by divine faith that the one defining is a legitimate Pontiff in order to believe the things defined. They prove the antecedent because divine revelation is more intimately connected to the thing to be believed than the definition of the Pontiff. But it is not necessary for believing a revealed matter to believe the revelation itself through the same faith, because faith in the revealed matter stands with the evidence of the revelation, and consequently without faith in the revelation itself, as they suppose they have proven. Therefore, etc. But truly this foundation is insufficient to take down that reasoning which they suppose to be common among Thomists. For those Thomists require that it be a matter of faith that the definition is legitimate and made by a legitimate Pontiff, because otherwise one cannot have infallible certainty about this, or because fallible moral certainty about a legitimate definition and legitimate Pontiff is not sufficient. Against this, however, I do not see by what consequence one may oppose the argument that faith in a revealed matter does not require divine faith in the revelation, but that evidence in attestation suffices, which is certainly either more or at least equally certain and metaphysically infallible. For it is the same as arguing thus: For divine faith in a revealed matter, it is not required to believe the revelation itself through faith, but it suffices to have evidence about it that is equally or more certain and infallible than faith itself. Therefore, for divine faith in a defined matter, it is not required to believe by divine faith that the definition is legitimate, but fallible moral certainty suffices, which is much inferior to the certainty of faith. This consequence, however, is most clearly invalid. Therefore, if the Salamancan Fathers were to substitute, in place of divine faith concerning legitimate definition and legitimate Pontiff, infallible supernatural evidence about this very matter—such as is the evidence of revelation—we would willingly grant them that it would not be necessary to believe through faith that the definition is legitimate. But we object to the notion that fallible moral certainty about a legitimate definition suffices for the defined matter to be of infallible faith. Hence… |
| **60.** Sic argumentor: Infallibilitas fidei divinae ut Catholicae, non solum nititur revelationi divinae infallibili, sed etiam infallibili propositioni Ecclesiae, quia nititur revelationi divinae, ut propositae per Ecclesiam, atque adeo non solum falleretur fides si falsa esset revelatio, sed etiam falleretur, si falsa foret Ecclesiae definitio: Sed ut res revelata sit de fide divina, seu certa secundum fidem, requiritur quod revelatio sit certa secundum fidem, vel loco illius per infallibilem evidentiam, & non sufficit sola certitudo moralis: Ergo ut res definita sit de fide divina, non sufficit tantum certitudo moralis fallibilis de eo quod definitio sit legitima, sed requiritur certitudo fidei infallibilis, vel evidentia supernaturalis infallibilis: Sed haec evidentia non habetur de legitima definitione: Ergo requiritur illa certitudo fidei infallibilis. Vide supra, *disput. 1. quest. 13. a num. 8*. |  | **60.** I argue thus: The infallibility of divine and Catholic faith rests not only on infallible divine revelation, but also on the infallible proposition of the Church, because it depends on divine revelation as proposed through the Church. Therefore, faith would be deceived not only if the revelation were false, but also if the Church’s definition were false. But for a revealed matter to be of divine faith, or certain according to faith, it is required that the revelation be certain according to faith, or in place of that, through infallible evidence, and mere moral certainty does not suffice. Therefore, for a defined matter to be of divine faith, mere fallible moral certainty that the definition is legitimate is not sufficient, but infallible certainty of faith is required, or infallible supernatural evidence. But this evidence is not available regarding a legitimate definition. Therefore, that infallible certainty of faith is required. See above, *disputation 1, question 13, from number 8*. |
| **61.** Sed dices: Ad credendam fide divina rem revelatam opus non est credere prius fide divina revelationem ut quod, ut ostendimus loco citat, a num.11. Ergo ad credendam fide divina rem definitam a Pontifice, opus non est credere fide divina illam esse definitam legitime, & a legitimo Pontifice. Distinguo consequens: Opus non est credere fide divina signate, & ut quod definitionem esse legitimam, concedo consequentiam: Exercite, & ut quo, vel ut cui, nego consequentiam. Itaque fatemur quod ad credendam fide divina rem definitam a Pontifice, non requiritur prius signate credere per actum praevium fidei divinae definitionem esse legitimam, & a legitimo Papa, quod eisdem rationibus probari potest, quibus idem probavimus de revelatione contra Suarez, ubi supra. Caeterum sicut hoc non obstante, requiritur, quod revelatio credatur fide divina, ut quo, & ut cui, & quod proponatur ut motivum infallibile, & ut infallibiliter certa, & non sufficit quod proponatur ut pure certa moraliter ex motivis humanis, ut ibidem ostendimus a num, 25. & 27. ita & idem dicimus de definitione Ecclesiae: Quia licet haec non sit motivum formale fidei, est tamen conditio essentialis ex parte motivi fidei Catholicae, ut Catholicae, unde debet proponi ut certa, & infallibilis, sicut ipsa revelatio. Aliud namque est, quod in ordine credendi, non debeat credi prius ut quod, nec revelatio, nec definitio Ecclesiae, aliud, quod non debeat esse certa, & infallibilis, & ut talis proponi: Dicimus enim, quod tam revelatio, quam Ecclesiae definitio non debent prius credi ut quod fide divina, immo nec fide humana, nec alio iudicio; attamen tam revelatio, quam Ecclesiae definitio debent prius proponi cum certitudine non solum morali, sed metaphisica, & infallibili, & debent gaudere hac certitudine, ut possint movere ad assensum fidei divinae circa rem revelatam, aut definitam, quia nisi tanta certitudine gaudeant, & proponantur, non possunt movere ad assensum infallibilem omnino rei definitae, seu revelatae. |  | **61.** But you might say: In order to believe by divine faith something that has been revealed, it is not necessary to first believe by divine faith the revelation itself as the object of belief, as we have shown in the cited passage, from number 11. Therefore, in order to believe by divine faith something defined by the Pontiff, it is not necessary to believe by divine faith that it has been legitimately defined, and by a legitimate Pontiff. I distinguish the consequent: It is not necessary to believe by divine faith explicitly and as the object of belief that the definition is legitimate, I concede the consequence; implicitly and as the means by which, or as that to which assent is given, I deny the consequence. And so we acknowledge that in order to believe by divine faith something defined by the Pontiff, it is not required to first explicitly believe through a prior act of divine faith that the definition is legitimate and from a legitimate Pope, which can be proven by the same reasoning with which we demonstrated the same regarding revelation against Suárez, as above. Nevertheless, just as, this notwithstanding, it is required that revelation be believed by divine faith as the means by which, and as that to which assent is given, and that it be proposed as an infallible motive and as infallibly certain, and it is not sufficient that it be proposed as merely morally certain from human motives, as we demonstrated in the same place from number 25 and 27, so we say the same about the definition of the Church: Because although this is not the formal motive of faith, it is nevertheless an essential condition on the part of the motive of Catholic faith as Catholic, whence it ought to be proposed as certain and infallible, just like revelation itself. For it is one thing that in the order of believing, neither revelation nor the definition of the Church need be believed first as the object of belief, and another that they need not be certain and infallible, and proposed as such: For we say that both revelation and the Church’s definition need not be believed first as the object of divine faith, nor even of human faith, nor by any other judgment; nevertheless, both revelation and the Church’s definition must first be proposed with certainty not only moral, but metaphysical and infallible, and they must possess this certainty, so that they can move one to assent of divine faith concerning the thing revealed or defined, because unless they possess and are proposed with such certainty, they cannot move one to a completely infallible assent to the thing defined or revealed. |
| **62.** Tertio probatur conclusio: Quia de fide est, immediate, & absolute quod hodie vere perseverat in Romano Pontifice dignitas Apostolica Summi Pastoris, & Vicarii Christi, quam Christus ipse contulit Div. Petro: Sed hodie vere perseverare illam dignitatem in Romano Pontifice formalissime est Romanum Pontificem hodie Regentem Ecclesiam, nempe Innocentium XII. esse verum Pontificem, & Christi Vicarium : Ergo immediate, & absolute est de fide Innocentium XII. hodie Regentem Ecclesiam esse verum Pontificem, & Christi Vicarium. Maior ostensa manet supra, quaest. 9. estque dogma Catholicum, ac definitum saepissime, ut videri potest ibidem a num. 4. Minor vero non est minus certa, quia solum differunt penes activam, & passivam haec duo : *Hodie vere perseverat dignitas Pontificia in Romano Pontifice : Romanus Pontifex hodie regnans, vere conservat, seu retinet dignitatem Pontificiam, seu est verus Pontifex* : Ergo idem formaliter est unum ac aliud. |  | **62.** Third, the conclusion is proven: Because it is of faith, immediately and absolutely, that today the Apostolic dignity of Supreme Pastor and Vicar of Christ, which Christ himself conferred upon Divine Peter, truly perseveres in the Roman Pontiff. But for that dignity to truly persevere today in the Roman Pontiff most formally means that the Roman Pontiff ruling the Church today, namely Innocent XII, is the true Pontiff and Vicar of Christ. Therefore, immediately and absolutely, it is of faith that Innocent XII, who rules the Church today, is the true Pontiff and Vicar of Christ. The major premise has been demonstrated above, in question 9, and is Catholic dogma, defined most frequently, as can be seen there from number 4. The minor premise is no less certain, because these two statements differ only in terms of active and passive voice: “Today the Pontifical dignity truly perseveres in the Roman Pontiff” and “The Roman Pontiff reigning today truly conserves or retains the Pontifical dignity, or is the true Pontiff.” Therefore, one is formally the same as the other. |
| Confirmatur, seu explicatur: Quia immediate de fide est dignitatem visibilem Capitis Ecclesiae collatam Petro perseveraturam in Ecclesia usque ad diem iudicii, id enim immediate revelavit Christus, cum dixit Petro: *Super hanc Petram aedificabo Ecclesiam meam; & portae inferi non praevalebunt adversus eam* : Ergo immediate de fide est, & immediate revelatum, quod illa dignitas semper perseverat vere in Ecclesia Dei, excepto tempore sedis vacantis, aut schismatis, quod non tollit continuationem, & perseverantiam moralem, ut supra vidimus, quaest. 9. d num. 11. Ergo cum hodie non sit tempus schismatis, nec sedis vacantis, de fide, immediate est, & immediate revelatum, quod hodie perseverat in Ecclesia ea suprema dignitas capitis visibilis : Ergo de fide est immediate, quod hodie est in Ecclesia verum caput visibile, cui visibiliter Ecclesia subordinatur : Hoc evidenter non est alius, nisi Innocent. XII. quia nunc non est tempus schismatis, in quo Ecclesiae proponantur duo capita visibilia, sed unum tantum, nempe Innocent. Ergo de fide immediate est quod Innocent. est verum caput visibile Ecclesiae, seu verus Pontifex. |  | **63.** It is confirmed, or explained: Because it is immediately of faith that the visible dignity of the Head of the Church conferred upon Peter will persevere in the Church until the day of judgment, for Christ immediately revealed this when He said to Peter: *Upon this Rock I will build my Church; and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it*. Therefore, it is immediately of faith, and immediately revealed, that this dignity always truly perseveres in the Church of God, except during the time of a vacant See or schism, which does not remove the moral continuation and perseverance, as we saw above in question 9, from number 11. Therefore, since today is not a time of schism, nor of a vacant See, it is immediately of faith, and immediately revealed, that the supreme dignity of the visible head perseveres in the Church today. Therefore, it is immediately of faith that there is today in the Church a true visible head, to whom the Church is visibly subordinated. This evidently is none other than Innocent XII, because now is not a time of schism, in which two visible heads are proposed to the Church, but only one, namely Innocent. Therefore, it is immediately of faith that Innocent is the true visible head of the Church, or the true Pontiff. |
| Dices forsan, esse de fide perseverare illam dignitatem in legitimis Successoribus Div. Petri : At non esse de fide, quod Innocent. sit legitimus Successor Div. Petri, quia non est de fide, quod sit legitime electus. Sed contra, quia redit argumentum factum, nam de fide est perseverare hodie illam dignitatem visibilem in legitimo Successore Div. Petri : ergo de fide est dari hodie legitimum Successorem, in quo perseveret illa dignitas : Sed non est hodie alius, qui habeat notas legitimi Successoris, nisi Innocentius XII. ergo de fide est illum esse legitimum Successorem Div. Petri : Si autem ad hoc requiritur quod sit legitime electus : Ergo mediate saltem erit de fide, quod est legitime electus. Explicatur : Revelatio illa Christi, in qua immediate revelatur perseveraturam in Ecclesia dignitatem Div. Petri, non est conditionata, sub conditione fallibili, aut defectibili, sed est revelatio omnino absoluta, tum quia in eodem sensu revelat firmitatem Petrae supra quam fundatur Ecclesia, ac firmitatem ipsius Ecclesiae; sed revelatio de firma Ecclesiae perseverantia non est conditionata, sub conditione fallibili, & defectibili, sed omnino absoluta, alias non esset hodie absolute de fide perseverare Ecclesiam a Christo fundatam : Ergo etiam revelatio de firma duratione illius Petrae, quae est dignitas Apostolica Petri, est absoluta, & non sub condine fallibili, & defectibili. Tum etiam, quia alias non certificasset Christus sufficienter Ecclesiam suam de constantia, & perseverantia illius Petrae, si illam reliquisset pendentem ex conditione fallibili, & defectibili; si enim sensus esset: Perseverabit firmiter illa solidissima Petra, si non desit rite electio, deficiet tamen, si rita electio defuerit, relinquendo contingentem, & fallibilem illam electionem, unde posset Ecclesia hodie certificari? Immo posset dicere: Forsam defecit Petra illa, quia forsan defecit rita electio : Debet ergo illa revelatio intelligi in sensu absoluto, & credi ut absoluta. Tunc sic, sed revelatio absoluta de perseverantia dignitatis est absoluta revelatio de existentia subiecti, vel Successoris in illa, quia dignitas perseverare nequit nisi in subiecto, & Successore, ut per se patet : Ergo illa revelatio Christi absolute revelat hodie existere verum Petri Successorem, in quo illa dignitas perseveret : Sed hic evidenter non est alius, nisi Innocentius XII. Ergo in vi illius revelationis est absolute revelatum, & absolute de fide illum esse legitimum Div. Petri Successorem, & in eo perseverare dignitatem ipsius : Ergo si ad hoc requiritur essentialiter, quod sit rite electus, quod sit valide baptizatus, valide consecratus, &c. haec omnia erunt etiam de fide, saltem mediate. |  | **64.** Perhaps you will say that it is a matter of faith that this dignity perseveres in the legitimate Successors of Divine Peter, but it is not a matter of faith that Innocent is the legitimate Successor of Divine Peter, because it is not a matter of faith that he was legitimately elected. But against this, the argument already made returns: for it is a matter of faith that this visible dignity perseveres today in the legitimate Successor of Divine Peter; therefore, it is a matter of faith that there exists today a legitimate Successor in whom that dignity perseveres. But there is no one else today who possesses the marks of a legitimate Successor except Innocent XII. Therefore, it is a matter of faith that he is the legitimate Successor of Divine Peter. If, however, being legitimately elected is required for this, then at least mediately it will be a matter of faith that he is legitimately elected. Let me explain: That revelation of Christ, in which it is immediately revealed that the dignity of Divine Peter will persevere in the Church, is not conditional upon a fallible or defectible condition, but is an entirely absolute revelation. This is so first because it reveals the firmness of the Rock upon which the Church is founded in the same sense as the firmness of the Church itself; but the revelation concerning the firm perseverance of the Church is not conditional upon a fallible and defectible condition, but is absolutely unconditional—otherwise it would not be absolutely a matter of faith today that the Church founded by Christ perseveres. Therefore, the revelation concerning the firm duration of that Rock, which is the Apostolic dignity of Peter, is absolute and not subject to a fallible and defectible condition. Furthermore, Christ would not have sufficiently assured His Church of the constancy and perseverance of that Rock if He had left it dependent upon a fallible and defectible condition. For if the meaning were: “That most solid Rock will firmly persevere if a proper election does not fail, but will fail if a proper election should fail,” by leaving that election contingent and fallible, how could the Church be certain of this today? Indeed, it might say: “Perhaps that Rock has failed because perhaps a proper election has failed.” Therefore, that revelation must be understood in an absolute sense and believed as absolute. If that is so, then an absolute revelation about the perseverance of the dignity is an absolute revelation about the existence of a subject or Successor in that dignity, because a dignity cannot persevere except in a subject and Successor, as is self-evident. Therefore, that revelation of Christ absolutely reveals that today there exists a true Successor of Peter in whom that dignity perseveres. But this is evidently no one else except Innocent XII. Therefore, by the force of that revelation, it is absolutely revealed and absolutely a matter of faith that he is the legitimate Successor of Divine Peter, and that the dignity of Peter perseveres in him. Therefore, if being properly elected, being validly baptized, validly consecrated, etc., are essentially required for this, all these things will also be matters of faith, at least mediately. |
| Nec dici potest, esse quidem revelatum, & de fide perseverare hodie dignitatem illam in aliquo illius legitimo Successore vage, sed non determinate in hoc individuo. Contra enim est, quia eodem modo est revelatum, & de fide unum caput visibile Ecclesiae, ac una Ecclesia, cum unitas Ecclesiae visibilis essentialiter requirat unum caput visibile in terris, ut supra ostendimus quaest. 7. Sed non solum est de fide dari unam Sanctam Catholicam, & visibilem Ecclesiam, vage, & indeterminate, sed illam esse determinate hanc numero hominum congregationem, quae sub Innocent. XII. fidem profitetur, ut ostensum manet, quaest. 6. Ergo non solum est revelatum, & de fide perseverare hodie unum caput visibile Ecclesiae, vage, & indeterminate, sed determinate, & in individuo, nempe in Innocent. XII. Explicatur, quia propterea est de fide una Catholica Ecclesia, non solum vage, sed determinate, & numerice ista, quia alias non haberent homines certam de fide divina Ecclesiam pro vera fide invenienda, & salute assequenda, & quia sola ista numero Ecclesia habet notas, & signa verae Dei Ecclesiae: Sed solus Innocent. XII. habet hodie notas, & signa veri capitis visibilis Ecclesiae; & alias si caput Ecclesiae solum esset certum de fide vage, & non individuo, non haberet Ecclesia certam regulam fidei ad veram fidem discernendam a falsa: Ergo. Vide rationes supra expensas quaest. 6. & 7, nam illae aeque probant esse de fide immediate, & absolute unum caput visibile Ecclesiae in individuo, ac unam numero Ecclesiam, & facile possunt applicari ad praesens; brevitatis enim gratia, illas hic non extendimus. |  | **65.** Nor can it be said that it is indeed revealed and a matter of faith that this dignity perseveres today in some legitimate Successor of his in a vague sense, but not determinately in this specific individual. For the contrary is true, because it is revealed and a matter of faith in the same way that there is one visible head of the Church as there is one Church, since the unity of the visible Church essentially requires one visible head on earth, as we demonstrated above in question 7. But it is not only a matter of faith that there exists one Holy, Catholic, and visible Church in a vague and indeterminate sense, but that it is determinately this specific congregation of men who profess the faith under Innocent XII, as has been shown in question 6. Therefore, it is not only revealed and a matter of faith that one visible head of the Church perseveres today in a vague and indeterminate sense, but determinately and individually, namely in Innocent XII. This is explained because the reason why the one Catholic Church is a matter of faith, not only vaguely but determinately and numerically this one, is because otherwise men would not have a certain Church of divine faith for finding the true faith and attaining salvation, and because only this specific Church has the marks and signs of the true Church of God. But only Innocent XII today has the marks and signs of the true visible head of the Church; and furthermore, if the head of the Church were only certain as a matter of faith vaguely and not individually, the Church would not have a certain rule of faith for discerning true faith from false. Therefore. See the reasons expounded above in questions 6 and 7, for they equally prove that it is a matter of faith immediately and absolutely that there is one visible head of the Church in the individual sense, just as there is one specific Church, and they can easily be applied to the present matter; for brevity’s sake, we do not expand on them here. |
| 66. Confirmatur denique, quia revelatum, & de fide est, veram Ecclesiam Christi esse visibilem in terris, ut ostensum manet supra, quaest. 5, a num. 57. Sed Ecclesia visibilis essentialiter importat, vel saltem integraliter caput visibile: Ergo etiam est revelatum, & de fide caput verum huius Ecclesiae esse visibile, nam revelato Corpore perfecto visibili, immediate revelantur eisdem revelationibus caput, & membra visibilia, cum sint partes intrinsecae ipsius: Sed evidens est omnino, non esse hodie aliud caput visibile Ecclesiae istius, nempe Romanae, nisi Innocent. XII. Ergo de fide est Innocent. XII. esse verum caput Ecclesiae: Sed hoc est formalissime esse vere Papam: Ergo de fide est Innocent. XII. esse vere Papam. |  | **66.** Finally, it is confirmed because it has been revealed and is a matter of faith that the true Church of Christ is visible on earth, as has been shown above in question 5, from number 57. But the visible Church essentially entails, or at least integrally includes, a visible head. Therefore, it is also revealed and a matter of faith that the true head of this Church is visible, for when a perfect visible Body is revealed, its visible head and members are immediately revealed by the same revelations, since they are intrinsic parts of it. But it is entirely evident that today there is no other visible head of this Church, namely the Roman Church, except Innocent XII. Therefore, it is a matter of faith that Innocent XII is the true head of the Church. But this is most formally to be truly the Pope. Therefore, it is a matter of faith that Innocent XII is truly the Pope. |
| 67. Explicatur, quia de fide est non separari in Ecclesia ista visibili verum ipsius caput seu Christi Vicarium, a capite visibili, & visibili Vicario Christi, alias non esset contra fidem dicere, verum Christi Vicarium in terris non esse caput visibile Ecclesiae, aut caput visibile Ecclesiae non esse verum Christi Vicarium, quorum utrumque haereticum est, non minus, quam dicere Ecclesiam Christi visibilem non esse veram Christi Ecclesiam, & sponsam, seu veram Christi sponsam, & Ecclesiam non esse visibilem: Sed evidens physice, & metaphysice est non esse hodie in Ecclesia Christi aliud caput visibile ipsius, nisi Innocent. XII. quia evidentissimum est Ecclesiam hodie aliud caput non videre, nec visibiliter agnoscere: Ergo de fide est immediate; &c absolute istum esse verum Christi in terris Vicarium. |  | **67.** It is explained, because it is a matter of faith that within this visible Church, the true head or Vicar of Christ is not separated from the visible head and visible Vicar of Christ. Otherwise, it would not be contrary to faith to say that the true Vicar of Christ on earth is not the visible head of the Church, or that the visible head of the Church is not the true Vicar of Christ—both of which are heretical assertions, no less than saying that the visible Church of Christ is not the true Church and Spouse of Christ, or that the true Spouse and Church of Christ is not visible. But it is physically and metaphysically evident that there is no other visible head of Christ’s Church today except Innocent XII, because it is most evident that the Church today sees no other head and visibly acknowledges no other. Therefore, it is immediately and absolutely a matter of faith that he is the true Vicar of Christ on earth. |
| **SOLVUNTUR OBIECTA.** |  | **OBJECTIONS ANSWERED** |
| **68.** OBIICITUR primo, praesertim contra primam probationem: Quamvis sit immediate revelata, & de fide illa universalis: *Omnis rite electus est verus Papa*, non inde sequitur quod sit absolute de fide, hunc numero, nempe Innoc. XII. esse verum Papam: Ergo. Probatur antecedens. Primo: Quia non est de fide hunc esse rite electum. Secundo, a paritate Hostiae consecratae, nam licet sit de fide immediate ista universalis: *Omnis Hostia rite consecrata continet Corpus Christi*, non infertur esse de fide immediata, & absolute, quod ista singularis Hostia, quae creditur consecrata, contineat Corpus Christi: Ergo idem in nostro casu. |  | **68.** FIRST OBJECTION, especially against the first proof: Although it is immediately revealed and a matter of faith universally that *“Every properly elected person is a true Pope,”* it does not follow that it is absolutely a matter of faith that this specific individual, namely Innocent XII, is the true Pope. Therefore, etc. The antecedent is proven. First: Because it is not a matter of faith that this man has been properly elected. Second, by comparison with a consecrated Host, for although it is immediately a matter of faith universally that *“Every properly consecrated Host contains the Body of Christ,”* it cannot be inferred that it is immediately and absolutely a matter of faith that this particular Host, which is believed to be consecrated, contains the Body of Christ. Therefore, the same applies in our case. |
| **69.** Communis solutio est, quod ex illa universali: *Omnis rite electus, &c.* cum certitudine morali de ista, nempe Innocens. XII. est rite electus, sequitur quod sit absolute de fide, hunc numero esse verum Papam: Et quia ista certitudo moralis de rite electione consistit in Papa pacifice electo, sed non in Hostia rite consecrata, ideo prima singularis est absolute de fide, sed non secunda. Sed haec solutio tam satis improbata manet, tum quia forsan non est maior certitudo moralis, in vi solius certitudinis moralis, de rite electione Papae, qua de rite consecratione Hostiae, praesertim, si plures Sacerdotes in magno numero eam consecrarent. Tum quia sola certitudo moralis, quantumvis magna, de continentia singularis in universali revelata sufficere nequit ut singularis sit absolute de fide sine tacita conditione, ut ostensum manet. |  | **69.** The common solution is that from this universal premise: *Every duly elected [Pope], etc.* together with moral certainty regarding this particular case, namely that Innocent XII was duly elected, it follows that it is absolutely a matter of faith that this specific individual is the true Pope. And because this moral certainty regarding a proper election exists in the case of a peacefully elected Pope, but not in the case of a properly consecrated Host, therefore the first particular proposition is absolutely a matter of faith, but not the second. But this solution remains sufficiently refuted, both because perhaps there is no greater moral certainty, by virtue of moral certainty alone, regarding the proper election of a Pope than regarding the proper consecration of a Host, especially if many priests were to consecrate it in great number. And also because moral certainty alone, however great, concerning the containment of a particular case within a universally revealed truth, cannot suffice for that particular case to be absolutely a matter of faith without a tacit condition, as has been demonstrated. |
| **70.** Sed dices: Non minus pendet fides rei revelatae ab evidentia credibilitatis, quam fides absoluta de singulari a certitudine continentiae illius sub universali revelata: Sed quamvis evidentia credibilitatis solum sit certa moraliter, solumque faciat revelationem moraliter certam, satis est ut fides sit absoluta: Ergo quamvis continentia singularis solum sit certa moraliter, sufficit ut fides de tali singulari sit absoluta. Sed contra: Quia evidentia credibilitatis nec est, nec constituit motivum formale fidei absolutae de mysterio credibili, sed consistit in motivis, quae faciunt prudenter credibilem revelationem absolutam de mysterio, quibus suppositis, sola revelatio absoluta ut talis est motivum adaequatum fidei: Attamen continentia singularis in universali revelata constituit essentialiter singularem ipsam inesse absolute revelare, & revelationem universalem inesse revelationis absolutae de singulari, unde intrinsece constituit, licet de connotato, motivum formale fidei absolutae ut absolutae, & non pure se tenet ex parte credibilitatis praevis: Sed licet ex parte credibilitatis sufficiat sola certitudo moralis, tamen ex parte revelationis ut est motivum fidei non sufficit, quod proponatur ut solum certa moraliter, sed debet proponi cum certitudine, & infallibilitate metaphisica: Ergo est ingens disparitas. Minor patet, quia propterea sufficit in motivis prudentis credibilitatis sola certitudo moralis, quia illis non innititur fides: Atqui fides absoluta rei revelatae intrinsece innititur revelationi absolutae ut absolutae rei revelatae, tanquam motivo formali: Ergo. Item, est alia disparitas, quia mysterium esse absolute revelatum, non pendet ex motivis credibilitatis, poset enim aliquid esse absolute revelatum, quamvis non esset evidenter credibile: At implicat singularem esse absolute revelatam per revelationem universalem, nisi sit contenta sub universali. Unde fides mysterij solum dependet a credibilitate evidenti, extrinsece, & praesuppositive, non tam in ratione fidei absolutae, quam in ratione prudentis, ut suo loco dicam; sed fides absoluta singularis in vi revelationis universalis pendet intrinsece in ratione fidei absolutae, a continentia singularis sub universali, quia pendet intrinsece, & motivum ab eo quod singularis sit absolute revelata: Ergo. |  | **70.** But you might say: The faith in a revealed matter depends no less on the evidence of credibility than absolute faith concerning a particular depends on the certainty of that particular’s inclusion under a universal revelation. But although the evidence of credibility is only morally certain, and only makes the revelation morally certain, it is sufficient for faith to be absolute. Therefore, although the inclusion of a particular is only morally certain, it suffices for faith concerning such a particular to be absolute. But against this I argue: Because the evidence of credibility neither is, nor constitutes, the formal motive of absolute faith regarding a credible mystery, but consists in motives which make an absolute revelation about the mystery prudently credible, and these being supposed, only the absolute revelation as such is the adequate motive of faith. However, the inclusion of a particular in a universal revelation essentially constitutes the particular itself as being absolutely revealed, and the universal revelation as being an absolute revelation about the particular; hence it intrinsically constitutes, albeit connotatively, the formal motive of absolute faith as absolute, and does not simply pertain to the domain of prior credibility. But although on the part of credibility moral certainty alone suffices, nevertheless on the part of revelation as the motive of faith, it does not suffice that it be proposed as only morally certain, but it must be proposed with metaphysical certainty and infallibility. Therefore, there is an immense disparity. The minor is evident, because moral certainty alone suffices in the motives of prudent credibility for this reason: because faith does not rest upon them. But absolute faith in a revealed matter intrinsically rests upon the absolute revelation as absolute of the revealed matter, as upon a formal motive. Therefore [the disparity stands]. Likewise, there is another disparity, because a mystery being absolutely revealed does not depend on the motives of credibility, for something could be absolutely revealed, even though it might not be evidently credible. But it is impossible for a particular to be absolutely revealed through a universal revelation unless it is contained under the universal. Hence, faith in a mystery depends on evident credibility only extrinsically and presuppositively, not so much in the nature of absolute faith as in the nature of prudent [faith], as I will say in its proper place; but absolute faith in a particular by virtue of a universal revelation depends intrinsically, in the nature of absolute faith, on the inclusion of the particular under the universal, because it depends intrinsically, and [as] a motive, on the fact that the particular is absolutely revealed. Therefore [the objection fails]. |
| 71. Mitto, quod evidens credibilitas mysteriorum respectu totius Ecclesiae, licet intrinsece solum fundet certitudinem moralem, extrinsece tamen connectitur metaphysice cum veritate mysteriorum, ut suo loco dicam, quia metaphysice infallibile est Deum non permissurum in praesenti providentia, quod toti Ecclesiae fiat evidenter credibile mysterium falsum, aut falsa revelatio: Sic ergo similiter, licet electio Papae pacifice consumata, & promulgata, ex se, & intrinsece solum fundet certitudinem moralem, tamen extrinsece connectitur metaphisice cum valore electionis, & cum veritate Papae electi, quia metaphysice infallibile est in vi promissionis, & revelationis Christi, quod non permittet pacifice eligi, & proponi toti Ecclesiae, ut verum Papam, eum qui valide electus, aut verus Papa non sit: Non ergo sufficit sola certitudo moralis de validitate electionis, sed de continentia singularis in universali revelata. |  | **71.** I set aside the fact that the evident credibility of mysteries with respect to the whole Church, although intrinsically it only establishes moral certainty, nevertheless extrinsically connects metaphysically with the truth of the mysteries, as I will explain in its proper place, because it is metaphysically infallible that God will not permit, in the present providence, that a false mystery or false revelation be made evidently credible to the whole Church. Similarly, therefore, although the election of a Pope peacefully completed and promulgated, of itself and intrinsically only establishes moral certainty, nevertheless it connects extrinsically and metaphysically with the validity of the election and with the truth of the elected Pope, because it is metaphysically infallible, by virtue of Christ’s promise and revelation, that He will not permit someone who has not been validly elected or who is not the true Pope to be peacefully elected and proposed to the whole Church as the true Pope. Therefore, moral certainty alone concerning the validity of the election is not sufficient, but rather certainty about the inclusion of the particular case within the universally revealed truth. |
| 72. Sed dices secundo: Non requiritur aequalis certitudo continentiae cum certitudine fidei habendae de singulari: Ergo sufficit moralis tantum. Antecedens probatur, primo quia non requiritur certitudo fidei, siquidem non requiritur quod continentia singularis in universali sit de fide: Sed quaelibet alia certitudo est minor: Ergo non requiritur equalis. Secundo: Quia in vi illius universalis: *Omnis homo est mortalis*, quae revelata est, est omnino absolute de fide ista singularis: *Petrus est mortalis*: Et tamen continentia istius sub illa non est aeque certa ac fides, quia solum est certa certitudine evidentiae naturalis, quae est minor, quam certitudo fidei: Ergo non requiritur aequalis certitudo. Respondeo, distinguendo antecedens: Non requiritur aequalis certitudo, nec certitudo metaphysice infallibilis, nego antecedens: Requiritur tamen certitudo metaphysice infallibilis, subdistinguo: Ad fidem singularis intrinsece absolutam, concedo antecedens: Ad fidem extrinsece absolutam, & tacite conditionatam, nego antecedens, & consequentiam in eodem sensu. Itaque ad fidem intrinsece absolutam de singulari, de qua modo loquimur, requiritur certitudo omnino, seu metaphysice infallibilis de continentia singularis sub revelatione universali, vi cuius creditur absolute, quia requiritur talis certitudo, quae nullam fallibilitatem relinquat in fide: Ista autem certitudo non requiritur quod sit fidei, nec aequalis cum certitudine fidei, quia satis est quod sit certitudo metaphysica naturalis evidentiae, quo pacto est certa continentia huius singularis: *Petrus est mortalis*, sub illa universali: *Homo est mortalis*, quia metaphysice infallibile est, quod *Petrus est homo*, & ideo sufficit haec certitudo, sed non sufficit moralis, quia haec relinqueret fidem fallibilem physice, & metaphysice. |  | **72.** But you may say secondly: An equal certainty of inclusion is not required as the certainty of faith regarding a particular case: Therefore, merely moral certainty suffices. The antecedent is proven, first because the certainty of faith is not required, since it is not necessary that the inclusion of the particular in the universal be a matter of faith. But any other certainty is lesser: Therefore, equal certainty is not required. Second: Because by virtue of the universal proposition “Every man is mortal,” which is revealed, this particular proposition “Peter is mortal” is absolutely a matter of faith. And yet the inclusion of the latter under the former is not as certain as faith itself, because it is only certain with the certainty of natural evidence, which is less than the certainty of faith: Therefore, equal certainty is not required. I respond by distinguishing the antecedent: Equal certainty is not required, nor metaphysically infallible certainty, I deny the antecedent. However, metaphysically infallible certainty is required; I further distinguish: For intrinsically absolute faith regarding a particular case, I concede the antecedent; for extrinsically absolute and tacitly conditional faith, I deny the antecedent and the consequent in the same sense. Thus, for intrinsically absolute faith concerning a particular case, which is what we are discussing now, a complete or metaphysically infallible certainty is required regarding the inclusion of the particular under the universal revelation, by virtue of which it is believed absolutely, because such certainty is required that leaves no fallibility in faith. This certainty need not be of faith, nor equal to the certainty of faith, because it is sufficient that it be metaphysical certainty of natural evidence, in which manner the inclusion of this particular proposition “Peter is mortal” under that universal “Man is mortal” is certain, because it is metaphysically infallible that “Peter is a man,” and therefore this certainty suffices, but moral certainty does not suffice, because this would leave faith physically and metaphysically fallible. |
| 73. Sed contra replicabis primo: Quia inde sequitur, non esse absolute de fide, quod Cicero contraxit peccatum originale, aut quod fuit mortalis. Secundo sequitur, nec sufficere certitudinem pure physicam, & naturalem de eo quod aliquis sit homo, ut sit absolute de fide ipsum esse mortalem, aut conceptum in peccato: Quia huiusmodi certitudo fallibilis est metaphysice, potest enim quis falli existimans hominem, eum qui evidentia naturali apparet homo, ut contigit Filio Tobiae, qui Angelum Comitem evidentia naturali putabat hominem, & tamen fallebatur: Hoc autem si dicatur, de nullo singulari poterimus habere fidem omnino absolutam, quia de singularibus aliam certitudinem habere non possumus, quam pure physicam a sensibili experientia, quae tamen absolute fallibilis est: Sed hoc est absurdum: Ergo. |  | **73.** But you will raise objections against this, first: Because it would follow that it is not absolutely de fide that Cicero contracted original sin, or that he was mortal. Second, it follows that not even purely physical and natural certainty about someone being human is sufficient for it to be absolutely de fide that he is mortal or conceived in sin. This is because certainty of this kind is metaphysically fallible, for one can be mistaken in considering as human someone who appears human by natural evidence, as happened to the son of Tobias, who by natural evidence thought his companion Angel was human, and yet he was mistaken. However, if this is maintained, we could have no absolutely certain faith about any particular individual, because concerning particular individuals we cannot have any certainty other than purely physical certainty from sensible experience, which nevertheless is absolutely fallible. But this is absurd. Therefore. |
| **74.** Respondeo, quod de Cicerone, & alijs individuis, de quorum existentia, & realitate solum est certitudo moralis, solum est de fide extrinsece absoluta, & tacite conditionata ipsos contraxisse peccatum originale, aut fuisse de facto mortales, aut quidquid aliud revelatum est in genere de omnibus hominibus, sed non esse de fide intrinsece absoluta, & sine illa tacita conditione, si re ipsa extiterint, sicut narratur; nam ad hoc necessaria erat major certitudo, quam moralis, de eo quod re ipsa fuerint in rerum natura. Ad secundam, dico, non sufficere certitudinem pure physicam re ipsa fallibilem, sicut est certitudo de singularibus pure desumpta a sensibili experientia, ut de talibus fides divina sit intrinsece absoluta, quod patet exemplo ipso arguenti, quia Filius Tobiae sane credebat fide divina: Omnem hominem esse mortalem, & habebat sensibilem evidentiam de eo, quod Comes sui itineris homo erat; & tamen non habebat fidem intrinsece absolutam de eo quod ille, quam oculis videbat, erat mortalis, alias fides divina in illo falsa fuisset: Sequitur ergo quod fides divina respectu singularium ut pure cadunt sub experientia sensibili, & fallibili, quando solum nititur revelationi universali, solum est respectu illorum extrinsece absoluta, ita ut si forsan fallantur, non fallatur intrinsece in se ipsa, sed solum in certitudine illa sensibili de purificatione conditionis, virtute cujus denominatur extrinsece absoluta; intrinsece autem solum est tacite conditionata: Si vero consideretur fides divina respectu singularium re ipsa, & intelligibiliter talium, de quibus sit metaphysica evidentia, quod sunt individua humanae naturae, absque omni fallibilitate, sic respectu eorum fides potest esse intrinsece absoluta, & sine tacita conditione: Et similiter de singularibus revelatis expresse in Sacro Textu. |  | **74.** I respond that concerning Cicero and other individuals, of whose existence and reality there is only moral certainty, it is only extrinsically absolute faith and tacitly conditional faith that they contracted original sin, or were in fact mortal, or whatever else has been revealed generally about all human beings. But it is not intrinsically absolute faith, without that tacit condition “if they truly existed as narrated”; for this would require greater than moral certainty about whether they truly existed in reality. To the second objection, I say that purely physical certainty which is in reality fallible—such as certainty about particulars derived solely from sensory experience—is not sufficient for divine faith to be intrinsically absolute. This is evident from the very example of the one arguing, because the son of Tobias surely believed with divine faith that every human being is mortal, and he had sensible evidence that his traveling companion was human; and yet he did not have intrinsically absolute faith that the one whom he saw with his eyes was mortal, otherwise divine faith in him would have been false. It follows, therefore, that divine faith regarding particulars as they fall purely under sensible and fallible experience, when it relies solely on universal revelation, is only extrinsically absolute with respect to those particulars. Thus, if perhaps they are mistaken, faith is not intrinsically deceived in itself, but only in that sensible certainty concerning the fulfillment of the condition, by virtue of which faith is called extrinsically absolute; intrinsically, however, it remains only tacitly conditional. But if divine faith is considered with respect to particulars that are in reality and intelligibly such—about which there is metaphysical evidence that they are individuals of human nature, without any fallibility—then faith regarding them can be intrinsically absolute and without tacit condition. And similarly concerning particular individuals explicitly revealed in the Sacred Text. |
| **75.** Si vero dicas: Innocent. XII. est singularis, cujus existentia solum constat sensibiliter, & ad sensum: Ergo non erit de fide intrinsece absoluta ipsum esse verum Papam, siquidem possunt falli sensus circa ipsius realitatem, ita ut re ipsa non sit homo. Respondeo, negando antecedens: Quia de fide est Pontificem visibilem, visibiliter Ecclesiae propositum esse re ipsa Pontificem, sicut Ecclesiam visibilem esse re ipsa veram Christi Ecclesiam, & e contra, ut supra diximus num.64. Unde in hoc, suppositis Christi revelationibus, non possunt falli sensus, & visibilis experientia, de alijs vero singularibus non sunt Christi revelationes, nec promissiones, unde de alijs creditur cum tacita conditione, de Pontifice tamen singulari nec tacite debet apponi conditio, quia revelatum est Caput Ecclesiae verum fore visibile, & quod Caput Ecclesiae visibile est verum ipsius Caput. Vide *supra*. Sed dices respectu nostri, saltem est fallibile quod actu vivat, forsan enim obiit Iam : Ergo fides de ipso non potest esse omnino absoluta. Respondeo, hanc conditionem, *si vivit*, semper esse subintelligendam, nec hanc excludimus, cum dicimus fidem de illo esse omnino absolutam, sed solum alias per se occultas etiam videntibus illum, adhuc ex suppositione quod vivat, quae possent eius infallibilem authoritatem minus certam reddere. |  | **75.** But if you should say: Innocent XII is a singular [individual], whose existence is known only sensibly and to the senses. Therefore, it will not be a matter of intrinsically absolute faith that he is the true Pope, since the senses can be deceived regarding his reality, such that he might not actually be a man. I respond by denying the antecedent: Because it is a matter of faith that the visible Pontiff, visibly presented to the Church, is in reality the Pontiff, just as the visible Church is in reality the true Church of Christ, and conversely, as we stated above in number 64. Hence in this matter, presupposing Christ’s revelations, the senses and visible experience cannot be deceived. Concerning other singular [individuals], however, there are no revelations or promises from Christ, and thus other [individuals] are believed with a tacit condition. Yet regarding a singular Pontiff, no condition should be tacitly applied, because it has been revealed that the Head of the Church will be visible, and that the visible Head of the Church is its true Head. See *above*. But you might say: at least with respect to us, it is fallible [knowledge] that he currently lives, for perhaps he has already died. Therefore, faith concerning him cannot be entirely absolute. I respond that this condition, *if he lives*, should always be understood implicitly, nor do we exclude this when we say that faith concerning him is entirely absolute. Rather, we exclude only other conditions that are intrinsically hidden even from those who see him, which, even supposing that he lives, could render his infallible authority less certain. |
| **76.** Melius ergo ad praecipuam obiectionem respondeo, distinguendo antecedent: Non inde sequitur, quod sit absolute de fide Innocent. XII. esse verum Papam, ex illa universali precise, concedo: Ex illa, & ex eo quod omnino infallibile est Innoc. XII. contineri sub illa, hoc est, esse valide electum, nego antecedens. Ad cuius probationem, distinguo antecedes: Non est de fide immediate, quod Innocent. XII. sit rite electus, omnino antecedens: Nec mediate, nec immediate, nego antecedens: Quia solum requiritur quod sit infallibile omnino ipsum esse valide electum: ad hoc autem sufficit, quod sit de fide, vel immediate, vel mediate hoc est, quod sit immediate revelatum, vel quod infallibiliter inferatur ex revelatis: Hoc autem modo de fide est, & infallibile illam electionem fuisse validam, quia revelatum est Ecclesiam non posse errare in proponendis universaliter rebus fidei, & etiam regi eam a Spiritu Sancto in consummanda, absolvenda, & promulganda illa electione: Hoc autem vel formaliter est electionem illam semel pacifice promulgatam non posse esse nullam, vel saltem id ex illo infertur per consequentiam infallibilem omnino. Ad secundam probationem, paret disparitas, quia minime infallibile est Hostiam singularem esse rite, aut valide consecratam, nec de hoc est revelatio immediata, nec mediata, sed ad summum certitudo moralis absolute fallibilis, quae minime sufficit, ut ostensum manet: At, electionem Innocent. XII. fuisse validam est omnino, & absolute infallibile in vi revelationis, vel promissionis Christi, sicut ostensum manet. |  | **76.** I answer better to the principal objection, therefore, by distinguishing the antecedent: It does not follow from this that it is absolutely a matter of faith that Innocent XII is the true Pope, from that universal principle precisely, I concede; From that principle, and from the fact that it is entirely infallible that Innocent XII is included under that principle, that is, that he was validly elected, I deny the antecedent. To prove this, I distinguish the antecedent: It is not immediately a matter of faith that Innocent XII was duly elected, I concede the antecedent entirely; That it is neither mediately nor immediately a matter of faith, I deny the antecedent. For it is only required that it be entirely infallible that he was validly elected; for this it suffices that it be a matter of faith, either immediately or mediately, that is, that it be immediately revealed, or that it be infallibly inferred from revealed truths. In this way it is a matter of faith and infallible that his election was valid, because it is revealed that the Church cannot err in universally proposing matters of faith, and also that she is governed by the Holy Spirit in consummating, completing, and promulgating that election. This either formally means that an election, once peacefully promulgated, cannot be null, or at least this is inferred from it by an entirely infallible consequence. To the second proof, the disparity is evident, because it is not at all infallible that a particular Host is duly or validly consecrated, nor is there an immediate or mediate revelation about this, but at most there is moral certitude that is absolutely fallible, which is not at all sufficient, as has been shown. But that the election of Innocent XII was valid is entirely and absolutely infallible by virtue of Christ’s revelation or promise, as has been shown. |
| **77.** Sed replicabis: Non potest esse de fide nec mediate, nec immediate electionem illam fuisse validam: Ergo ruit solutio. Probatur antecedens, quia ut illa electio sit valida plura requiruntur, quae non sunt de fide, nec immediate, nec mediate: Sed non potest esse de fide nec mediate, nec immediate electionem illam esse validam, nisi sint de fide omnia requisita ad valorem illius: Ergo. Probatur maior, quia ut electio illa sit valida requiritur, quod sit facta a duabus partibus Cardinalium, quod illi sint vere Cardinales, quod non sit facta per simoniam, quod electus non sit haereticus sate manifestus, quod sit vir, quod sit mentis compos, ut vidimus supra num. 4. Sed haec omnia non possunt esse de fide, nec immediate, nec mediate, quia nec mediate, nec immediate sunt revelata: Ergo. |  | **77.** But you may reply: It cannot be a matter of faith, either mediately or immediately, that that election was valid. Therefore, the solution collapses. The antecedent is proven because for that election to be valid, several requirements are necessary which are not matters of faith, either mediately or immediately. But it cannot be a matter of faith, either mediately or immediately, that that election is valid unless all the requirements for its validity are matters of faith. Therefore, etc. The major premise is proven because for that election to be valid, it is required that it be made by two-thirds of the Cardinals, that they be true Cardinals, that it not be conducted through simony, that the elect not be a manifestly known heretic, that he be a man, that he be of sound mind, as we have seen above in number 4. But all these things cannot be matters of faith, either mediately or immediately, because they are revealed neither mediately nor immediately. Therefore, etc. |
| Respondeo, ex his requisitis, aliqua esse ita essentialiter requisita, quod nec Ecclesia possit supplere defectum illorum, ut quod sit baptizatus, vir, mentis compos, valide ordinatus, &c. Et huiusmodi requisita, supposita pacifica electione, sive pacifice absoluta, & promulgata, sunt immediate de fide, & mediate revelata, quia infallibiliter inferuntur ex revelatis, nempe ex assistentia Spiritus Sancti infallibiliter promissa Ecclesiae, ne erret in rebus fidei proponendis, ex perpetua duratione dignitatis, seu Cathedrae Petri, revelata a Christo, & Ecclesiae unitate visibili revelata, cum suo Pastore, iuxta illud. *Erit unum Ovile, et unus Pastor*. |  | I respond that, among these requirements, some are so essentially required that not even the Church can supply for their defect, such as that he be baptized, a man, of sound mind, validly ordained, etc. And such requirements, once a peaceful election is supposed—that is, peacefully completed and promulgated—are immediately matters of faith and mediately revealed, because they are infallibly inferred from revealed truths, namely from the infallible assistance of the Holy Spirit promised to the Church lest it err in proposing matters of faith, from the perpetual duration of the dignity or Chair of Peter revealed by Christ, and from the visible unity of the Church revealed along with its Pastor, according to that saying: “There shall be one fold and one shepherd.” |
| Ex his enim, ut ostensum iam manet in probationibus conclusionis, infallibiliter infertur, Ecclesiam non posse errare circa conditiones essentiales validae electionis, & electum, ex suppositione quod sit electus, & promulgatur pacifice, propositusque Ecclesiae, illis conditionibus carere non posse. Alia autem sunt requisita, quae Ecclesia supplere potest, nempe quod electio sit a duabus partibus Cardinalium, quod omnes illi sint vere Cardinales, quod nullus suffragetur per simoniam, aut per metum, & de his certum quidem est, posse annullare electionem, si allegentur antequam electio pacifice absolvatur, & promulgetur, caeterum si talia capita nullitatis non allegentur antea, sed illis ignoratis, aut dissimulatis, electio absolvatur, & promulgetur pacifice, nullo rationabiliter reluctante, infallibile iam manet, vel illos defectus non intervenisse, vel Ecclesiam illos supplere, ut potest. |  | For from these, as already remains demonstrated in the proofs of the conclusion, it is infallibly inferred that the Church cannot err concerning the essential conditions of a valid election, and that the elect, on the supposition that he is elected and peacefully promulgated and presented to the Church, cannot lack those conditions. However, there are other requirements that the Church can supply, namely that the election be by two-thirds of the Cardinals, that all of them be true Cardinals, that none vote through simony or through fear. And concerning these, it is certainly true that they can nullify an election if they are alleged before the election is peacefully completed and promulgated. However, if such grounds for nullity are not alleged beforehand, but with them being unknown or overlooked, the election is completed and peacefully promulgated with no one reasonably objecting, it already remains infallible that either those defects did not occur or the Church has supplied for them, as it can. |
| Nec obstant Canones in contra, quia si Canones declarant illos defectus annullare electionem, debet intelligi modo explicato, nempe si allegentur ante pacificam eius promulgationem, non autem absolute, quia nullus Pontifex, nec Concilium potuit decernere, quod ex illis capitibus, quamvis non allegatis in tempore, electio maneret nulla, & Papa nullus, adhuc, potest pacificam eius promulgationem, & acceptationem. Unde in forma, nego antecedens. Ad probationem, distinguo maiorem: Plura requiruntur, ex his, quae Ecclesia supplere non potest, quae non sunt de fide nec immediate, nec mediate, supposita pacifica electione, & eius promulgatione, nego maiorem: Ex his quae Ecclesia supplere potest, sub distinguo: Quae non sunt de fide mediate, nec immediate quod determinate concurrerint, omitto maiorem : Quin sit de fide vage, vel quod ea requisita concurrerint, vel quod eorum defectum Ecclesia suppleverit, nego maiorem. Ad cuius probationem patet ex dictis. |  | Nor do the contrary Canons present an obstacle, because if the Canons declare that those defects nullify an election, this must be understood in the manner explained, namely if they are alleged before its peaceful promulgation, but not absolutely. For no Pontiff nor Council could decree that on those grounds, even if not alleged in time, the election would remain null and the Pope null, even after its peaceful promulgation and acceptance. Wherefore, in formal terms, I deny the antecedent. To the proof, I distinguish the major premise: Several requirements are necessary, from among those which the Church cannot supply, which are not matters of faith either mediately or immediately, supposing a peaceful election and its promulgation—I deny the major premise. From among those which the Church can supply, I subdistinguish: Which are not matters of faith mediately or immediately such that they determinately concurred—I let the major premise pass. That it is not a matter of faith in a general way either that those requirements concurred or that the Church supplied for their defect—I deny the major premise. To the proof of which, the answer is clear from what has been said. |
| **78.** Sed inquies, an sit immediate, an solum mediate de fide electionem illam validam fuisse, & similiter de conditionibus essentialibus ad valorem ipsius? Respondeo, quod ut recte notant PP. Salmanticenses in praesenti, parum interest ad propositum, quod immediate potius, quam mediate sint de fide, quia dummodo sit infallibile metaphysice ipsum fuisse valide electum, & cum omnibus conditionibus essentialibus ad valorem electionis, hoc sufficit ut possit esse de fide immediate, absolute, & in singulari, hunc pacifice electum, nempe Innocent. XII. esse verum Papam. |  | **78.** But you may ask whether it is immediately or only mediately a matter of faith that such an election was valid, and similarly concerning the essential conditions for its validity? I respond that, as the Fathers of Salamanca correctly note on this matter, it matters little for our purpose whether these things are of faith immediately rather than mediately, because as long as it is metaphysically infallible that he was validly elected and with all the essential conditions for the validity of the election, this suffices for it to be immediately of faith, absolutely and in particular, that this peacefully elected person, namely Innocent XII, is the true Pope. |
| Veruntamen dico, verosimilius esse, quod rita, seu valida electio, & conditiones essentiales ipsius solum mediate sunt de fide, solumque habere certitudinem theologicam infallibilem per modum theologicae conclusionis : Nam si attendamus ad eam revelationem, vi cuius immediate revelatur perpetuitas Sedis Apostolicae in Successoribus Div. Petri, ex vi illius solum directe revelatur, idque solum est definitum ab Ecclesia, nempe quod Romanus Pontifex pro tempore existens est verus Christi Vicarius, & verus Successor Div. Petri, ex quo per theologicam consequentiam infertur fuisse rite electum, & intervenisse omnes conditiones essentiales, hoc autem illa revelatione, nec immediate, & directe revelatur, nec ita est definitum ab Ecclesia. |  | Nevertheless, I say that it is more probable that a proper or valid election and its essential conditions are only mediately of faith, and have only infallible theological certainty by way of theological conclusion. For if we attend to that revelation, by virtue of which the perpetuity of the Apostolic See in the Successors of Divine Peter is immediately revealed, by virtue of that revelation only this is directly revealed, and only this is defined by the Church: namely, that the Roman Pontiff existing at a given time is the true Vicar of Christ and the true Successor of Divine Peter, from which it is inferred by theological consequence that he was properly elected and that all essential conditions were present. However, this is neither immediately and directly revealed by that revelation, nor is it thus defined by the Church. |
| Si autem attendatur ea revelatio, in qua Ecclesiae promittitur assistentia Spiritus Sancti, & dicitur Columna, & firmamentum veritatis, licet videatur per illam implicite revelari immediate, Ecclesiam non posse errare in electione illa ut pacifice promulgata, quia tamen in hoc sensu non est definitum ab Ecclesia directe, licet ex definitis inferatur, probabilius mihi est, quod, licet quoad se in vi illarum revelationum esset immediate de fide validitas illius electionis iam pacifice promulgatae, tamen quoad nos solum est mediate de fide, & certa theologice. |  | If, however, we attend to that revelation in which the assistance of the Holy Spirit is promised to the Church, and the Church is called the Pillar and Foundation of truth, although it seems through that revelation to be implicitly and immediately revealed that the Church cannot err in that election as peacefully promulgated, nevertheless because this is not directly defined by the Church in this sense, although it is inferred from what is defined, it is more probable to me that, although in itself by virtue of those revelations the validity of that already peacefully promulgated election would be immediately of faith, nevertheless for us it is only mediately of faith and theologically certain. |
| **79.** Ex quo patet, ut tacitae obiectioni fiat satis, non solum pie credi quod Ecclesia non errat in electione Papae, sed id esse certum theologice, ac metaphysice infallibile ex praedictis revelationibus, & promissionibus, ut ostensum manet. Nec obest fabula illa, potius quam Historia, de Pontifice credito tali ab Ecclesia, qui tamen inventus est postea feminam esse. Id enim falsissimum est, & anilis Fabula, a Martino Polono homine simplicissimo cito, & ex animi levitate decepto, narrata, ex quo aliqui alij illam transcripserunt, omnes quidem seducti, vel seducentes. De quo videatur Belarm. lib. 3. de Romano Pontifice, cap. 24. Et Baronius, a num. 853. Et alij, qui scripsere de Romano Pontifice, qui evidenter ostendunt falsitatem talis Fabulae. |  | **79.** From this it is evident, to satisfy an unspoken objection, that not only is it piously believed that the Church does not err in the election of the Pope, but it is theologically certain and metaphysically infallible based on the aforementioned revelations and promises, as has been demonstrated. Nor does that story—which is more a fable than history—pose an obstacle, concerning a person believed by the Church to be Pontiff, who was afterward discovered to be a woman. For this is utterly false, an old wives’ tale narrated by Martin of Poland [Martinus Polonus], a most simple man who was quickly deceived through his mental weakness, from whom some others transcribed it—all of them either deceived or deceiving. On this matter, see Bellarmine, Book 3 on the Roman Pontiff, chapter 24, and Baronius, from the year 853, and others who have written about the Roman Pontiff, who clearly demonstrate the falsity of such a fable. |
| Si vero dicas: Saltem non esse haereticus, qui illam crederet: Ergo non est de fide illam esse falsam: Ergo nec est de fide Papam electum, & acceptatum ab Ecclesia esse verum Papam. Respondeo, quod qui illam Fabulam crederent ex ignorantia, & inscitia in rebus fidei, aut sine pertinaria, non esset haereticus, sicut qui alia contra fidem ignoranter credunt: Caeterum qui pertinaciter illam Fabulam crederet veram, & contenderet aliquando totam Ecclesiam falsam fuisse acceptando feminam pro vero Pontifice, haereticus tunc esset. |  | If, however, you should say: “At least one who believes this tale is not a heretic; therefore, it is not a matter of faith that the tale is false; therefore, it is not a matter of faith that a Pope elected and accepted by the Church is the true Pope.” I respond that those who might believe this fable out of ignorance and lack of knowledge in matters of faith, or without pertinacity, would not be heretics, just as those who ignorantly believe other things contrary to the faith are not heretics. However, one who pertinaciously believes this fable to be true and contends that at some time the entire Church was in error by accepting a woman as the true Pontiff would then be a heretic. |
| **[The numbering here jumps from 80-90. This is a mistake of the original editor.]** |  | **[The numbering here jumps from 80-90. This is a mistake of the original editor.]** |
| 90. Objicies secundo: Non est de fide, saltem quo ad nos, Innocent. XII. esse verum Papam, ante quam sit electus, neque electus ante promulgationem pacificam electionis, neque promulgatus ante acceptationem Ecclesiae, neque immediate post pacificam Ecclesiae acceptationem, neque tandem quando Papa ex Cathedra aliquid definit: Ergo nunquam est immediate de fide. Antecedens, quo ad primam partem patet, quia nondum electus non est Papa. Quo ad secundam etiam est certa, quia ante promulgationem electionis non est propositus Ecclesiae ut Papa: Sed nihil est de fide quoad nos, sive respectu Ecclesiae, antequam Ecclesiae proponatur ut de fide tenendum: Ergo quamvis sit pacifice electus, si non dum est promulgata electio, non dum est de fide quoad nos esse verum Papam. Quoad tertiam partem etiam probatur, quia adhuc promulgata pacifice electione, si non acceptetur ab Ecclesia, non erit Papa certus: Ergo nec de fide talis. Secundo: Quia Cardinales promulgantes electionem non habent authoritatem infallibilem in proponendis rebus fidei, si enim Concilium Generale sine Papa non habet talem infallibilitatem: Ergo multo minus Collegium Cardinalium: Sed ut aliquid sit de fide quoad nos, debet esse propositum Ecclesiae ab habente authoritatem infallibilem in proponendis rebus fidei: Ergo electione promulgata a Cardinalibus, sed nondum acceptata ab Ecclesia, nondum est de fide quoad nos electum esse verum Papam. Quo ad quartam partem etiam probatur, quia acceptatio Ecclesiae, inquit P. Sedio, in praesent. Controv. 6. num. 79. Tantum infert certitudinem moralem consistentem in consensu plurium: Ergo ipsa non potest facere de fide divina, quod antea de fide divina non supponitur. Secundo: Quia Ecclesia acceptans est reliquum Corpus Ecclesiae, confusum, sine Capite, & sine unitate, quia praeter Collegium Cardinalium, quod electionem promulgat, solum restat Clerus inferior, & turba Fidelium, in qua, praecisive a tali Collegio, & a Papa nondum acceptato, nulla datur unitas Capitis, nec Congregationis, quia non est congregata per modum Concilii: Sed in Corpore Ecclesiae sic sumpto non datur authoritas infallibilis faciendi de fide, quod de fide non est: Ergo per Ecclesiae acceptationem non fit de fide quoad nos, electum esse verum Papam. Quoad quintam denique partem etiam probatur, quia authoritas infallibilis Papae debet praesupponi antequam definiat: non enim propterea habet authoritatem infallibilem in definiendo, quia definit, sed propterea definit infallibiliter, quia habet authoritatem infallibilem in definiendo: Ergo si antequam definiat, non habet authoritatem infallibilem definiendi, nec illam habebit in ipso actu definiendi: Sed non habet talem authoritatem infallibilem nisi sit de fide ipsum esse verum Papam: Ergo si non est de fide ipsum esse verum Papam antequam definiat, nec in ipso actu definiendi erit de fide quod sit verus Papa. Explicatur: Si antequam definiat, non est de fide quod est verus Papa: Ergo nec est de fide quod habet authoritatem infallibilem in definiendo, quia in hac authoritate potissime consistit Dignitas Papae: Si autem hoc non est de fide: Ergo antequam actu definiat, non est de fide ista conditionalis: Si definiat, definitio eius erit infallibilis: Ergo cum definierit, eius definitio non erit de fide credenda, nec infallibilis: Sed per definitionem, quam esse infallibilem non est de fide, non potest fieri de fide definientem esse verum Papam: Ergo. |  | **90.** You will object secondly: It is not a matter of faith, at least with respect to us, that Innocent XII is the true Pope before he is elected, nor that he is elected before the peaceful promulgation of his election, nor that he is promulgated before the acceptance of the Church, nor immediately after the peaceful acceptance of the Church, nor finally when the Pope defines something ex Cathedra: Therefore it is never immediately a matter of faith. The antecedent, as to the first part, is evident, because one not yet elected is not Pope. As to the second part it is also certain, because before the promulgation of the election he is not proposed to the Church as Pope: But nothing is a matter of faith for us, or with respect to the Church, before it is proposed to the Church as something to be held by faith: Therefore, although he may be peacefully elected, if the election has not yet been promulgated, it is not yet a matter of faith for us that he is the true Pope. As to the third part, it is also proven, because even after the election has been peacefully promulgated, if it is not accepted by the Church, he will not be a certain Pope: Therefore, it is not a matter of faith that he is such. Secondly: Because the Cardinals who promulgate the election do not have infallible authority in proposing matters of faith, for if a General Council without the Pope does not have such infallibility: Therefore, much less does the College of Cardinals: But for something to be a matter of faith for us, it must be proposed to the Church by one having infallible authority in proposing matters of faith: Therefore, when an election has been promulgated by the Cardinals, but not yet accepted by the Church, it is not yet a matter of faith for us that the elected one is the true Pope. As to the fourth part it is also proven, because the acceptance of the Church, says Father Sedio, in the present Controversy 6, number 79, only produces moral certainty consisting in the consent of many: Therefore, it cannot itself make something a matter of divine faith which was not previously presupposed to be of divine faith. Secondly: Because the Church that accepts is the remaining Body of the Church, confused, without a Head, and without unity, because apart from the College of Cardinals, which promulgates the election, there remains only the lower Clergy, and the crowd of the Faithful, in which, considered apart from such a College, and from the Pope not yet accepted, there is no unity of Head, nor of Congregation, because it is not congregated in the manner of a Council: But in the Body of the Church thus taken, there is no infallible authority to make a matter of faith what is not a matter of faith: Therefore, through the acceptance of the Church it does not become a matter of faith for us that the elected one is the true Pope. As to the fifth part, finally, it is also proven, because the infallible authority of the Pope must be presupposed before he defines: for he does not have infallible authority in defining because he defines, but rather he defines infallibly because he has infallible authority in defining: Therefore, if before he defines, he does not have infallible authority of defining, neither will he have it in the very act of defining: But he does not have such infallible authority unless it is a matter of faith that he is the true Pope: Therefore, if it is not a matter of faith that he is the true Pope before he defines, neither in the very act of defining will it be a matter of faith that he is the true Pope. This is explained: If before he defines, it is not a matter of faith that he is the true Pope: Therefore, neither is it a matter of faith that he has infallible authority in defining, because the Dignity of the Pope consists most especially in this authority: But if this is not a matter of faith: Therefore, before he actually defines, this conditional is not a matter of faith: If he defines, his definition will be infallible: Therefore, when he has defined, his definition will not be to be believed by faith, nor infallible: But through a definition, which it is not a matter of faith is infallible, it cannot be made a matter of faith that the one defining is the true Pope: Therefore. |
| 91. Hoc argumentum exigit, quod determinemus, quando incipiat esse de fide quoad nos, electum esse verum Papam. Dico ergo primo, quod antequam pacifice eligatur, non est de fide, immo nec re ipsa est verus Papa. De hoc nemo dubitat, quia ut supra ostendimus, Christus non instituit hanc dignitatem ut transituram ad Successores, nisi per electionem Ecclesiae. Dico secundo, quod rite electus, sed nondum pacifice promulgatus, est quidem re ipsa iam verus Papa, sed nondum est de fide quoad nos. Primum patet, quia Christus ad conferendam re ipsa Dignitatem illam Apostolicam valde expectat designationem personae faciendam ab Ecclesia, huiusmodi autem designatio sit consummate, & absolute, quando electio in ratione electionis consummatur, & absolvitur pacifice. Et item, quia quando Ecclesia repraesentata in S. Collegio Cardinalium promulgat electionem, & proponit electum ut verum Papam, non proponit ut verum Papam, nisi eum, quem iam supponit verum Papam, promulgatio enim illa, & propositio iam non est designativa personae ut fiat verus Papa, nec factiva veri Papae, sed solum declarativa veri Papae: Ergo pro priori debet iam supponi electus ut verus Papa, alias declararet Ecclesia, quod verum non esset, sed falsum ante ipsam declarationem. Secundum etiam patet, & recte probatur in argumento, quia quod Corpori Ecclesiae non est promulgatum, seu sufficienter propositum, non est de fide quoad nos, quamvis in se verum sit, & infallibile. Antequam Papa ex Cathedra definiat aliquid debet iam supponi de fide absolute quoad nos ipsum esse verum Papam. Patet, tum quia hoc recte probatur in argumento. Tum, quia etiam id ipsum probat ratio secunda pro Conclusione supra num. 52. ut eam expendenti patebit. Nec obstat, si dicas: Satis provisum esse infallibilitati fidei, & Ecclesiae, si promissiones Christi intelligantur disiunctim, ita ut solum promiserit unum e duobus, nempe vel non permissurum, quod invalide electus habeatur ab Ecclesia ut verus Papa, vel quod si habeatur, non permittet quod aliquid definiat, & proponat ex Cathedra; nam hoc asseverato, firma, & secura maneret certitudo fidei: Sed ad hoc unice factae sunt Christi promissiones, ut Ecclesia nunquam falli posset in fide, & ut Cathedra Petri esset infallibilis in rebus fidei proponendis: Ergo debent intelligi in illo sensu conditionato, aut disiunctivo: Sed sic intellectae non faciunt de fide absoluta, & determinata, pacifice electum esse verum Papam, sed solum faciunt de fide disiunctim, vel quod est verus Papa, vel quod Deus nihil permittet eum ex Cathedra definire: Ergo usquedum constet, eum aliquid definivisse, non erit de fide absolute eum esse verum Papam. Non inquam, obstat, tum quia promissiones Christi, non solum sunt factae a fine ut Ecclesia non fallatur in rebus ex Cathedra Petri definitis, sed etiam ut habeat certam, & infallibilem potestatem clavium, ad quam Fideles cum firma spe possint recurrere pro remissione peccatorum, & indulgentia consequenda, id enim promisit, cum dixit: Tibi dabo claves Regni Caelorum: hanc autem potestatem statim incipit exercere Summus Pontifex. Tum, quia etiam illae promissiones ordinantur ut Ecclesia sit perfecta, & vere una, vere & infallibilis coniuncta unicopiti visibili, veroque sui Pastori, & etiam, ut Ecclesia in hoc capite agnoscendo non fallatur, nec falli possit: Sed antequam Pontifex aliquid definiat ex Cathedra, Ecclesia ipsum reveretur ut sui Summum Pastorem, utque habentem Caeli claves, & ut regulam infallibilem fidei in actu primo: Ergo ne ecclesia in his falli possit, debent promissiones Christi intelligi absolute, & determinate, non vero sub illa disiunctione. Confirmatur, quia ut recte provisum sit Ecclesiae, non satis est, quod ille, quem Ecclesia tenet ut Papam, non possit falsum definire, sed opus est, ut in controversiis fidei possit, & habeat authoritatem verum definiendi, nam haec potestas, & authoritas omnino necessaria est in Ecclesia, ut supra ostendimus quaest. 4. Sed, si solum esset de fide disiunctim, vel hunc esse verum Papam, vel nihil definiturum ex Cathedra, solum esset certum, ipsum nihil posse falso definire, at non esset determinate certum in Ecclesia quod definire posset, quia si non esset verus Papa, definire non posset ex Cathedra: Ergo non esset sufficienter provisum Ecclesiae. Debent ergo illae Christi promissiones intelligi in sensu determinato, & absoluto, ita ut Successoribus Div. Petri absolute promittat potestatem clavium, & authoritatem infallibilem independenter ab eo, quod actu definiant, vel non definiant. |  | **91.** This argument requires that we determine when it begins to be a matter of faith for us that the elected person is the true Pope. I say first, that before someone is peacefully elected, it is not a matter of faith, indeed he is not even in reality the true Pope. No one doubts this, because as we have shown above, Christ did not institute this dignity to pass to Successors except through the election of the Church. I say secondly, that one who is rightly elected, but not yet peacefully promulgated, is indeed already in reality the true Pope, but it is not yet a matter of faith for us. The first point is evident because Christ, in order to confer in reality that Apostolic Dignity, awaits the designation of the person to be made by the Church, and such designation is consummated and absolute when the election, in the nature of an election, is consummated and peacefully resolved. Moreover, when the Church, represented in the Sacred College of Cardinals, promulgates the election and proposes the elected as the true Pope, it does not propose as the true Pope anyone except him whom it already supposes to be the true Pope, for that promulgation and proposition is not designative of the person so that he might become the true Pope, nor does it make the true Pope, but is only declarative of the true Pope. Therefore, prior to this, the elected must already be supposed to be the true Pope, otherwise the Church would declare what was not true, but false before that declaration. The second point is also evident, and is rightly proved in the argument, because what has not been promulgated or sufficiently proposed to the Body of the Church is not a matter of faith for us, although in itself it may be true and infallible. Before the Pope can define something ex Cathedra, it must already be absolutely presupposed as a matter of faith for us that he is the true Pope. This is evident, both because it is rightly proved in the argument, and because the second reason for the Conclusion above in number 52 also proves this, as will be clear to anyone who considers it. Nor does it stand as an objection if you say: It would be sufficient provision for the infallibility of faith and of the Church if Christ's promises were understood disjunctively, so that He only promised one of two things, namely, either that He would not permit an invalidly elected person to be regarded by the Church as the true Pope, or that if such a person were so regarded, He would not permit him to define and propose anything ex Cathedra; for with this assertion, the certainty of faith would remain firm and secure. But Christ's promises were made solely for this purpose, that the Church might never be deceived in faith, and that the Chair of Peter might be infallible in proposing matters of faith. Therefore, they ought to be understood in that conditional or disjunctive sense. But understood in this way, they do not make it an absolute and determinate matter of faith that one peacefully elected is the true Pope, but only make it a matter of faith disjunctively, either that he is the true Pope, or that God will not permit him to define anything ex Cathedra. Therefore, until it is established that he has defined something, it will not be an absolute matter of faith that he is the true Pope. This objection, I say, does not stand. First, because Christ's promises were made not only for the purpose that the Church might not be deceived in matters defined ex Cathedra Petri, but also that it might have a certain and infallible power of the keys, to which the Faithful with firm hope might have recourse for the remission of sins and for obtaining indulgence, for He promised this when He said: "I will give to thee the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven." And the Supreme Pontiff begins to exercise this power immediately. Second, because these promises are also ordained so that the Church might be perfect and truly one, truly and infallibly joined to its one visible head and true Pastor, and also so that the Church might not be deceived, nor could be deceived, in recognizing this head. But before the Pontiff defines anything ex Cathedra, the Church reveres him as its Supreme Pastor, as having the keys of Heaven, and as the infallible rule of faith in first act. Therefore, lest the Church be deceived in these matters, Christ's promises must be understood absolutely and determinately, not under that disjunction. This is confirmed because, for the Church to be rightly provided for, it is not enough that the one whom the Church holds as Pope cannot define falsehood, but it is necessary that in controversies of faith he can and has the authority to define truth, for this power and authority is absolutely necessary in the Church, as we showed above in question 4.\ But if it were only a matter of faith disjunctively, either that this person is the true Pope or that he will not define anything ex Cathedra, it would only be certain that he could not falsely define anything, but it would not be determinately certain in the Church that he could define, because if he were not the true Pope, he could not define ex Cathedra. Therefore, the Church would not be sufficiently provided for. Thus, Christ's promises must be understood in a determinate and absolute sense, so that to the Successors of Divine Peter He absolutely promises the power of the keys and infallible authority independently of whether they actually define something or not. |
| **92.** Tota ergo difficultas restat inter promulgationem, & accepationem. Dico tamen, probabilius mihi videri, quod ex quo electio pacifice promulgatur, & electus acceptat in se electionem, & totum hoc proponitur authentice Corpori Ecclesiae, incipit esse de fide absolute ipsum electum esse verum Papam pro priori ad acceptationem Corporis Ecclesiae. Moveor primo, quia reliquum Corpus Ecclesiae tenetur acceptare illam electionem, & illum electum sic pacifice electum, & promulgatum; ex quo sic pacifice eligitur, & promulgatur, nullus enim de Corpore reliquo Ecclesiae habet authoritatem recusandi illam electionem ut nullam, nec sic electum, ut Papam nullum, aut falso talem; quia reliqui omnes, praeter Cardinales, & electum, comparatur ut subditi, & inferiores, qui tenentur ratum habere, quidquid in illa electione Collegium Cardinalium decernit, & pacifice praestat, siquidem tota Ecclesia universalis illis commisit plenam potestatem, & facultatem circa illam electionem, & voluit ratum haberi a reliquo Ecclesiae Corpore, quidquid Collegium illud pacifice praestaverit, & promulgaverit; unde Collegium illud repraesentat totam Ecclesiam: Ergo reliqui omnes tenentur quam primum acceptare: Sed acceptatio fit credendo illum esse verum Papam: Ergo quam primum tenentur credere illum esse verum Papam: Ergo quid ante acceptationem iam supponitur de fide quoad illos, ipsum esse verum Papam. Explicatur: definitiones, & declarationes Papae ex Cathedra ut sint de fide quoad nos, non pendent a nostra acceptatione, nec ab acceptatione Corporis Ecclesiae, sed semel factae, & promulgatae, sunt de fide quoad omnes Ecclesiae subditos, & omnes obligant ad sui fidem: Sed electio pacifica Papae, pacifice absoluta, & promulgata, acceptaque ab ipso electo, habet vim definitionis Ecclesiae sufficienter promulgatae: Ergo ante acceptationem subditorum supponitur iam absolute de fide, & obligans ad sui fidem omnes subditos. Urgetur: Si ante acceptationem non esset de fide, & fieret de fide per acceptationem subditorum, ipsi subditi facerent sibi de fide articulum Papae existentis, & essent sibi ipsis regula infallibilis fidei, vel saltem acceptando constituerent sibi metipsis regulam infallibilem fidei: Sed hoc repugnat subditis, aut membris Ecclesiae: Ergo. Demum, quia auctoritas infallibilis Papae semel pacifice electi, & promulgati supra omnia Ecclesiae membra est independens a subditis, nam illam unice accipit electus a Christo, independenter a reliquo Corpore Ecclesiae; Ergo ante subditorum acceptationem iam supponitur Papa electus ut regula infallibilis respectu illorum: Sed nequit intelligi ut regula infallibilis respectu illorum, nisi intelligatur de fide, quoad ipsos, esse verum Papam: Ergo. |  | **92.** Therefore, the entire difficulty remains between promulgation and acceptance. I maintain, however, that it seems more probable to me that from the moment an election is peacefully promulgated, and the elected person accepts the election, and all this is authentically proposed to the Body of the Church, it begins to be an absolute article of faith that the elected person is the true Pope—even prior to the acceptance by the Body of the Church. I am moved to this position, first, because the remaining Body of the Church is bound to accept that election and that elect who has been thus peacefully elected and promulgated. From the moment he is peacefully elected and promulgated, no one from the remaining Body of the Church has the authority to reject that election as null, nor the one so elected as a false or invalid Pope. This is because all others, apart from the Cardinals and the elected one, are considered as subjects and inferiors, who are bound to ratify whatever the College of Cardinals decides and peacefully carries out in that election. Indeed, the entire universal Church has committed to them full power and faculty concerning that election, and has determined that whatever that College peacefully performs and promulgates should be ratified by the remaining Body of the Church; therefore that College represents the entire Church. Thus, all others are bound to accept it as soon as possible. But acceptance occurs by believing him to be the true Pope. Therefore, they are bound to believe as soon as possible that he is the true Pope. Consequently, even before their acceptance, it is already presupposed as a matter of faith for them that he is the true Pope. Let me explain: the definitions and declarations of the Pope ex Cathedra, to be matters of faith for us, do not depend on our acceptance, nor on the acceptance of the Body of the Church, but once made and promulgated, they are matters of faith for all subjects of the Church, and they oblige all to faith in them. But the peaceful election of the Pope, peacefully completed and promulgated, and accepted by the elected himself, has the force of a sufficiently promulgated definition of the Church. Therefore, even before the acceptance of the subjects, it is already presupposed absolutely as a matter of faith, and obliges all subjects to faith in it. Furthermore: if before acceptance it were not a matter of faith, and became a matter of faith through the acceptance of the subjects, the subjects themselves would make for themselves an article of faith regarding the existence of the Pope, and would be for themselves an infallible rule of faith, or at least by accepting would constitute for themselves an infallible rule of faith. But this is repugnant to subjects or members of the Church. Therefore [it cannot be so]. Finally, because the infallible authority of the Pope, once peacefully elected and promulgated, over all members of the Church is independent of the subjects, for the elected one receives it solely from Christ, independently of the rest of the Body of the Church. Therefore, even before the acceptance of the subjects, the elected Pope is already presupposed as an infallible rule with respect to them. But he cannot be understood as an infallible rule with respect to them unless it is understood as a matter of faith, for them, that he is the true Pope. Therefore [my position is proven]. |
| **93.** Sequitur ergo, tunc incipere esse de fide quoad membra Ecclesiae, electum esse verum Papam, cum absoluta electione pacifica, & acceptata ab electo, pacifice promulgatur, & proponitur reliquo Corpori Ecclesiae, nam ex illo tunc tenentur omnes credere absolute ipsum esse verum Papam. Ad probationem tertiae partis antecedentis in contra, respondeo, negando casum possibilem, quod consummata pacifice electione, & pacifice promulgata, tota Ecclesia non acceptaret: Solum ergo posset contingere, quod aliquis subditus, vel aliqui nollent acceptare, & tunc ille, vel isti essent puniendi ut schismatici; si nempe pure nollent ipsi praestare obedientiam; si vero nollent credere illi ut regulae infallibili fidei, aut negarent esse verum Papam, habendi essent pro haereticis. Ad secundam probationem dico, quod Cardinales in illo munere absolvendi, & promulgandi electionem habent auctoritatem infallibilem, siquidem in illo munere habent auctoritatem totius Ecclesiae, quae absque dubio est infallibilis. Nec ista auctoritas est sine Capite Ecclesiae, nam quia Summi Pontifices antecessores cum Conciliis Generalibus commiserunt totam Ecclesiae authoritatem pro illo munere S. Collegio Cardinalium, ac proinde in illo Collegio vivit virtualiter authoritas Pontificum praecedentium, & totius Ecclesiae cum capite. Tum quia electus de novo, acceptando in se talem electionem, & ostendendo se ut verum Papam, quasi confirmat sui electionem, & authorizat promulgationem. Nec in contra est, quod ipse non possit facere de fide se ipsum, nam declarative, & per modum proponentis est ipse ratio sui, & caeterorum, cum sit primum in suo genere, & sic potest cum Collegio Cardinalium se ipsum declarare ut verum Papam : Quod quidem constat ab actu ipso; nam plures Pontifices definierunt cum Concilio universali Pontificem Romanum esse verum Successorem Div. Petri, & Vicarium Christi. Vide supra quaest. 9. a num. 4. |  | **93.** It follows, therefore, that it begins to be a matter of faith for the members of the Church that the elected person is the true Pope when, after the election has been peacefully completed and accepted by the elect, it is peacefully promulgated and proposed to the rest of the Body of the Church, for from that moment all are bound to believe absolutely that he is the true Pope. To the proof of the third part of the antecedent to the contrary, I respond by denying the possibility of the case where, after the election has been peacefully completed and peacefully promulgated, the whole Church would not accept it. It could only happen that some subject or subjects would refuse to accept it, and then he or they would be punished as schismatics—namely, if they purely refused to render obedience to him; but if they refused to believe in him as the infallible rule of faith, or denied that he was the true Pope, they would have to be regarded as heretics. To the second proof I say that the Cardinals, in that function of completing and promulgating the election, possess infallible authority, since in that function they possess the authority of the whole Church, which is without doubt infallible. Nor is this authority without the Head of the Church, for since the preceding Supreme Pontiffs with General Councils committed the entire authority of the Church for that function to the Sacred College of Cardinals, consequently in that College there virtually lives the authority of the preceding Pontiffs and of the whole Church with its head. Furthermore, because the newly elected, by accepting such an election for himself and by presenting himself as the true Pope, quasi-confirms his own election and authorizes its promulgation. Nor does it stand against this that he himself cannot make himself a matter of faith, for declaratively and by way of proposition he is the reason of himself and of others, since he is the first in his kind, and thus with the College of Cardinals he can declare himself the true Pope. This indeed is evident from the act itself; for many Pontiffs have defined with the universal Council that the Roman Pontiff is the true Successor of St. Peter and the Vicar of Christ. See above, question 9, from number 4. |
| **94.** Objicies tertio : Non est immediate de fide, quod non est immediate revelatum, nec definitum : Sed non est immediate revelatum, nec definitum de hoc numero homine, nempe de Innocent. XII. esse verum Papam, quia talis numero hominis nulla mentio sit in Sacro Texto, nec in definitionibus Ecclesiae, nec potest haberi ex traditione immemoriali, cum sit factum novum : Ergo non est immediate de fide. Respondeo, concessa maiori, negando minorem, quia ut aliquid sit immediate revelatum, non requiritur, quod expressis terminis, & proprio nomine inveniatur in Scriptura, sed sufficit, quod in ea reveletur quoad sensum, & quod talis sensus constet ex Ecclesiae traditione, seu communi PP. intelligentia : Patet autem quod Christus expresse revelavit Petram, supra quam fundatur Ecclesia, esse Div. Petrum, ut Ecclesiae Pastorem, & hanc firmam semper futuram in Ecclesia, ita ut portae inferi non praevalerent adversus eam; hoc autem ex perpetua Ecclesiae traditione, & communi PP. intelligentia non alium sensum habet, nisi Dignitatem Petri firmam, veram, & infallibilem perseveraturam in omnibus, & singulis Petri Successoribus visibiliter usque ad diem iudicij, quin unquam deficiat verus illius Successor, nisi in Sede Vacante, & tempore schismatis, ac proinde, quod hodie, dum non est tempus Sedis Vacantis, nec schismatis, ille numero, qui visibiliter regit Ecclesiam in Sede Petri, sit verus Successor Petri, & verus Papa, seu Christi Vicarius. |  | **94.** Third objection: What is not immediately revealed, nor defined, is not immediately of faith. But it is not immediately revealed, nor defined, concerning this particular man, namely Innocent XII, that he is the true Pope, because no mention of such a particular man is made in Sacred Scripture, nor in the definitions of the Church, nor can it be derived from immemorial tradition, since it is a new fact. Therefore, it is not immediately of faith. I respond by conceding the major premise but denying the minor, because for something to be immediately revealed, it is not required that it be found in Scripture in express terms and by proper name, but it is sufficient that it be revealed in Scripture according to its sense, and that such sense is established from the tradition of the Church or the common understanding of the Fathers. It is evident, however, that Christ expressly revealed that the Rock upon which the Church is founded is the Divine Peter as Pastor of the Church, and that this foundation would always remain firm in the Church, so that the gates of hell would not prevail against it. This, according to the perpetual tradition of the Church and the common understanding of the Fathers, has no other meaning than that the Dignity of Peter, firm, true, and infallible, will persevere in each and every one of Peter’s Successors visibly until the day of judgment, without ever lacking a true Successor, except during a Vacant See or in time of schism. And consequently, that today, when it is not a time of Vacant See nor of schism, that particular man who visibly governs the Church in the See of Peter is the true Successor of Peter and the true Pope, or Vicar of Christ. |
| 95. Objicies quarto : Qui negat propositionem, quae immediate est de fide, est formalis haereticus : Sed qui negaret hanc propositionem : Innocent. XII. est verus Papa, non esset formalis haereticus : Ergo illa non est immediate de fide. Distinguo maiorem; qui negat talem propositionem pertinaciter, post sufficientem promulgationem, concedo: Si aliter negat, ex ignorantia, aut non sufficienti promulgatione, nego minorem: Et distincta minori eodem modo, nego consequentiam, quia si quis nunc scienter, postquam satis est promulgata electio pacifica huius numero Papae, negaret ipsum esse verum Papam, & Vicarium Christi in terris, absdubio esset formalis haereticus, licet talis non esset, si ex ignorantia, aut non sufficienti promulgatione id negasset. |  | **95.** You will object fourthly: One who denies a proposition which is immediately of faith is a formal heretic. But one who would deny this proposition: “Innocent XII is the true Pope,” would not be a formal heretic. Therefore, that proposition is not immediately of faith. I distinguish the major premise; one who denies such a proposition pertinaciously, after sufficient promulgation, I concede; if one denies it otherwise, from ignorance or insufficient promulgation, I deny the minor premise. And having distinguished the minor premise in the same way, I deny the consequence, because if anyone now knowingly, after the peaceful election of this particular Pope has been sufficiently promulgated, were to deny that he is the true Pope and Vicar of Christ on earth, he would undoubtedly be a formal heretic, although he would not be such if he had denied it out of ignorance or insufficient promulgation. |
| 96. Obijcies quinto. Non est immediate de fide, quod Iulius II, Eugenius IIII, & sic de alijs praeteriti temporis, fuerint veri Papae: Sed eadem est ratio de Innocent. XII. nunc regnante: Ergo nec est immediate de fide istum esse verum Papam. Maior patet, quia illos fuisse Papas solum constat ex historijs humanis: Ergo non est de fide divina. Confirmatur primo: Quia definitiones fidei factae a Praedecessoribus sunt immediate de fide, quamvis non sit immediate de fide ipsos fuisse veros Papas: Ergo opus non est, quod sit immediate de fide definientem esse verum Papam, ut sit immediate de fide articulus ab ipso definitus, contra rationem supra expensam num. 53. Confirmatur secundo: Ut hodie Innocent. sit verus Papa, requiritur essentialiter quod hodie vivat: Sed non est de fide, adhuc mediate, immo nec certum moraliter ipsum hodie vivere: Ergo nec quod sit verus Papa. Patet consequentia, quia ut aliquid sit absolute de fide exigitur quod conditiones essentiales ad illud requisitae sint de fide, saltem mediate, aut certe Theologice, vel ad minus certitudine morali. |  | **96.** You will object fifthly: It is not immediately of faith that Julius II, Eugene IV, and so on for others of past times, were true Popes. But the same reasoning applies to Innocent XII, now reigning. Therefore, it is not immediately of faith that he is the true Pope. The major premise is evident because their having been Popes is known only from human histories; therefore, it is not of divine faith. It is confirmed firstly: Because the definitions of faith made by Predecessors are immediately of faith, although it is not immediately of faith that they themselves were true Popes. Therefore, it is not necessary that it be immediately of faith that the one defining is the true Pope, in order that an article defined by him be immediately of faith, contrary to the reasoning explained above in number 53. It is confirmed secondly: For Innocent to be the true Pope today, it is essentially required that he be alive today. But it is not of faith, even mediately, indeed not even morally certain, that he is alive today. Therefore, neither is it [of faith] that he is the true Pope. The consequence is evident because for something to be absolutely of faith, it is required that the essential conditions requisite for it be of faith, at least mediately, or certainly theologically, or at minimum with moral certainty. |
| 97. Respondeo, distinguendo maiorem: Si de illis perseveret in Ecclesia traditio infallibilis tamquam de veris Pontificibus, nego maiorem: Si de illis solum detur traditio moraliter certa, subdistinguo: Non est de fide intrinsece absoluta, sine tacita illa conditione, *si vere extiterint, & pacifice obtinuerint Cathedram Petri*, illos fuisse veros Papas, concedo: Non est de fide extrinsece absoluta, & cum tacita illa conditione, nego maiorem, & minorem: Quia de aliquibus Praedecessoribus in Cathedra D. Petri extat hodie in Ecclesia infallibilis traditio, praesertim de illis, de quibus extant definitiones fidei, in quibus traditionibus conservandis Ecclesia est infallibilis omnino; & de istis, est de fide intrinsece absoluta quod fuerint veri Papae, nec est necessarium subintelligi conditionem praefatam, quia eorum Pontificatus non constat ex historijs pure humanis, ut humanis, sed ex Ecclesiae traditione, quae habet ex assistentia Spiritus Sancti, in his traditionibus authoritatem divinam, cum ad fidei firmitatem spectent. De aliis vero, de quorum Pontificatu non extant definitiones in Ecclesie deposito, nec constans, & conformis traditio, sed sola historia fallibilis, licet moraliter certa, solum est de fide absoluta extrinsece, & cum tacita conditione, modo sepe explicato. De Innocent. vero XII. hodie regnante, est evidentia metaphysica, quod ipse est, qui pacifice visibiliter regnat, qua supposita, est de fide immediate ipsum esse verum Papam, de fide inquam intrinsece absoluta, & sine tacita conditione. Ex quo patet ad primam confirmationem. Ad secundam, concessa maiori, distinguo minorem: Sumpto ly *hodie* matematice pro hoc die, quo haec scribo, concedo minorem: Sumpto ly, *hodie* moraliter, relate ad tempus moraliter nobis praesens, quo visibiliter Romae apparet, quo pacto a nobis sumitur, nego minorem, & consequentiam in eodem sensu: Quia cum dicimus esse de fide absolute, quod hodie in Ecclesia Innocentius est verus Papa, per ly hodie non intelligimus mathematice hunc diem, sed moraliter loquendo intelligimus tempus illud nobis moraliter praesens, quo visibiliter apparet Romae, licet mathematice respectu huius diei praeteritum. Si vero intelligatur ly *hodie* mathematice, pro hac die; semper subintelligitur tacita conditio, *si vivit*, ut supra explicavimus. Unde cum diximus in conclusione esse omnino absolute de fide, non excludimus hanc tacitam conditionem, sed solum alias, quae adhuc supposito quod vivat, relinquerent fallibilem eius Pontificatum verum, eiusque authoritatem, & dignitatem, v.g. istas: *Si est rite electus, si est rite baptizatus, &c*. Quia si fides solum crederet sub his conditionibus, relinquendo illas fallibiles, certitudo fidei de vero Papa non esset sufficienter absoluta, ut vidente ipso, daretur absoluta firmitas dignitatis Apostolicae in ipso. Unde istae conditiones debent esse de fide, saltem mediate, seu certae certitudine theologica; at illa alia, *si vivit*, non debet esse ita certa, immo nec moraliter sine prudenti formidine: In quo quidem omnes tenentur assignare disparitatem. |  | **97.** I respond by distinguishing the major premise: If there exists in the Church an infallible tradition concerning them as true Pontiffs, I deny the major premise. If concerning them there is only a morally certain tradition, I further distinguish: It is not intrinsically absolute faith, without that tacit condition, *if they truly existed and peacefully obtained the Chair of Peter*, that they were true Popes, I concede. It is not extrinsically absolute faith, with that tacit condition, I deny the major and minor premises. Because concerning some Predecessors in the Chair of St. Peter, there exists today in the Church an infallible tradition, especially concerning those for whom there exist definitions of faith, in the preservation of which traditions the Church is completely infallible; and concerning these, it is of intrinsically absolute faith that they were true Popes, nor is it necessary to understand the aforementioned condition, because their Pontificate is not established from purely human histories as human, but from the tradition of the Church, which has, by the assistance of the Holy Spirit, divine authority in these traditions, since they pertain to the firmness of faith. Concerning others, however, of whose Pontificate there exist neither definitions in the deposit of the Church nor a constant and uniform tradition, but only fallible history, albeit morally certain, it is only extrinsically absolute faith, and with the tacit condition, in the manner often explained. Concerning Innocent XII, however, who reigns today, there is metaphysical evidence that he is the one who peacefully and visibly reigns, which being supposed, it is of immediate faith that he is the true Pope—of intrinsically absolute faith, I say, and without tacit condition. From this, the answer to the first confirmation is clear. To the second, having conceded the major premise, I distinguish the minor: Taking “today” mathematically for this day on which I write these things, I concede the minor premise. Taking “today” morally, in relation to the time morally present to us, in which he visibly appears in Rome, in which sense we take it, I deny the minor premise and the consequence in the same sense. Because when we say it is of absolute faith that Innocent is the true Pope today in the Church, by “today” we do not understand mathematically this day, but speaking morally, we understand that time morally present to us in which he visibly appears in Rome, although mathematically with respect to this day it is past. But if “today” is understood mathematically, for this day, the tacit condition “if he is alive” is always understood, as we explained above. Hence, when we said in the conclusion that it is absolutely of faith, we do not exclude this tacit condition, but only others which, even supposing that he is alive, would leave his true Pontificate, his authority, and dignity fallible, e.g., these: “If he is rightly elected, if he is rightly baptized, etc.” Because if faith would believe only under these conditions, leaving those fallible, the certainty of faith concerning the true Pope would not be sufficiently absolute, so that, with him presiding, there would be given an absolute firmness of Apostolic dignity in him. Hence these conditions must be of faith, at least mediately, or certain with theological certainty; but that other condition, “if he is alive,” need not be so certain, indeed not even morally certain without prudent fear: In which indeed all are bound to assign a disparity. |
| **98.** Obiicies Sexto : Non minus est necessaria in Ecclesiae fides de Sacramento Eucharistiae, & praesentia Christi in illo, quam de vero Papa, nec minus revelata illa, quam hic, potissime cum Christus expresse dixerit: *Hoc est Corpus meum: Hoc quotiescumque feceritis, &c*. Et: *Ecce ego vobiscum sum usque ad consummationem seculi*: Et tamen non est immediate, & absolute de fide Sacramentum Eucharistiae in individuo, nec in hac numero Hostia esse Corpus Christi, sed solent in genere: Ergo pariter de Pontifice. Huic argumento nullam aliam reddunt aliqui disparitatem, nisi quod non potest esse certum moraliter hanc numero Hostiam esse valide consecratam, sicut est certum moraliter hunc hominem esse valide electum. Sed sane, si motiva solius certitudinis moralis spectentur, numquam hoc potui percipere, nam sane validitas electionis Papae a pluribus dependet fallibilibus conditionibus, quam cita consecratio Hostiae; haec enim unice pendet ex eo quod consecrans sit verus Sacerdos, habeat veram intentionem, & materia sit vera, circa materiam levis, vel nulla est contingentia falsitatis, cum sit visibilis, unde solum est fallibilitas in illis duobus primis conditionibus. Attamen valida electio Papae a pluribus dependet, nempe ab eo quod Cardinales sint re ipsa Cardinales, quod non eligant per symoniam, quod electus sit vir, baptizatus valide, quod etiam pendet ex intentione baptizantis, valide ordinatus, quod pendet etiam ex eo quod ordinans fuerit verus Episcopus, & habuerit intentionem; de quibus non fit ab electoribus alia inquisitio, quam regularis, quae supponitur facta, quando electus baptizatus, & ordinatus fuit, quae diligentia fallibilis est ex se: Ergo si solum attendantur motiva certitudinis moralis, & humanae plures fallibilitates habere potest electio Papae, quam consecratio Hostiae; praesertim si concurrerent centum, aut mille Sacerdotes ad eius consecrationem, nam vix possibile videtur, quod nullus esset in illis verus Sacerdos, qui haberet veram intentionem. |  | **98.** You will object sixthly: Faith in the Sacrament of the Eucharist and Christ’s presence therein is no less necessary in the Church than faith in the true Pope, nor is the former less revealed than the latter, especially since Christ explicitly said: “This is my Body: Do this as often as you will, etc.” And: “Behold, I am with you always, until the end of the age.” And yet it is not immediately and absolutely a matter of faith that the Sacrament of the Eucharist in a particular instance, nor that Christ’s Body is present in this specific Host, but only in general terms. Therefore, the same applies to the Pontiff. To this argument, some offer no other distinction except that it cannot be morally certain that this particular Host has been validly consecrated, in the way that it is morally certain that this particular man has been validly elected. But truly, if one considers only the grounds for moral certainty, I have never been able to comprehend this, for indeed the validity of a papal election depends on more fallible conditions than the consecration of a Host. The latter depends solely on the consecrator being a true Priest, having the right intention, and the matter being valid. Regarding the matter, there is little or no possibility of falsity, since it is visible; thus fallibility exists only in the first two conditions. However, a valid papal election depends on more factors: namely, that the Cardinals are actually Cardinals; that they do not elect through simony; that the one elected is a man, validly baptized (which also depends on the intention of the one baptizing), validly ordained (which likewise depends on the ordaining bishop being a true Bishop and having the proper intention). Concerning these matters, no investigation is conducted by the electors other than the standard one, which is presumed to have been done when the elect was baptized and ordained—a diligence which is inherently fallible. Therefore, if one attends only to the grounds for moral and human certainty, a papal election can have more points of fallibility than the consecration of a Host, especially if a hundred or a thousand Priests were to concur in its consecration, for it would scarcely seem possible that among them there would be no true Priest who had the proper intention. |
| **99.** Disparitas ergo assignanda est ex certitudine superna desumpta ab assistentia, Spiritus Sancti, quae quidem promissa est Ecclesiae in electione Papae absolvenda pacifice, sed non Sacerdotibus in Hostia consecranda. Et item quia cum Sacramentum Eucharistiae non sit regula fidei pro tota Ecclesia, non opus est quod detur in Ecclesia hoc numero Sacramentum Eucharistiae; de quo sit de fide quod est verum Sacramentum: Et item, quia de essentia Sacramenti Eucharistiae non est quod sit unum numero tantum in Ecclesia, nec visibiliter invenibile: At de essentia veri Summi Pontificis est quod sit unus tantum numero, & hoc visibiliter, unde cum Christus revelavit: Ecce ego vobiscum sum, &c. non determinavit unum numero Sacramentum visibile, in quo tantum esset, secus cum revelavit Petram Apostolicam pro fundamento; quo quidificanda erat Ecclesia, & sustentanda, quia hanc esse unam tantum visibiliter propositam Fidelibus est de fide. Recole rationes, quibus nostram sententiam probatam relinquimus, quae quidem minime probane de uno numero Sacramento, nec baptismi, nec Eucharistiae, nec alio, & haec est sufficies disparitas. Instarique potest in Ecclesia visibili, quae est de fide, non solum vage, sed determinate, & numerice illa, quin inde liceat inferre idem de Sacramento ullo. |  | **99.** The disparity, therefore, must be established from the supernal certainty derived from the assistance of the Holy Spirit, which indeed is promised to the Church in peacefully completing the election of the Pope, but not to priests in consecrating the Host. And likewise because, since the Sacrament of the Eucharist is not a rule of faith for the whole Church, it is not necessary that there be given in the Church this numerically one Sacrament of the Eucharist, concerning which it is a matter of faith that it is a true Sacrament. Moreover, because it is not of the essence of the Sacrament of the Eucharist that it be numerically one only in the Church, nor visibly findable. But it is of the essence of a true Supreme Pontiff that he be only one in number, and this visibly. Hence when Christ revealed: “Behold, I am with you, etc.,” He did not determine one numerically visible Sacrament in which alone He would be present; it was otherwise when He revealed the Apostolic Rock as the foundation upon which the Church was to be built and sustained, for it is a matter of faith that this is only one visibly presented to the Faithful. Recall the reasons by which we have left our position proven, which certainly do not prove about any numerically one Sacrament, neither of baptism, nor of the Eucharist, nor of any other, and this is sufficient disparity. And this can be further demonstrated in the visible Church, which is a matter of faith, not only vaguely, but determinately and numerically that one, without it being permitted to infer the same about any Sacrament. |
| **100.** Obiicies sexto: Demus, quod eligeretur in Papam nondum Sacris innitiatus, & quod pacifice promulgaretur: Tunc sane nondum esset verus Pontifex, quia non haberet potestatem Clavium: Ergo non est de fide quod omnis rite electus est verus Papa. Hoc argumentum non solum est contra propositionem singularem, de qua procedit quaestio, sed contra universalem, quam omnes supponunt de fide, & probat eam non solum non esse de fide, sed esse falsam: unde quia nimium probat, nihil probat. Dico ergo, quod cum eligitur nondum Sacris innitiatus, non eligitur pro vero Papa adaequate statim futuro, sed post consecrationem, unde illa electio non habet adaequatum effectum, nec intelligitur adaequate confirmata, quousque electus Sacris initietur, unde nihil mirum quod eo usque electus non sit verus Pontifex adaequate, quia nec Cardinales hoc declararunt, nec promulgarent, sed solum quod postquam fuerit consecratus sit adaequate verus Pontifex. |  | **100.** You will object sixthly: Let us suppose that someone not yet initiated into Holy Orders were elected as Pope, and that this election were peacefully promulgated. In that case, he would clearly not yet be a true Pontiff, since he would not possess the power of the Keys. Therefore, it is not a matter of faith that everyone duly elected is a true Pope. This argument not only contradicts the singular proposition which is the subject of our inquiry, but also the universal proposition which all presume to be a matter of faith. It attempts to prove that this proposition is not only not a matter of faith, but is actually false. Hence, because it proves too much, it proves nothing. I say, therefore, that when someone not yet initiated into Holy Orders is elected, he is not elected to become immediately and completely a true Pope, but rather to become so after consecration. Thus, that election does not have its complete effect, nor is it understood to be fully confirmed until the elect receives Holy Orders. It is therefore not at all surprising that until then, the elect is not adequately a true Pontiff, because the Cardinals have not declared this, nor would they promulgate it, but only that after he has been consecrated will he be fully a true Pontiff. |
| *101.* Sed dices: Demus, quod Episcopus Hostiensis, cui de iure attinet ipsum ordinare, & consecrare, vel non sit verus Episcopus, vel nolit habere intentionem, id sane possibile est: Sed eo ipso, adhuc consecratus non esset verus Papa: Ergo non est de fide divina ipsam, adhuc Sacris innitiatum, & consecratum, esse verum Papam. Respondeo, quod licet secundum se, & ex terminis sit possibilis suppositio facta, tamen ex suppositione promissionis Christi, & revelationis ipsius de soliditate, & firmitate illius Apostolicae Petrae, est consequenter Impossibilis talis suppositio siquidem manet infallibile, quod Christus non relinquet Ecclesiam suam falli existimando verum Christi Vicarium, cui Christus tradididerit Claves Regni Caelorum, illum qui tales Claves re ipsa non habeat, & ideo ad Christi regimen, & providentiam spectat impedire talem suppositionem factam, vel illam detegere Ecclesiae, vitando quod pacifice promulgetur ut verus Ianitor Regni Caelorum, qui talis vere non sit. |  | ***101.*** But you might say: Let us suppose that the Bishop of Ostia, to whom by right belongs the duty to ordain and consecrate him, either is not a true bishop, or does not intend to have the proper intention—this is certainly possible. But in that very case, the one consecrated would not be a true Pope. Therefore, it is not a matter of divine faith that he, even when initiated into the Sacred Orders and consecrated, is the true Pope. I respond that although according to itself and in its terms the supposed situation is possible, nevertheless, given the supposition of Christ’s promise and His revelation concerning the solidity and firmness of that Apostolic Rock, such a supposition is consequently impossible. Indeed, it remains infallible that Christ will not allow His Church to be deceived into regarding as the true Vicar of Christ—to whom Christ has handed the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven—one who in reality does not possess such Keys. Therefore, it belongs to Christ’s governance and providence to prevent such a supposed situation, or to reveal it to the Church, avoiding that one who is truly not the Gatekeeper of the Kingdom of Heaven be peacefully proclaimed as such. |
| *102.* Obiicies septimo: Potest Papa semel electus, & promulgatus pacifice, incidere in haeresim, saltem occultam: Sed tunc desineret esse verus Papa, quia desineret esse verum Caput Ecclesiae, & hoc quamvis pacifice electus, & acceptatus : Ergo non est de fide omnino absolute ipsum esse verum Papam. Respondeo, de hoc varias esse sententias, nam aliqui tenent, Papam in sensu composito Pontificatus non posse esse haereticum adhuc occultum, ac proinde ex quo desineret esse Fidelis, desineret esse Caput Ecclesiae; & verus Papa; sed negant casum possibilem de haeresi omnino occulta Ecclesiae. Alii inquiunt, quod, quamvis haereticus occultus, adhuc esset verus Papa. Alii quod etiam si esset manifestus, usque dum ab Ecclesia per Concilium deponeretur. Alii quod eo ipso, quod esset haereticus manifestus, ipso facto esset depositus. Quam ex istis sententiam veriorem iudicem, forsan infra dicam. Nunc, abstrahendo ab his sententiis, distinguo maiorem: Si minor sit vera, nego maiorem : Si minor sit falsa, concedo maiorem, & nego minorem : Quia implicat perseverare inesse promulgati, & pacifice acceptati ab Ecclesia, semel quod re ipsa sit depositus ab illa dignitate veri Papae, & Pastoris universalis Ecclesiae, unde si haeresis occulta aut manifesta ponatur incompossibilis cum ea dignitate, dicendum est, non posse contingere in vi promissionis Christi, quod Papa pacifice acceptus in sensu composito sit occulte haereticus, & consequenter nec manifestus : Si vero contendas talem posse esse, dicendum est, non eo ipso amittere illam dignitatem, sed re ipsa manere Papam, usque dum per Ecclesiam deponatur; aut saltem Ecclesiae manifestetur. Quia licet de hoc possint esse opiniones, unum tamen ut certum citra dubium, & opinionem tenendum est, nempe, non posse Ecclesiam falli, nec proponendo, nec acceptando ut verum Papam, eum, qui verus Papa non sit. |  | ***102.*** You will object seventhly: A Pope once elected and peacefully promulgated can fall into heresy, at least secretly. But then he would cease to be the true Pope, because he would cease to be the true Head of the Church, and this despite being peacefully elected and accepted. Therefore, it is not absolutely a matter of faith that he is the true Pope. I respond that there are various opinions on this matter. For some hold that the Pope, in the composite sense of the Pontificate, cannot be a heretic, even secretly, and consequently, from the moment he would cease to be Faithful, he would cease to be the Head of the Church and true Pope; but they deny the possibility of heresy entirely hidden from the Church. Others say that, even if secretly heretical, he would still be the true Pope. Others maintain that even if he were manifestly heretical, he would remain Pope until deposed by the Church through a Council. Still others hold that by the very fact of being manifestly heretical, he would be deposed ipso facto. Which of these opinions I judge to be more correct, perhaps I shall say below. Now, setting aside these opinions, I distinguish the major premise: If the minor premise is true, I deny the major; if the minor premise is false, I concede the major and deny the minor. For it is contradictory to persevere in the state of being promulgated and peacefully accepted by the Church once he is actually deposed from that dignity of true Pope and universal Pastor of the Church. Hence, if secret or manifest heresy is posited as incompatible with that dignity, it must be said that, by virtue of Christ’s promise, it cannot happen that a peacefully accepted Pope, in the composite sense, could be secretly heretical, and consequently neither manifestly so. If, however, you contend that such a thing is possible, it must be said that he does not thereby lose that dignity, but actually remains Pope until he is deposed by the Church, or at least until his heresy is made manifest to the Church. For although there may be differing opinions about this, one thing must be held as certain beyond doubt and opinion, namely, that the Church cannot err, either in proposing or in accepting as true Pope one who is not truly Pope. |
| **AN SIT DE FIDE ESSE DE fide propositionem, de qua est quaestio.** |  | **WHETHER IT IS A MATTER OF FAITH THAT the proposition in question is a matter of faith.** |
| **103.** DENIQUE obiicies : Si esset de fide illa propositio : Innocent. XII. est verus Papa : Contraria sententia esset haeretica; siquidem haereticum est negare id quod est de fide : Sed hoc dici nequit, quia gravissimi Authores Catholici tenent contrariam sententiam: Ergo non est de fide, praesertim quoad nos. Minor patet, quia ut videre est in PP. Salmant. *disp. 4. dub. 2. a num. 28*. Cardinalis Turrecremata, *lib. 4. Summae, part. 2. cap. 9. in fine* Caietanus *22. quaest. 2. art. 3. ad 4*. Castro *lib. 1, adversus haereses, cap. 9*. Cano *lib. 6. de locis cap. 8. in resp. ad 10*. Corduva *lib. 1. quaest. 17. §. 2*. Banez *2.2. quaest. 1. artic. 10*. Malderus *in praesent. art. 10. disp. 5*. Araujo *in praef. dub. 2. vol. 2*. Horum verba referunt PP.Salm.ex quibus aperte colligitur omnes istos Authores tenere, contra nostram sententiam, quod non sit absolute, & immediate de fide hunc hominem esse verum Papam : Et hanc sententiam, nostrae contrariam, minime esse haereticam, tenent vel positive, vel negative omnes Authores, qui nostram tuentur: Siquidem aliqui positive affirmant illam non esse haereticam, ut Salm. aliqui eam admittunt ut probabilem, ut Azor. lib. 4. cap. 5. §. In hac controversia : Ergo nostra sententia non est de fide, nec contraria haeretica. |  | **103.** FINALLY, you may object: If the proposition “Innocent XII is the true Pope” were a matter of faith, the contrary opinion would be heretical, since it is heretical to deny what is a matter of faith. But this cannot be maintained, because very eminent Catholic authors hold the contrary opinion. Therefore, it is not a matter of faith, especially for us. The minor premise is evident because, as can be seen in the Salmanticenses [theologians of Salamanca], *disp. 4, doubt 2, from number 28*, Cardinal Torquemada [Juan de Torquemada], *book 4 of the Summa, part 2, chapter 9, at the end*, Cajetan [Thomas de Vio], *22, question 2, article 3, to the 4th*, [Alfonso de] Castro, *book 1, Against Heresies, chapter 9*, [Melchior] Cano, *book 6, On Theological Loci, chapter 8, in response to the 10th*, Córdoba, *book 1, question 17, § 2*, [Domingo] Báñez, *2.2, question 1, article 10*, Malderus [Jan Malderus], *in the present article 10, disputation 5*, [Juan de] Araujo, *in the preface, doubt 2, volume 2*. The Salmanticenses cite the words of all these authors, from which it is clearly gathered that all these authors maintain, contrary to our opinion, that it is not absolutely and immediately a matter of faith that this man is the true Pope. And this opinion, contrary to ours, is by no means heretical, as held either positively or negatively by all authors who defend our view. Indeed, some positively affirm that it is not heretical, like the Salmanticenses; others admit it as probable, like [Juan] Azor, *book 4, chapter 5, § In this controversy*. Therefore, our opinion is not a matter of faith, nor is the contrary heretical. |
| **104.** Ut huic argumento fiat satis, distinguendae sunt sigillatim istae propositiones. Prima : Innocent. XII. est verus Papa. Secunda : Immediate de fide est, Innocent. XII. esse verum Papam. Tertia : De fide est esse de fide, Innocent. XII. esse verum Papam. Prima est directa, secunda primo reflexa qualificativa directae, quia primo reflectit supra directam designando qualificationem illius, nempe, quod est de fide, tertia secundo reflexa, qualificativa primae reflexae. Prima est subiectum praesentis quaestionis primo reflexae, quia primo reflectentes supra illam, de illa disputamus, an sit de fide : Secunda est sententia nostra in quaestione primo reflexa, quae potest proponi ut subiectum quaestionis secundo reflectentis, & inquirentis, an sit etiam de fide. Tertia est decisio, quae posset correspondere huic quaestioni secundo reflexae. Item subiectum primae propositionis est solum Innocent. XII. subiectum secundae est prima propositio, subiectum tertiae est secunda propositio. Haec quidem clare percipiet, qui attente inspexerit praedictas propositiones, proptereaque ita distincte eas discerno, quia video maximam difficultatem praecedentis argumenti consistere in eo, quod facillime arguens, & respondens confundunt, & equivocant unam cum alia, & hac quidem distinctione praemissa. |  | **104.** In order to adequately address this argument, these propositions must be distinguished individually. First proposition: Innocent XII is the true Pope. Second proposition: It is immediately of faith that Innocent XII is the true Pope. Third proposition: It is of faith that it is of faith that Innocent XII is the true Pope. The first is a direct proposition; the second is a first-level reflexive qualification of the direct proposition, because it first reflects upon the direct proposition by designating its qualification, namely, that it is of faith; the third is a second-level reflexive qualification of the first reflexive proposition. The first proposition is the subject of the present first-level reflexive question, because in reflecting first upon it, we debate whether it is of faith. The second proposition represents our position in the first-level reflexive question, which can be proposed as the subject of a second-level reflexive question, inquiring whether it is also of faith. The third proposition is the decision that could correspond to this second-level reflexive question. Likewise, the subject of the first proposition is solely Innocent XII; the subject of the second proposition is the first proposition; the subject of the third proposition is the second proposition. Indeed, one who attentively examines the aforementioned propositions will clearly perceive these distinctions, and I discern them so distinctly because I see that the greatest difficulty of the preceding argument consists in the fact that the one arguing and the one responding very easily confuse and equivocate one proposition with another. With this distinction now established… |
| **105.** Respondeo, distinguendo maiorem : Contraria sententia esset haeretica, contraria, inquam, nostrae, quae est secunda propositio ex annumeratis, seu primo inflexa, nego maiorem : Contraria directae, quae est subiectum praesentis quaestionis, & de qua defendimus esse de fide, concedo maiorem, quia directa est ista : Innocent. XII. est verus Papa, & huic contraria est ista : Innocent. XII. non est verus, sed falsus Papa. Haec autem haeretica est, & haeretica pronunciari potest absque ullo inconvenienti, quia nullus Catholicus eam asseruit, nec asserere potest perseverando in Catholica fide; nam quis Catholicus unquam pronunciavit de Papa praesenti, pacifice electo, & promulgato: *Iste non est verus, sed falsus Papa*? Sane nullus. Si autem sermo sit de sententia contraria nostrae sententiae, nempe, primo reflexe, illa sane non est haeretica, quia contraria illi est ista primo reflexa: *Non est immediate de fide Innocent. XII. esse verum Papam*: Haec autem non est haeretica, siquidem plures DD.Catholici illam docent quin hucusque eam Ecclesia damnaverit, aut proscripserit: Et item, quia nostra sententia, nempe primo reflexa, cui praedicta propositio contrariatur, non est de fide, nec illam ut de fide defendimus; sed solum ut veram, non enim defendimus: *Quod est de fide, esse de fide Innocent. XII. esse verum Papam*, nam haec est tertia propositio ex annumeratis, & secundo reflexa, quam modo non defendimus, sed potius eam falsam reputamus. Sed solum defendimus secundam, non tanquam de fide, sed unice tanquam veram, stat autem, quod sit vera, quin sit de fide, ut per se patet. |  | **105.** I respond by distinguishing the major premise: If the contrary opinion—contrary, I say, to our position, which is the second proposition among those enumerated, or the first reflexive one—were heretical, I deny the major premise. If the contrary to the direct proposition, which is the subject of the present question, and which we defend as being a matter of faith, I concede the major premise, because the direct proposition is this: “Innocent XII is the true Pope,” and its contrary is this: “Innocent XII is not the true, but a false Pope.” This latter proposition is heretical and can be pronounced heretical without any inconvenience, because no Catholic has asserted it, nor can one assert it while persevering in the Catholic faith; for what Catholic has ever pronounced concerning the present Pope, peacefully elected and promulgated: “This man is not the true, but a false Pope”? Certainly none. If, however, we speak of the opinion contrary to our position, namely, the first reflexive proposition, it certainly is not heretical, because its contrary is this first reflexive proposition: “It is not immediately a matter of faith that Innocent XII is the true Pope.” This proposition is not heretical, since many Catholic doctors teach it, and the Church has not yet condemned or proscribed it. Furthermore, our position, namely the first reflexive one, which the aforementioned proposition contradicts, is not a matter of faith, nor do we defend it as a matter of faith, but only as true. For we are not defending: “That it is a matter of faith that it is a matter of faith that Innocent XII is the true Pope,” for this is the third proposition among those enumerated, and the second reflexive one, which we do not now defend, but rather consider false. We defend only the second proposition, not as a matter of faith, but solely as true, for it stands that it can be true without being a matter of faith, as is self-evident. |
| **106.** Est dicere: Haec directa: *Innocent. XII. est verus Papa*, est de fide immediate: Haec autem primo reflexa: *De fide est immediate Innocent. XII. esse verum Papam*, non est de fide, sed solum vera cum magna probabilitate: Haec autem secundo reflexa: *De fide est esse de fide Innocent. &c.* nec de fide, nec vera est, sed falsa: Item contraria primae directae, nempe ista: *Innocent. XII. non est verus Papa*, est haeretica: Contraria primo reflexae, nempe ista: *Non est immediate de fide Innocent. XII. esse verum Papam*, est falsa, sed non haeretica: Contraria vero secundo reflexae, nempe ista: *Non est de fide, esse de fide Innocent. &c.* nec haeretica, nec falsa, sed vera est. |  | **106.** It is to say: This direct statement: “*Innocent XII is the true Pope*,” is immediately of faith. This first reflexive statement, however: “*It is immediately of faith that Innocent XII is the true Pope*,” is not of faith, but only true with great probability. This second reflexive statement: “*It is of faith that it is of faith that Innocent [XII], etc.*” is neither of faith nor true, but false. Likewise, the contrary of the first direct statement, namely: “*Innocent XII is not the true Pope*,” is heretical. The contrary of the first reflexive statement, namely: “*It is not immediately of faith that Innocent XII is the true Pope*,” is false, but not heretical. The contrary of the second reflexive statement, however, namely: “*It is not of faith that it is of faith that Innocent [XII], etc.*” is neither heretical nor false, but true. |
| **107.** Sed replicabis: Non potest esse de fide prima, id est, directa, nisi sit de fide esse de fide: Ergo ruit solutio. Probatur antecedens, primo, quia non potest esse de fide illa directa, nisi sit de fide ipsam esse revelatam: Sed si est de fide ipsam esse revelatam, est de fide ipsam esse de fide, siquidem quod sit de fide consistit formaliter in eo, quod sit revelata: Ergo. Secundo, quia si solum sit probabile, licet maxima probabilitate, quod sit de fide, solum erit probabile ipsam esse revelatam: Sed cum sola probabilitate de eo, quod sit revelata, non potest esse de fide, siquidem non sufficit notitia probabilis revelationis, ut aliquid sit de fide, ut iam definitum est: Ergo. Tertio. Quia ut sit de fide quoad nos, in quo sensu procedit quaestio, illa directa, opus est, quod omnes Catholici teneantur illam credere fide divina, siquidem requiritur, quod sit revelata, & sufficienter proposita toti Ecclesiae tanquam revelata: Sed si non est de fide, esse de fide, non omnes tenentur illam credere fide divina, nam poterunt probabiliter Catholici existimare, illam non esse de fide, & qui hoc existimaverint, non tenebantur illam credere fide divina, siquidem probabili opinione excusabuntur: Ergo. |  | **107.** But you will reply: Something cannot be of direct faith, that is, of primary faith, unless it is of faith that it is of faith: Therefore, the solution collapses. The antecedent is proven, first, because it cannot be of direct faith unless it is of faith that it itself has been revealed: But if it is of faith that it has been revealed, it is of faith that it is of faith, since what is of faith consists formally in this, that it is revealed: Therefore. Second, because if it is only probable, albeit with the highest probability, that something is of faith, it will only be probable that it itself has been revealed: But with mere probability concerning whether something has been revealed, it cannot be of faith, since probable knowledge of revelation is not sufficient for something to be of faith, as has already been defined: Therefore. Third. Because for something to be of faith for us, in which sense the question proceeds, that direct faith, it is necessary that all Catholics be bound to believe it with divine faith, since it is required that it be revealed and sufficiently proposed to the whole Church as revealed: But if it is not of faith that it is of faith, not all are bound to believe it with divine faith, for Catholics could probably consider it not to be of faith, and those who would think this would not be bound to believe it with divine faith, since they would be excused by probable opinion: Therefore. |
| **108.** Respondeo, negando antecedens. Ad primam probationem distinguo maiorem: Nisi sit de fide exercite, & ut quo, ipsam esse revelatam, concedo maiorem: Nisi sit de fide signate, & ut quod ipsam esse revelatam, nego maiorem, & distincta minori eodem modo, nego consequentiam, quia ut sit de fide exercite, & ut quo, directam illam singularem esse revelatam, satis est, quod subiectum illius proponatur ab Ecclesia cum infallibili, seu sufficienti certitudine, ut contenta in illa revelatione universali, *omnis rite electus*, &c. nam eo ipso proponitur illa singularis ut revelata, sufficienter ut credi possit fide divina tanquam divinitus revelata, revelatione obligate, & movente ut quo ad fidem divinam illius singularis directe. Ut autem esset signate, & ut quod de fide ipsam esse revelatam, opus erat, quod daretur reflexa revelatio de eo, quod illa esset revelata, & quod Ecclesia proponeret reflexe, cum infallibili certitudine, tanquam quid adeo revelatum, ipsam singularem esse revelatam; hoc autem ita non proponit Ecclesia, ut per se patet. |  | **108.** I respond by denying the antecedent. To the first proof, I distinguish the major premise: Unless it is of faith *exercite* [in practice] and as that *by which* [*ut quo*] it is revealed, I concede the major premise; unless it is of faith *signate* [explicitly] and as that *which* [*ut quod*] is revealed, I deny the major premise. And having distinguished the minor premise in the same way, I deny the consequence. For in order that a direct singular proposition be revealed as a matter of faith *exercite* and as that *by which* [*ut quo*], it suffices that the subject of that proposition be proposed by the Church with infallible or sufficient certainty as contained in that universal revelation, “everyone who is duly elected,” etc. For by that very fact, that singular proposition is sufficiently proposed as revealed, so that it can be believed with divine faith as divinely revealed, with the revelation obligating and moving as that *by which* [*ut quo*] one comes to divine faith in that singular proposition directly. However, for it to be *signate* [explicitly] and as that *which* [*ut quod*] is of faith to be revealed, a reflexive revelation would be necessary concerning the fact that it was revealed, and that the Church would reflexively propose, with infallible certainty, as something thus revealed, that the singular proposition itself is revealed; but the Church does not propose it in this way, as is self-evident. |
| **109.** Ad secundam, dico, esse medium inter esse de fide illam singularem esse revelatam, & inter esse probabile, nam potest esse certum theologice, ut nos dicimus, aut certum moraliter citra formidinem prudentem falsitatis, ut alij dicunt, & ideo non sequitur, quod notitia solum probabilis de eo, quod illa sit revelata, sufficiat ad fidem illius, sed quod certitudo theologica, aut moralis, excedens probabilitatem, de revelatione illius singularis sufficiat ad fidem divinam de illa, quod hucusque damnatum non est, nec oppositum definitum. |  | **109.** To the second [objection], I say that there is a middle ground between something being of the faith because that particular [proposition] has been revealed, and it being merely probable. For it can be theologically certain, as we say, or morally certain beyond prudent fear of falsehood, as others say. Therefore, it does not follow that merely probable knowledge about whether something has been revealed is sufficient for faith in it. Rather, theological or moral certainty—which exceeds mere probability—regarding the revelation of that particular proposition is sufficient for divine faith concerning it, which up to this point has not been condemned, nor has the opposite been defined. |
| **110.** Sed dices, cum certitudine theologica, aut morali praedicta, non compatitur, quod opinio contraria, quae negat talem directam singularem esse absolute revelatam, sit probabilis, nam contra certitudinem illam non potest esse vera probabilitas: Sed opinio contraria probabilis est, cum tot Authorum calculo confirmetur: Ergo non est certitudo theologica, nec moralis de eo, quod illa singularis sit revelata. Responderi potest primo, negando quod opinio contraria sit probabilis, nam licet illi Auctores illa docuerint, tamen ia nemo audebit eam docere, praesertim postquam omnes Theologi in contra insurrexerunt, & Clemens VIII. teste Petro Hurtado, disputat. 37. sect. 2. incarceravit nonnullos Doctores, iussitque eos sibi praesentari, tanquam supplicio dignos, eo quod contrariam sententiam docuerint. |  | **110.** But you might say: theological or moral certainty, as described above, is incompatible with the view that the contrary opinion (which denies that such a particular directive has been absolutely revealed) is probable, since true probability cannot exist against such certainty. But the contrary opinion is probable, as it is confirmed by the judgment of so many authors. Therefore, there is neither theological nor moral certainty that this particular proposition is revealed. One can respond first by denying that the contrary opinion is probable, for although those authors may have taught it, now no one would dare to teach it, especially after all theologians have risen up against it, and Clement VIII, as attested by Pedro Hurtado in disputation 37, section 2, imprisoned certain doctors and ordered them to be brought before him as deserving punishment, because they had taught the contrary opinion. |
| **111.** Veruntamen haec solutio non placet, quia si propter certitudinem, quam defendimus, de eo quod singularis directa de Pontificatu Innocentii, sit revelata, reiicienda esset sententia illorum Doctorum ut improbabilis, seu ut non probabilis, non solum ut improbabilis, sed ut temeraria, vel erronea etiam reiicienda esset: In illorum quidem Theologorum sententia, qui solam certitudinem moralem agnoscunt de continentia illius sub revelatione universali, esset temeraria, immo, & sapiens haeresim, vel errori proxima, quia contra certitudinem moralem totius Ecclesiae in rebus fidei excludentem prudentem formidinem falsitatis, qui contrarium asserere audet, non solum temeritatis notam, sed alias praedictas notas incurrit. In nostra autem sententia, qui certitudinem theologicam metaphysice infallibilem agnoscimus de illius singularis revelatione, opposita sententia esset erronea in fide: His autem censuris notare tot Illustrium Doctorum sententiam, antequam Ecclesia illam expresse proscripserit, non licet, nec decet. Nec Historia illa Petri Hurtado ullam censuram probat contra praedictam opinionem, nam post Clementem VIII. qui eos Theologos incarceravit, Malderus, & Araujo eandem opinionem docuerunt, quin Ecclesia in illos animadverterit. Alia ergo, ut inquiunt PP. Salmant. in illorum Doctorum punitione, & longe diversa causa intervenit, quam nec investigare libet, nec edere in publicum. |  | **111.** Nevertheless, this solution does not satisfy, because if, on account of the certainty which we defend—that the direct singular proposition regarding the Pontificate of Innocent is revealed—the opinion of those Doctors were to be rejected as improbable, or as not probable, it should be rejected not only as improbable, but as temerarious, or even erroneous. Indeed, according to the opinion of those Theologians who acknowledge only moral certainty concerning its containment under universal revelation, it would be temerarious, nay, even savoring of heresy, or proximate to error, because whoever dares to assert the contrary against the moral certainty of the whole Church in matters of faith—which excludes prudent fear of falsity—incurs not only the mark of temerity, but also the aforementioned censures. But in our opinion, who acknowledge theological certainty that is metaphysically infallible concerning the revelation of that particular case, the opposite view would be erroneous in faith. However, to mark the opinion of so many Illustrious Doctors with these censures, before the Church has expressly proscribed it, is neither permissible nor fitting. Nor does that account of Peter Hurtado prove any censure against the aforementioned opinion, for after Clement VIII, who imprisoned those Theologians, Malderus and Araujo taught the same opinion, without the Church taking action against them. Therefore, as the Salmanticenses Fathers state, there was another and quite different cause for the punishment of those Doctors, which neither do I wish to investigate, nor to publish. |
| *112. Respondeo ergo, hic intervenire magnam aequivocationem, quia illorum Authorum sententia non negat directe, illam singularem,* Innocentius XII. est verus Papa*, esse revelatam in universali illa,* omnis rite electus*, &c. quia non negant illi Authores* Innocentium esse rite electum*. Quod si negarent, mererentur sane censuras praedictas. Solum ergo negant certitudinem infallibilem de rite electione, & consequenter de continentia illius singularis in revelatione universali, sed de eo quod singularis sit re ipsa revelata in universali, & defectu huius certitudinis, inquiunt, singularem illam non esse de fide, non quia sentiant eam re ipsa non esse inclusam in obiecto revelationis universalis, sed quia sentiunt id non esse ita certum, sicut exigitur ad fidem divinam: Negare autem huiusmodi certitudinem, seu potius certitudinis qualitatem, de eo quod sit implicite revelata non est negare ipsam esse revelatam, immo nec hoc relinquere sub opinione, sed solum est negare certitudinem de eo quod sit revelata, exactam ad fidem divinam. Dato ergo, quod illorum sententia probabilis sit, solum sequitur, quod certitudo, seu qualitas certitudinis de revelatione singularis maneat reflexe probabilis, & inter probabiles opiniones, non vero quod revelatio illius singularis maneat solum probabilis, aut inter probabiles opiniones controversa, quia nulla extat opinio probabilis de eo quod singularis illa non sit re ipsa in universali revelata, sed solum est opinio probabilis de eo, quod hoc non sit ita certum, sicut requiritur ut fide divina credatur illa singularis: Licet autem cum notitia solum probabili de revelatione singularis, non stet fides de singulari solum probabiliter revelata; tamen cum certitudine theologica metaphysice infallibili de revelatione stat quam optime fides de singulari ita certo revelata, licet facta reflexione super hanc certitudinem, de illa sint opiniones contrariae probabiles, seu quamvis reflexe solum sit probabilis talis certitudo. Ex quo.* |  | ***112.*** *I respond, therefore, that a great equivocation occurs here, because the opinion of those Authors does not directly deny that the particular proposition,* ”Innocent XII is the true Pope,“\* is revealed in that universal proposition, *“everyone who is rightly elected,”* etc., since those Authors do not deny that *Innocent is rightly elected*. If they were to deny this, they would certainly deserve the aforementioned censures. Therefore, they only deny the infallible certainty concerning the right election, and consequently concerning the inclusion of that particular proposition within the universal revelation. But regarding whether the particular proposition is itself revealed in the universal, they say, due to this defect of certainty, that the particular proposition is not a matter of faith—not because they believe it is not actually included in the object of universal revelation, but because they believe it is not as certain as is required for divine faith. To deny this kind of certainty, or rather the quality of certainty, regarding what is implicitly revealed is not to deny that it is itself revealed, nor even to leave this under opinion, but only to deny the certainty (required for divine faith) that it is revealed. Given, therefore, that their opinion is probable, it only follows that the certainty, or quality of certainty, regarding the revelation of the particular proposition remains reflexively probable and among probable opinions, but not that the revelation of that particular proposition remains merely probable or disputed among probable opinions. For there exists no probable opinion that the particular proposition is not actually revealed in the universal, but only a probable opinion that this is not as certain as is required for it to be believed by divine faith. Although with knowledge that is only probable regarding the revelation of the particular, there is no faith regarding what is only probably revealed; nevertheless, with theological certainty that is metaphysically infallible concerning revelation, faith stands quite securely regarding a particular proposition that is certainly revealed, even though upon reflection on this certainty, there may be contrary probable opinions about it, or although reflexively such certainty is only probable. From which…\* |
| *113. Ad tertiam probationem, dico, quod Theologi illi, qui senserunt, aut senserint illam singularem non esse de fide divina, id senserunt per existimationem reflexam falsam, putantes non dari certitudinem sufficientem de revelatione illius singularis, aut de valida electione, & propterea existimare potuerunt opinione probabili reflexa, falsa tamen, se non teneri ad illam credendam fide divina; ex quo ad summum sequitur, illos ex ignorantia probabili excusari, & non obligari formaliter ad illam credendam, non tamen, quod non obligentur fundamentaliter, quia fundamentaliter obligari est dari re ipsa fundamentum obligationis; hoc autem fundamentum datur re ipsa respectu omnium, quia hoc fundamentum est revelatio illius singularis ut proposita ab Ecclesia cum sufficienti certitudine; hoc autem pacto omnibus proponitur, ut ostensum manet, unde omnes fundamentaliter obligatur, quia Ecclesia ex modo proponendi novum Papam ut pacifice electum cum certitudine infallibili, omnes fundamentaliter obligat, licet aliqui ex probabili ignorantia talis certitudinis non obligentur formaliter reflexe; hoc autem non facit, quod respectu omnium non sit re vera de fide, sed solum, quod non omnes cognoscant illam esse de fide, quia aliqui id probabiliter ignorant. Et iuxta hanc doctrinam potest responderi in forma distinguendo maiorem: Opus est, quod omnes teneantur fundamentaliter illam credere fide divina, concedo maiorem: Quod omnes teneantur formaliter, nego maiorem, & distincta minori eodem modo, ad eius probationem constat solutio.* |  | ***113.*** *To the third proof, I say that those Theologians who have held, or who might hold, that this particular [proposition] is not a matter of divine faith, have held this through a false reflective judgment, supposing that there is not sufficient certainty about the revelation of that particular [proposition], or about the valid election, and therefore they could have believed, with a probable but nonetheless false reflective opinion, that they were not bound to believe it by divine faith. From this, it follows at most that they are excused through probable ignorance and are not formally obligated to believe it, but not that they are not fundamentally obligated, because to be fundamentally obligated means that there actually exists a foundation for the obligation. This foundation actually exists with respect to all, because this foundation is the revelation of that particular [proposition] as proposed by the Church with sufficient certainty. This is, in fact, proposed to all, as has been shown, wherefore all are fundamentally obligated, because the Church, by the manner of presenting the new Pope as peacefully elected with infallible certainty, fundamentally obligates all, although some, through probable ignorance of such certainty, are not formally obligated in a reflective sense. This, however, does not mean that it is not truly a matter of faith with respect to all, but only that not all recognize it to be a matter of faith, because some are probably ignorant of it. And according to this doctrine, one can respond in form by distinguishing the major premise: It is necessary that all be fundamentally bound to believe it by divine faith—I concede the major premise; That all be formally bound—I deny the major premise, and having distinguished the minor premise in the same way, the solution to its proof is evident.* |
| *114. Vel aliter, potest distingui maior: Opus est, quod omnes teneantur exercitè, & ex motivis directis, concedo maiorem: Quod omnes teneantur reflexè, ex cognitione reflexa, nego maiorem, & distinguo minorem eodem modo. Ad cuius probationem, dico, quod qui probabiliter opinaverint se no teneri, cum haec opinio sit reflexa, non tenebuntur ex cognitione reflexa; attamen cum hoc componitur, quod illis proponatur in actu exercito revelatio certi Pontificis cum sufficienti certitudine directa, ut obligentur directè, & in actu exercito, immo ut in actu exercito illam credant fide divina, quia solet cognitio reflexa ex ignorantia probabili contradicere cognitioni directae; & hoc pacto contingere Authoribus negantibus, esse de fide, hunc esse verum Papam, inquit Ioan. à S.Thom. in praesenti, allegans etiam Suarium, his verbis: Non omnes acceptant illam propositionem tanquam materiam de fide quasi speculativè, & figuratè, virtualiter tamen, & in actu exercito acceptant Papam cum tota Ecclesia in regulam supremam fidei, & illi credunt fide divina, unde solum ex ignorantia putant se non credere, quod in exercitio, & actu credunt, & acceptant ut regulam infallibilem fidei, & ita sibi ipsis quasi contradicunt. Haec Ioan. à S. Thom. & merito, nam saepe fallimur in cognitione reflexa, existimantes aliter de statu intellectus, quem habet in cognitione directa, ac re ipsa se habet. Ex quo patet solutio ad sequentem replicam.* |  | ***114.*** *Or alternatively, the major premise can be distinguished: It is necessary that all are bound directly and from direct motives, I concede the major premise; That all are bound reflexively, from reflexive knowledge, I deny the major premise, and I distinguish the minor premise in the same way. To prove this, I say that those who have probably held the opinion that they are not bound, since this opinion is reflexive, will not be bound by reflexive knowledge; however, this is compatible with the fact that there is presented to them in actual practice the revelation of a certain Pontiff with sufficient direct certainty, so that they are directly bound in actual practice, indeed so that in actual practice they believe it with divine faith, because reflexive knowledge based on probable ignorance often contradicts direct knowledge. And in this way it happens to Authors who deny that it is a matter of faith that this is the true Pope, says John of St. Thomas in the present work, also citing Suárez, in these words: “Not all accept that proposition as a matter of faith in a speculative and figurative sense, yet virtually and in actual practice they accept the Pope together with the whole Church as the supreme rule of faith, and they believe him with divine faith. Hence, only out of ignorance do they think they do not believe what in practice and in act they do believe and accept as the infallible rule of faith, and thus they seem to contradict themselves.” Thus says John of St. Thomas, and rightly so, for we are often deceived in reflexive knowledge, judging the state of the intellect in direct knowledge to be different from what it actually is. From this, the solution to the following objection is clear.* |
| 115. Replicabis denique, quia si non esset de fide esse de fide, Innoc. XII. esse verum Papam, nec esse de fide esse de fide eius definitionem, aut rem ab eo definitam: Sed est de fide esse de fide res ab eo definitas, quia de hoc nemo dubitat: Ergo. Sequela probatur, quia per nos non potest dari maior certitudo de definitione Pontificis, quam de veritate Pontificis definientis; inde enim probamus supra, esse de fide Innocent. esse verum Pontificem, quia est de fide eius definitio, & quia definitio non potest esse de fide, quin sit de fide definientem esse legitimum Pontificem: Ergo non potest esse de fide, quod sint de fide definitiones Pontificis, nisi sit de fide, esse de fide, quod Pontifex est verus Pontifex. Respondeo, negando sequelam: Quia definitiones Pontificias esse de fide proponitur ab Ecclesia ut Dogma Catholicum, cum sufficienti certitudine, ut eas esse de fide sit articulus credendus fide divina, & ideo nullus Catholicus hoc in dubium vertit, nec oppositum asserit, saltem de definitionibus Pontificis cum Concilio universali, & in rebus fidei. At, quod sit de fide hunc hominem definentem esse verum Papam, non proponitur hucusque ab Ecclesia tanta certitudine reflexa, quae sufficiat ut sit de fide reflexè, cum permittat Theologos Catholicos oppositum reflexè defendere. Unde ad probationem sequelae, distinguo antecedens: Non potest dari maior certitudo directa de definitione Pontificis,quam de veritate Pontificis, concedo : Maior certitudo reflexa nego antecedens, & consequentiam. |  | **115.** You will finally object: if it is not a matter of faith that it is a matter of faith that Innocent XII is the true Pope, nor is it a matter of faith that it is a matter of faith that his definition, or the matter defined by him [is true]: But it is a matter of faith that it is a matter of faith that things defined by him are [true], because no one doubts this: Therefore. The consequence is proven because, according to us, no greater certainty can be given regarding the definition of the Pontiff than regarding the truth of the Pontiff who defines; for that reason we prove above that it is a matter of faith that Innocent [XII] is the true Pontiff, because his definition is a matter of faith, and because the definition cannot be a matter of faith unless it is a matter of faith that the one defining is the legitimate Pontiff: Therefore, it cannot be a matter of faith that the definitions of the Pontiff are matters of faith, unless it is a matter of faith that it is a matter of faith that the Pontiff is the true Pontiff. I respond by denying the consequence: Because the fact that Pontifical definitions are matters of faith is proposed by the Church as Catholic Dogma, with sufficient certainty that their being matters of faith is an article to be believed by divine faith, and therefore no Catholic calls this into doubt, nor asserts the opposite, at least concerning the definitions of the Pontiff with a universal Council, and in matters of faith. However, that it is a matter of faith that this particular man who defines is the true Pope is not yet proposed by the Church with such reflexive certainty that would suffice for it to be reflexively a matter of faith, since the Church permits Catholic Theologians to defend the opposite view reflexively. Hence, to the proof of the consequence, I distinguish the antecedent: Greater direct certainty about the definition of the Pontiff than about the truth of the Pontiff cannot be given, I concede; Greater reflexive certainty, I deny the antecedent and the consequence. |
| 116. Ex dictis colliges primò, ut tacitae obiectioni satisfacias, non esse de fide, de alio singulari Episcopo, ipsum esse verum Episcopum. Ratio est, primo, quia nullus singularis Episcopus proponitur ab Ecclesia ut res, seu materia fidei, quia nullus proponitur ut regula infallibilis fidei, sicut Summus Pontifex. Secundo, quia licèt sit revelatum, & de fide, futuros in Ecclesia veros Episcopos, & Pastores vagè, & indeterminatè, tamen nec revelatum est, nec de fide aliquem singularem Episcopum, nec Archiepiscopum esse verè talem; nec de hoc extat Ecclesiae definitio, sicut de Episcopo Romano. Ergò. |  | **116.** From what has been said, you may first gather, in order to satisfy an unspoken objection, that it is not a matter of faith regarding any individual bishop that he is a true bishop. The reason is, first, because no individual bishop is proposed by the Church as a matter or object of faith, since none is proposed as an infallible rule of faith, as is the Supreme Pontiff. Second, because although it is revealed and a matter of faith that there will be true bishops and pastors in the Church vaguely and indeterminately, nevertheless it is neither revealed nor a matter of faith that any particular bishop or archbishop is truly such; nor does a definition of the Church exist concerning this, as it does regarding the Bishop of Rome. Therefore. |
| 117. Sed dices, supponamus casum, in quo duo tantum relicti essent Episcopi in universa Christi Ecclesia, sanè tunc esset de fide, sicut modo, esse in Ecclesia veros Episcopos: Sed non vagè, & indeterminatè, quia non essent alij, inter quos esset indifferentia, aut vagitas : Ergò esset determinatè de fide illos esse veros Episcopos. Respondeo, non esse revelatum, nec de fide semper, sine aliqua longa interruptione, permansuros in Ecclesia veros Episcopos in numero plurali, quia de alijs Sedibus Episcopalibus non est revelatum, quod portae inferi non praevalebunt adversus eas, sed solum de Sede, & Cathedra Petriae proindè, adhùc in eo casu, non esset de fide illos duos relictos praeter Romanum, esse veros Episcopos. Et item, quia non esset infallibile non esse in Ecclesia alios, forsan latentes, in quibus Prophetiae, & revelationes verificarentur, quia de alijs, praeter Romanum, non est de fide, quod visibiliter perseverent in Ecclesia. Ac demùm, quia si Ecclesia posset pervenire, vi persecutionum, ad talem statum, quod solum duo Episcopi in illa perseverarent, cur non posset, vi persecutionis, redigi ad unum tantum, nempè Romanum; quod si hoc admittatur possibile: Ergò, non est de fide semper extituros in Ecclesia veros Episcopos in numero plurali, sine ullo temporis intervallo. Recollantur rationes, & motiva, quibus stabilitam relinquimus firmitatem Cathedrae Div. Petri, & ex illis constabit talem firmitatem non convenire de fide ulli alteri Episcopatui. |  | **117.** But you may say, let us suppose a case in which only two Bishops remained in the universal Church of Christ; surely then it would be a matter of faith, just as it is now, that there are true Bishops in the Church: But not vaguely and indeterminately, because there would not be others among whom there might be indifference or vagueness: Therefore it would be determinately a matter of faith that these two are true Bishops. I respond that it is not revealed, nor is it always a matter of faith, that true Bishops in the plural number will remain in the Church without any long interruption, because concerning other Episcopal Sees it is not revealed that the gates of hell will not prevail against them, but only concerning the See and Chair of Peter; therefore, even in that case, it would not be a matter of faith that those two remaining besides the Roman [Bishop] are true Bishops. And likewise, because it would not be infallibly certain that there were not others in the Church, perhaps hidden, in whom the Prophecies and revelations might be verified, because concerning others, besides the Roman [Bishop], it is not a matter of faith that they visibly persevere in the Church. And finally, because if the Church could come, by force of persecutions, to such a state that only two Bishops would persevere in it, why could it not, by force of persecution, be reduced to only one, namely the Roman [Bishop]; and if this is admitted as possible: Therefore, it is not a matter of faith that true Bishops in the plural number will always exist in the Church without any interval of time. Let us recall the reasons and motives by which we have established the firmness of the Chair of Divine Peter, and from these it will be evident that such firmness does not belong, as a matter of faith, to any other Episcopate. |
| **118.** Vel aliter responderi potest, dando, & concedendo, quod in illo casu metaphysico, quo Ecclesia reduceretur ad duos, tantum Episcopos, cum certitudine de non existentia aliorum, fore de fide illos esse veros Episcopos, sicut casu dato, quo soli duo manerent fideles, esset de fide illos esse vere fideles, quia de fide est nunquam defuturos in Ecclesia veros Fideles; & casu, quo certum foret non esse in Ecclesia nisi unam tatum Hostiam consecrataa, de fide esset, quod in illa maneret Christus in vi illius revelationis: *Ecce ego vobiscum sum usque ad consummationem saeculi*. Sed quid inde contra nostram sententiam? Sane nihil. Nec video, ad quid prosit excitare quaestiones, de his casibus metaphysicis, qui certissime nunquam evenient. Unde arguenti a paritate ex his casibus desumpta, responderi potest conditionate distinguendo: Si sit ratio aeque probans in illis casibus, ac modo de vero Pontifice Romano, concedo, quod tunc esset de fide illos singulares Episcopos fore veros Episcopos: Si non sint motiva, & rationes aeque probantes, nego, recusando semper disputationem absolutam, an absolute sint, vel non sint rationes id probantes in illis casibus metaphysicis; quia huiusmodi disputatio solum ad libidinem ingeniorum sustentandam, & ad novitates, aut novas quaestiones inutiles in scholis introducendas, videtur utilis. |  | **118.** Or another response can be given, by granting and conceding that in that metaphysical case where the Church would be reduced to only two Bishops, with certainty of the non-existence of others, it would be a matter of faith that they are true Bishops, just as in the hypothetical case where only two faithful remained, it would be a matter of faith that they are truly faithful, because it is a matter of faith that true Faithful will never be lacking in the Church; and in the case where it would be certain that there exists in the Church only a single consecrated Host, it would be a matter of faith that Christ remains in it by virtue of that revelation: *Behold, I am with you always, until the end of the age*. But what follows from this against our position? Truly nothing. Nor do I see what purpose it serves to raise questions about these metaphysical cases, which most certainly will never occur. Thus, to one arguing from parity drawn from these cases, one can respond conditionally by making a distinction: If there is an equally probative reason in those cases as there is now concerning the true Roman Pontiff, I concede that then it would be a matter of faith that those individual Bishops would be true Bishops. If there are not equally probative motives and reasons, I deny it, always refusing absolute disputation about whether there absolutely are or are not reasons proving this in those metaphysical cases; because disputation of this kind seems useful only for sustaining the whims of clever minds and for introducing novelties or new useless questions into the schools. |